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ABSTRACT
Largely due to colonial experiences and the nature 
of the country's geography and population, Costa Rica had 
a fairly high level of social cohesiveness in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . There was a 
degree of consensus on fundamental questions which was 
unusual in Latin America and, partly for this reason, 
modern political parties, repz'esenting the interests of 
identifiable social groups and fostering partisan politica 
goals, did not emerge<> Thus, Costa Rica, paradoxically had 
a more personalistic political tradition than Latin 
countries whose political systems were, in other ways, 
less mature.
Allowing for the many defects in the country's 
political system, Costa Rica nevertheless was one of the 
more democratic countries in Latin America or anywhere in 
the tropics* The political system was one of representa­
tive, rather than direct, democracy, and it emphasized 
civil liberties and formal participation in the political 
process while tending to restrict actual decision-making 
to a small group. The system v/as maintained intact both 
by the cohesive nature of society and by a considerable 
level of legitimacy resting on a view of national history 
to which many, probably a majority, of Costa Ricans 
subscribed. According to this view— which was part
fiction and part reality— Costa Rica was a tranquil 
democracy, superior to its neighbors in political develop­
ment and in general social well-being.
This traditional system was challenged in the 
1940's by two separate groups, each representing a view of 
society and government different from that of the tradi­
tional system. The first group, headed by President 
Calderon, was dedicated to social reform and, in order to 
further it, resorted to some undemocratic practices. In 
1948 a calderonista-dominated congress nullified the 
presidential election of Otilio Ulate, an influential 
journalist who was the leader of the traditional forces. 
Forced to choose, as he saw it, between two of Costa Rica's 
basic values— peaceful stability and democracy— Ulate 
hesitated and allowed the momentum to pass to -Jos§ Figueres 
who launched a revolution. Ulate acquiesced in the ouster 
of Calder5n but then discovered that Figueres, who set up 
an extra-legal government and enacted his own reform 
program by decree, was also a challenge to the traditional 
order.
In November, 1949 Ulate finally assumed the 
presidency along with a congress controlled by members of 
his party, and Costa Rica's traditional forces appeared 
to have a chance of reasserting themselves. Ulate, 
however, tended to work with, rather than against,
iv
existing legislation when he came to office and thus 
declined the opportunity to undermine the reform movement. 
Little additional progress was made in the field of social 
legislation but Ulate restored a faltering economy and 
began programs designed to spread the new prosperity„
The watchwords of his administration were pragmatism, 
conciliation and democracy, and he worked effectively to 
close social schisms opened in the 19^0's and to rebuild 
confidence in the government.
Despite a generally successful administration, 
however, Ulate and the traditional system he headed were 
unable to meet the challenge presented by Figueres who, 
by the end of Ulate's administration in 1953» had created 
a modern effective political party and used it to change 
the workings of the political system in Costa Rica. Since 
1953 this new party has been the dominant force in national 
politics and traditional leaders seeking office have had to 
rely on the support of widely divergent groups lacking the 
consensus on which the traditional system rested. Repre­
senting the last real chance to restore the old order,
Ulate1s administration offers an opportunity to study the 
dilemma of a conservative in a period of great change.
v
INTRODUCTION
i
The role of conservatives in recent Costa Rican 
history first interested me in 196? when I spent three 
months in Costa Rica doing research for an M.A. thesis 
on the Junta de Gobierno formed after the revolution of 
1948. In the course of my research, I came to realise 
how significantly both the Junta and the CalderSn-Picado 
administration it replaced differed from the political 
pattern of the past. Costa Rica's traditional political 
system placed greater emphasis on social harmony than on 
progress and assumed that the government would maintain 
a low profile in the lives of the people. Sy contrast, 
both CalderSn and Jose Figueres, leader of the Junta, 
were determined men, advocating activist roles for the 
government in support of controversial reform programs.
I wondered how Costa Rican traditional political 
forces, led at that time by Otilio Ulate, had reacted to 
these back-to-back challenges to the established order, 
but no writer, Costa Rican or foreign, had given more 
than passing_attention to the question. In fact, there 
seems to be little scholarly work on the general subject 
of true Burkean conservatives in Latin America. The word 
"conservative" is often used to refer to strongmen 1 
who in reality are reactionaries or, as used in John 
Mander's The Unrevolutionary Society, to describe members
vi
of a wealthy elite lacking in social consciousness and 
interested only in perpetuating static, materialistic 
societies. In neither case, it seems to me, is the 
term "conservative" properly employed.
For these reasons, I was interested in studying th 
response of Costa Rican traditionalists to the modernizing 
political and social changes occurring in that country 
during the turbulent 19^0's, centering the study on the 
19^9-1953 Ulate administration, which immediately 
followed the Junta period and attempted to restore the 
traditional order before new political forces could 
consolidate their hold on the country.
Research for this topic thus grew out of my 
original research in Costa Rica. During that initial 
visit I interviewed Ulate and most members of the Junta 
and had access to the private collections of certain membe 
of the National Liberation Party, A second visit to 
Costa Rica *n 19?^ enabled me to make use of the papers in 
Ulate’s private collection and to talk with a number of 
his political associates and family members.
In this country I have done research in the Latin 
American collections at Louisiana State University and at 
Tulane University's Middle American Research Institute. 
Since moving to Washington in 197^r I have done research 
at the Library of Congress and have had convenient access 
to a number of U.S. government sources, such as the
annual economic reports from the U.S. embassy in San 
Jos§, as well as other materials available in the 
libraries of the Department of State and other U.S. 
government agencies.
Among the many people who have helped with this 
study, a few deserve special mention. I would like to 
thank all those Costa Ricans who gave their time for 
interviews and assisted me in gaining access to useful 
materials. Lie. Daniel Oauber, currently President of 
Costa Rica, was particularly forthcoming and was also 
kind enough to make available to me the unpublished 
transcript of the minutes of the meetings of the Junta*
My discussions with Lie. Alberto Martin, a prominent 
Costa Rican who has maintained the rare position of 
separation from politics since he resigned from the 
Junta in 19^9, were especially thought-provoking. Srta.
Olga Marta Ulate rendered most valuable assistance by 
granting access to her father's papers and by sharing 
her own reminiscenses.
I am also grateful to the Graduate Council of 
Louisiana State University for providing a Field Research 
Fellowship which financed my first stay in Costa Rica.
Thanks are also due to my adviser Professor Jane DeGrummond, 
whose interest in the topic, patience and sense of humor 
greatly contributed to the study.
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CHAPTER I 
DEVELOPMENT OP THE NATION
The Geographic Setting 
Costa Rica* a country of about 19,600 square 
miles and some two million people, lies between Nicaragua 
and Panama. Since Panama was a part of Colombia until 
1903* Costa Rica has historically been regarded as the 
southeastern tip of Central America.^ Costa Rica was 
thus placed in one of the most remote corners of the 
Spanish empire, a fact which significantly influenced its 
developmento
Costa Rican isolation was further encouraged by 
the topography and climate of the country which favored
1 Since the early sixteenth century, Panama’s 
function as a bridge between the two oceans has given it a 
special role in history, quite separate from that of 
Central America. During the colonial period, the narrow 
land of Panama was the chief transit route for goods 
going to and from the Pacific coast of South America. 
Hence, Spain logically placed Panama in the southern half 
of her New World empire— the Viceroyalty of Peru. Costa 
Rica and the four other modem Central American states 
were part of Spain's northern viceroyalty, with head­
quarters in Mexico.
Panama's separation from Central America continued 
in the national period. While Central America broke away 
from Spain, experimented with a federation and split into 
five separate republics by mid-nineteenth century, Panama 
remained a part of Colombia until 1903. Only in the 
twentieth century have limited attempts been made to 
involve Panama in regional affairs, but Panama has 
3hown little interest and continues to follow a course 
largely separate from that of Central America.
1
,the early concentration of the population In an 
inaccessible region, Behind Costa Rica's Caribbean 
coastline is a large, flat alluvial plain with the heat, 
dense forest and heavy year-round rainfall typical of 
much of the lowland tropics. The Pacific coast is more 
varied and has a coastline broken by gulfs and hilly 
peninsulas. The Pacific side also has a more pleasant 
climate, including a dry season in the winter, 'cut the 
region still suffers from the heat of the lowland tropics. 
Between these two lowlands are mountains with 
highland plateaus. The most important is the Meseta 
Central, a basin about forty miles long and fifteen miles 
wide, with a cool springtime climate. Since early 
Spanish settlers considered the lowlands boo hot and 
disease-ridden, they concentrated in the Meseta,*^ Thus, 
the Meseta has been the heartland of Costa Rica and has 
exerted an overwhelming influence on national development.
2 The Meseta Central is actually composed of two 
basins divided by low hills which form the Continental 
Divide, The eastern basin, the Meseta Central Oriental, 
drains to the Caribbean by the Reventazfin River* The 
western Meseta Central Occidental drains to the Pacific 
through the Tarcoles River valley, Leo Waibel, "White 
Settlement in Costa Rica," Geographical Review. XXIX,
No, ij- (Oct. 1939). 531 and 51
3 There was also some settlement fairly early in 
Guanacaste, a cattle-raising region in Costa Rica's Pacific 
Northwest, But Guanacaste was a part of Nicaragua until 
1820 and has had little influence on Costa Rican cultural 
development. Ibid.. 5^7*
3Robert West described the Meseta Central as "truly the 
political, social and economic core— and historically the 
cultural hearth— of Costa Rica*
Demographic History
Settlement in this highland basin did not begin
immediately after discovery in 1502. During his fourth
voyage tc the New World, Columbus touched on Costa Rica's
Caribbean coast and saw Indians wearing gold ornaments.^
His descriptions gave rise to the rumor that the "Rich
Coast,M as it later came to be called, was a land of 
£
wealths Thereafter, Spanish colonists tried to 
penetrate the lowland forests and establish settlements 
on the Caribbean and Pacific sides of the country.
k Robert C. West and John P„ Augelli, Middle 
America: Its Lands and Peonies (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentic e-Hall, 1966), 439,
Leo Waibel agrees, noting that "in the history of 
colonization, we have many examples of the development of 
a whole state from a coastal town; but nowhere else has a 
town lying in the interior highlands, difficult of access 
on every side, exerted such an influence. Costa Rica was 
from the very beginning a 'central' land." "White 
Settlement," 5^2#
5 FernSndez Gudrdia, Cartilla histfirica de Costa 
Rica (San JosSi Imprenta Lehmann, 196 7), 20„
6 In a rather-superficial, book, Thorsten 
Kalijarvi provides the interesting information that 
"Costa Rica" was originally used to describe the whole 
southwestern coast of the Caribbean, while present-day 
Costa Rica was known as "Nuevo Cartago." The current 
names were given about 15^0* Thorsten Kalijarvi, Central 
America: Land of Lords and Lizards (Princeton: Van
Nostrand, 1962), 74.
However, no Spanish settlement was permanently 
successful until Cartago, Costa Rica's colonial capital, 
was founded on the Meseta Central in 156^« One writer's 
theory is that those of European blood were unsuited for 
permanent settlement in the tierra caliente. or "hot 
lands," of the lower altitudes. Writing in 1939* he 
noted that the lower limits of European settlement on 
both the Pacific and Caribbean slopes corresponded 
closely to the dividing line between the climatic zones 
of the tierra temolada (temperate zone) and the tierra 
caliente.^
Some fifty Spanish families settled around 
Cartago. They found that Costa Rica was not rich in 
minerals and the Indians were not of the sedentary sort 
easily adapted for worfc on large haciendas. Probably for 
this reason, very few other Spaniards came to settle in 
these highlands. Thus, many writers say that most Costa
7 Waibel, "White Settlement," especially 535* 
Jorge LeGn noted a similar pattern in 1952i he found 
that two-thirds of the total population still lived in 
the highlands and that "the people of these zones have a 
very high percentage of white blood," Lefin, Nueva 
geografia de Costa Rica {San JosS« Librerla La Espaftola, 
1952), 23 and chart o n 2 ,^
However, with disease-control efforts since World 
War II, a significant number of highlanders have begun to 
settle in the tierra caliente. a development similar to 
that followed in other parts of the Caribbean lowlands.
5Ricans are descendants of this small group of original 
settlers.®
Population grew very slowly at first. It was
more rapid in the eighteenth century\ hut Costa Rica still
had "scarcely 66 ,000 souls'*— the smallest number in
o
Central America— at the time of independence. Despite 
this low figure, population density was high in the 
settled areaso Settlers filled most of the.Meseta 
Central by the end of the colonial period, giving the 
central portion of it one of the highest rural densities
8 John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New 
Yorki Columbia University Press, 19^4), 6 . Oscar 
Schmieder also noted that "the population of Costa Rica 
grew from a nucleus of some 300 square kilometers"— the 
original Cartago settlement area. Schmieder, Geografla de 
America Latina (Mgxico* Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1965),
5951
Schmieder noted that blacks and Indians were also 
attached to the original settlement area but, from all 
accounts, their numbers declined dramatically during the 
colonial period, leaving a population largely composed of 
descendants of the Spanish settlers. The 192? census, for 
example, listed over 80$ of the population as pure white, 
with some 1^$ mestizo, black and 1$ Indian. The next 
full-scale census, taken in 1950, listed "whites and 
mestizos" together and thus provided no further infor­
mation on the number of people of unmixed white blood. 
Schmieder, however, estimated in 1965 that 75% of the 
people were of white blood. See Costa Rica, DirecciSn. 
General de Estadistica de Costa Rica, Censo de poblaciSn.
11 de mayo de 1927 (San JosS* Ministerio de Economia y 
Kac1enda, 1960 ), 90-92; and Schmieder, Geografia. ^98.
9 Ricardo Femdndez Guardia, Costa Rica en el 
siglo XIX (San JosSi Editorial Universitaria Centro- 
americana, 1970), 581. Of these 66,000, the great 
majority lived in the highlands. Some 5,000 lived in 
Guanacaste and several hundred near the Pacific port of 
Puntarenas.
in Latin America— 260 persons per square mile. 10 The
settlement pattern indicated that these were true
pioneers. The spread of settlement did not take place in
waves which left "behind empty areas. It was not directed
by the Crown— there was little of value to the Crown in
Costa Rica. Instead, settlement spread spontaneously into
contiguous land. This pattern of outward movement without
a decrease in the population of the original settlement
area was unique in the Middle American region of Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean, 11
Preston James says that "in all colonial Latin
America there were not many settlers like these” in the
12Costa Rican highlands. With neither significant 
immigration nor commerce, they lived in isolation and 
poverty throughout the colonial period. It is said that
l*i
Costa Rica was the poorest of the Spanish colonies. J 
Land was plentiful but most of the Spaniards did not have 
Indian servants and had to work their own land. For this 
reason, they tended to develop small-sized farms. They 
were farther from Mexico than any other mainland colony
10 Waibel, “White Settlement," 5^ 5<>
11 West and Augelli, Middle America. 440.
12 Preston James, Latin America (New York*
Odyssey, 1959)1 709.
13 Abelardo Bonilla, "El costarricense y su 
actitud polltica," Revista de la Universidad de Costa 
Rica, X (Nov, 195^), 3Sj Jorge LeOn, "Land Utilization in 
Costa Rica," Geographical Review. XXXVIII, No. 3 (19^8), ^44,
?in the viceroyalty and they received little help or 
attention from the government,^ They shared, instead, 
a long period of the sort of "benign neglect” which is 
thought to have contributed to democratic traditions and 
self-reliance in the United States,
This combination of experiences was important in 
shaping the national character. Costa Rica's colonial 
life fostered a degree of individualism unusual in Latin 
America. While Costa Rican writers probably exaggerate in 
claiming that colonial society was c l a s s l e s s i t  does 
seem probable that this sort of environment produced a 
more egalitarian, less rigid class structure than was the 
norm in Latin America.
Costa Rica's insularity continued, to a large 
extent, even after independence. Despite some increase 
in movement to the lowlands, the colonial pattern of 
concentrated settlement in the central highlands was 
maintained. Xn 19^8 two-fifths of the entire population 
of the country lived in the Coffee Belt, a 150-square-raile 
area of the Meseta Central. Throughout the Coffee Belt, 
rural population density was almost 1 ,0 0 0 persons per
1^ Fero&ndez Guardia, Cartilla histSrica. 30-35®
15 Bonilla, "El costarricense39} Eugenio 
Rodriguez, Anuntes para una socioloala costarricense (San 
Jos6* EditoriajT^Iniversitaria, 1953), 99-101.
8T 6square mile. For a small country there have been 
considerable advantages to such a settlement pattern.
It facilitated the building of roads to link the people 
and made public services more feasible, and rural 
children were brought together in sufficient numbers to 
justify the costs of schools, which are lacking in parts
\rj
of rural Latin America even today. ' Costa Rica's
literacy rate, one of the highest in Latin America, may
T _ 3thus be related to the settlement pattern.
Land Distribution and Social Patterns
The nature of Costa Rican colonial society, like 
the settlement pattern, was intricately linked to the
16 LeSn, "Land Utilization," 444,
17 Joseph F. Thorning, "Costa Rica: A Rural 
Democracy," World Affairs. CVIII, No, 3 (Sept. 1945), 177,
18 In 1950 > 78 .767s of all Costa Ricans over ten 
years of age were literate; the literacy rate varied from 
a high of 8Sfo in the Central Highlands to 687$ in the 
southern region of the Pacific lowlands. Costa Rica, 
Direccidn General de Estadlstica y Censos, Areas 
demogrgJicas de Costa Rica (San JosS: Ministerio de 
Economla y Hacienda, 1959)* 16. 46,
One writer has said that Costa Rica's illiteracy 
was the lowest in the Caribbean area. He speculated that 
it was lower than that of any other tropical country in 
the world. Harry B, Murkland, "Costa Rica: Fortunate
Society," Current History. XXII (March 1952)> 142,
9landholding system. Reliable statistics for this early
period are not available but commentators have agreed
that from the mid-sixteenth to about the mid-nineteenth
19century Costa Rican land was widely distributed.
The landholding pattern was said to be the most
egalitarian in Central America, if not in all of Latin
America. It is logical that this should have been the
case, given the small size of the population and the
availability of land, as well as the absence of any
reason to carve out large plantations when Indian
servants were few and commerce negligible. One of Costa
Rica’s leading historians explained!
The cultivation of the soil grew into the 
development of the small property. This 
matter of each one having his owns of not 
submitting to feudal exploitation by powerful 
rulers of the land; and of each one earning 
what he could through his own efforts, explains 
the feeling of equality which developed 
very early. Thus, Costa Rica was a land of 
tillers, of proprietors of small pieces 
of land.20
The distribution of the land during this long 
period left its mark on Costa Rica. Just as eighteenth
19 Among the scholars who have given such a 
description of early landholding in Costa Rica are Waibel, 
"White Settlement," 5^s FernSndez Guardia, Cartilla 
histSrica. 31-35; Biesanz, Costa Rican Life.T22FT James 
L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy. University of 
Colorado Series in Political Science No. 2 (Boulder, 1962.) , 
53» Carlos Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica (San Jos§: 
Imprenta Trejos, 1959) • 129. No writer is., known to have 
contradicted this characterization of Costa Rican land- 
holding during the early period.
20 Monge Alfaro, Historia, 129,
10
and early nineteenth Century land patterns in the United 
States probaoly counted for more than present-day 
patterns in determining the nature of American society 
today, by the same token Costa Rica's early landholding 
pattern seems to have left a cultural impression which 
outlived subsequent changes in the landholding pattern 
itselfo
While modern land distribution is thus of less
concern than thax of the earlier period for our purposes,
it is of some interest. Despite the concentration of
land during the nineteenth century as a result of the
rise of coffee and banana plantations, it is popularly
thought that land in Costa Rica remained widely
distributed*. Costa Rica has been called "a democracy of
21small farmers, each working his own acres," Other
writers described the country as "an agrarian demo- ■
22cracy," Remarking on his country's landholding system
in 1935i Costa Rica's education minister said that "it is
the policy of the government that every Costa Rican
21should have some land of his own," J As if in support of 
that statement, one observer about that time said that
21 Thoming, "Rural Democracy," 172-73*
22 Lawrence and Sylvia Martin, "Four Strong Men 
and a President," Harper * s. CLXXXV (Sept, 19^2), ^25.
23 Teodoro Picado Michalsky, "The School and 
Democracy in Costa Rica," Bulletin of the Pan American 
Union (1933)> 3^6,
11
Costa Rica had the highest percentage of landowners of
Oh
any Latin American country. Another even claimed that
eighty percent of the people owned land, a figure he
believed was unequaled anywhere else in the world
Leading students of Costa Rica and Central America have
made more moderate claims , A number of twentieth century
26scholars, however, also found land widespread and Costa
Rica with "a much higher percentage of landowners" than
27elsewhere in Central America, Typifying these views, 
Chester Lloyd Jones said that Costa Rica had a "highly 
democratic system of landholding which has contributed 
greatly to the stability of the political and economic
24 John Gunther, "Costa Rica, a True Democracy," 
Current History. LII (Dec, 1940), 12,
25 Murkland, "Fortunate Society," 142.
26 Dana Munro, The Five Republics of Central 
America!; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), 142- 
43? and James Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy. 
University of Colorado Series in Political Science No, 2 
(Boulder, 1962), 62-72,
27 Parker, Central American Republics, 2 9 0,
12
life. ”28
Some observers, however, have held that Costa 
Rica's egalitarian reputation was exaggerated. A leading 
social critic of Costa Rica during the 1930's said that 
poor economic conditions were forcing small coffee 
growers in the Meseta Central to sell their land. 
Acknowledging indirectly that land was once widely 
distributed, he predicted that if the trend then current 
continued, "the small properties and village proprietors 
which once formed the basis of our economy will have 
disappeared forever into the mass of day laborers. " - 7  
Other observers a few years later listed "wide land 
distribution,ras an important factor in forming Costa 
Rican society; but they, too, felt that the land was no 
longer so well distributed.-^0
28 Jones, Costa Rica. 12^. Jones felt that the 
1 9 2? census indicated wide distribution of land ownership 
but believed that ownership was actually even more 
widespread than indicated by the census. He said that a 
number of peasant owners had refused to answer census 
questions out of fear the information was to be used for 
tax purposes.
The 1927 census itself expressed a similar view. 
It reported that incomplete instructions to census takers 
had led to misapprehensions about the purpose of the 
poll. Costa Rica, Censo de poblacion de Costa Rica, 11 
de mayo de 1927 (San Jo'sS: Ministerio de Economfa y
Hacienda, DirecciSn General de Estad-fstica y Censos, 
I9 6 0), 86-87.
29 Mario Sancho, Costa Ricat Suiza Centro- 
americaha • (San Jos'S j- Imprenta Tri-buna, 1935) * 35*
30 Biesans, Costa Rican Life. ^0, 22^,
Even writers who claim that landholding is 
widespread in the Meseta have acknowledged that land is 
more concentrated in other regions. For example, one 
observer said that: “the striking social feature" of the 
Coffee Belt is the division of the land into small farmsj 
.but on the Pacific slope he found large farms with 
absenteeism common, and in Guanacaste he found that "the 
cattle ranches, still holding to the pattern of colonial 
days, are disproportionately large.
Census figures fail to provide the definitive 
answer to the question as to whether Costa Rica is a 
nation- .of small farmers or one of concentrated land- 
holding. Table 1, taken from the 195° census, shows that 
small farms were the rule during the mid-twentieth 
century period under consideration here. Of ^3,086 
fineas (farms or estates) listed in the census, seventy
■50percent were between one and fifty manzanas in size.
At the same time, it can be;seen that about one-fourth0 
of the land was held in huge fincas of over 3 ,5 0 0  
manzanas, and much of the remainder was in other large
31 Le§n, "Land Utilization," ^50-51.
32 Small farms were, in fact, probably much more 
numerous than the census figures indicate because Costa 
Rica does not include in the census fincas smaller than 
than one manzana. In 1963 there were some such 
tiny fincas out cf a total of 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 fincas of all sizes 
in the country. See Howard I. Blutstein, et. al„, Area 
Handbook for Costa Rica (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1970), 2 2 7.
farmsa Census figures thus are cited both by those who
point to the large number of Costa Ricans who own land
and those who note the existence of large farms in which
33much of the land is concentratedo-^
Table I
Distribution of' Costa Rican fincas according to size,
1950
Size of Number of Percentage Manzanas
finca in fincas of fincas in fincas
manzanas thi3 size this size this size
all fincas 43,086* 100.00 2 ,592 ,220
1-4 12,004 2 7 .8 291,273
5-9 6,972 16.2 46,524
10-19 6*572 15.3 88,074
20-49 9 ,004 20.9 230,391
50-99 4,703 10.9 309,390
100 -500 3,258 7.6 605 ,803
500-3499 524 1,2 543 *687
3500 or more 49 0,1 688,578
Sourcest Costa Rica", Direcci.on General de Estadlstica
y Censos. Areas demoarSficas de Costa Rica (San Jos£i
Costa Rica, Direcci§n General de Estadlstica y Censos, 
Qenso agro’oecuario de 1950 (San Josl: Ministerio de
EconomSa y Hacienda, 1953), 9, 122.
&
Costa Rican census figures do not include fincas 
smaller than one manzana (approximately 1.7 acres),.
Another way of examining Costa Rican landholding 
is to consider the tenancy pattern— often a factor in
33 For example, the Costa Rican census itself 
glossed over the fairly high percentage of the land held 
in large farms and made much of the fact that most of 
the farms were small, noting that "in all the country- 
only 49 fincas larger than 3. 5QQ manzanas existed." £reas 
demogrSf icas. 17-
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determining both the extent of agrarian unrest and the 
credit facilities available to farmers 0 Figures listed 
in the Tercer compendio estadolstico centroamericano 
show that Costa Rica has a higher percentage of owner- 
operated farms— and a higher percentage of owner- 
cultivated farmland as well— than other countries in 
Central America.J Yet the significance of these 
figures is also open to disputes Costa Rican landowners, 
like those elsewhere, may hire any number of workers to 
assist them. Such owner-operated farms thus may be huge 
enterprises, employing large numbers of landless 
peasants, rather than family-sized farms.
34 The Tercer compendio listed these percentages 
for owner-operated farms:
Costa HI Guatemala Honduras
Rica Salvador
Percentage of
proprietor- 75 .5 3 9 -3 54.9 2 1 .3
operated farms
Percentage of
proprietor- 8 8 .9 81.5 46.7 46.3
cultivated land.
Secretarla Permanente del Tratado General de IntegraciSn 
Centroamericana, Tercer compendio estadlstico centro­
americano . 1 9 6 3. Nicaraguan figures were not given.
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The tenancy figures* however, seem to have some 
significance when considered in conjunction with James 
Busey's examination of worker-farm ratios in Central 
America. By studying the average number of workers per 
economically producing farm— defined as a farm of at 
least thirty manzanas— Busey found that Costa Rica had 
an average of 10,9 workers .on each such farm, as compared 
to 38<>2 for El Salvador, 48.2 for Guatemala and 26.4 
for Honduras. ^ With significantly fewer workers per 
viable farm than other countries in Central America,
Costa Rica presumably has fewer landless peons and a 
higher percentage of landowners.
In light of these facts, what conclusions can be 
drawn about the landholding system which is believed to 
have played such an important role in Costa Rican 
history? First, there seems little doxibt that Costa 
Rican land was fairly widely distributed during the 
colonial and early national period, and thus whatever 
impact the landholding system may have had on society 
was greatest during the country's formative period. 
Concentration of land within Costa Rica’s heartland, the 
Meseta Central, became more pronounced with the advent 
of coffee plantations in the nineteenth century because,
35 Busey, Notes, Table II, 68. Nicaraguan 
figures were not given.
1?
for the first time, land on the Meseta was 
really valuable. A more concentrated landholding 
pattern was also the norm in the regions beyond the 
Meseta, which were slowly developed and brought into the 
national economy during the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Even considering the lowlands 
and the greater concentration of the nineteenth century, 
however, Costa Rica appears to have retained its position 
as the Central American country with the most equitably 
distributed land, a fact which probably contributed both 
to Costa Rica's more stable political history and to the 
more satisfactory state of social well-being at mid­
twentieth century, as indicated in Table 2.
Economic Development
The changes in Costa Rica's landholding pattern 
beginning about the middle of the nineteenth century 
were primarily due to the development of the country's
36 Guanacaste, as we have seen, was somewhat 
developed from early colonial days but was not really 
tied into the national economy until at least the 
nineteenth century. (Until Ulate's administration there 
was not even an all-weather road connecting Guanacaste*s 
capital of Liberia with the Meseta Central. See Chapter 
5). Much of the rest of the Atlantic and Pacific coastal 
regions developed as banana lands, and large plantations 
were the norm, especially during the first decades of 
the banana industry's growth.
Table 2
Central America at mid-twentieth century? Socioeconomic indicators
Population Percentage Life expect- No. of Percentage of . Percentage^-
1950 of urban ancy at birth inhabitants illiteracy in of children
1949-1951 per doctor, population over aged 7-14 )
1957-1960 ten years of attending
age, 195° school,
1950
housing
with
electrical 
lighting, 
1949-1953
Costa Rica 800,875 8 1 .6 Male-54,65'= 
female-57•°5
2 ,7 0 0 2 1 .2 6 1 .7
El Salvador 1,855,917 39,2 male-49,94 
female-52 .40
5 ,8 0 0 57.8 41.1
Guatemala 2 ,790 ,868 3 8 .8 male-43.82
female-43»52
6,400 70.3 24.4
Honduras 1 ,368 ,605 23.7 * a 6 6 .3 24.7
Nicaragua 1,057,023 * * 2,800 , 62.6 25.5
Sources? Organisation of American States, Inter-American Statistical Institute* 
America en cifras, IV, (Washington? OAS, 1964), 26, 85s United Nations, Economic 
Commission for Latin America. Los recursos humanos de Centroamdrica, PanamS y Mexico 
en 1950-1980 (New York, I960), 20, 2 3, 35 * informaiion"not”provided.
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two chief economic activities— the production of coffee 
and bananas. Neither of these crops had any importance 
in the colonial period, however, Most of the people at 
that time were subsistence farmers and engaged in very 
little commercial exchange with the outside world.
Coffee was introduced into Central America only at the 
very end of the colonial period. Costa Ricans soon 
found that the soil and climate of the Meseta Central 
were almost ideal for producing a high-quality product, 
and Costa Rica was the first country in Central America 
to establish coffee as an export crop, sending its first 
abroad in 1925• Coffee almost immediately became the 
country's chief export, a position it has held in most 
years since that date.-^ The government encouraged 
coffee by building a cart road to the Pacific port of
37 Indicative of the state of economic develop­
ment of the Meseta Central during the colonial period is 
the fact that cacao, grown only in a small area along 
the Atlantic coast, may have been the colony's chief 
crop. Cacao was an important preconquest crop in much of 
Central America and it continued to be grown after the 
arrival of the Spaniards. However, the industry declined 
rapidly after the mid-eighteenth century and cacao was not 
grown again along Costa Rica's Caribbean coast until the' 
United Fruit Company began planting there in the early 
twentieth century. Leon, "Land Utilization," ^5^*
38 For example, coffee averaged .almost sixty 
percent of the total value of the country’s exports during 
the decade of the 1930's. Manuel Jimenez, "Coffee in 
Costa Rica,“ Bulletin of the Pan American Union. LXXXIX, 
No. 3 .(Feb, 1?^5), 8b.
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Puntarenas, which was then the outlet for coffee, and by
offering free land to anyone who would put out coffee 
39trees. These measures paid off in the rapid growth of 
coffee cultivation. Visiting Costa Rica in 1 8 3 9, John 
Lloyd Stephens described the coffee growing:
On the top of the ravine we came upon 
a large table of land covered with the rich 
coffee-plantations of San Jose. It was 
laid out into squares of two hundred feet, 
enclosed by living fences of trees bearing 
flowers, with roads sixty feet wide...seven 
years before the whole plain was an open 
waste.1+0
Coffee gave the country its first significant 
source of foreign exchange and, for the first time, a 
chance to escape from the poverty and isolation of 
colonial days. Some of its social effects, however, 
were less desirable. Land values rose and land became 
concentrated in the hands of a “coffee aristocracy" which 
became a powerful social and political, as well as economic, 
force. Costa Ricans write about the formation of a 
"coffee class:"
The men with money were becoming a 
plutocracy. They believed in good 
faith that their interests were the same 
. as those of the country. They truly 
felt that they were the ones who gave
39 James, Latin America, 712.
b0 John Lloyd Stephens, Incidents of Travel in 
Central America. Chiapas and Yucatdn. I. (New York: Dover, 
1969), 352-53.
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life to the country and not vice versa,
They were being converted into a class.
Some say Costa Rica had no real upper class until 
42the coffee boom. Although that seems doubtful, society 
certainly became more stratified as a result of the 
development of coffee plantations. Together v/ith a 
limited number of leading merchants and professional men, 
the large coffee growers remain today the social elite 
of the country.
The need for an east coast exit route for the 
coffee led Costa Rica to undertake the most ambitious 
railroad project in Central America at that time--the 
building of a rail line between the Meseta Central and
41 Hugo Navarro Bolandi, La generacifin del 48: 
.iuicio historico-polftico sobre la democracia costarricense 
(MSxico: Sdiciones Humanismo, 1957), 21-22.
42 Rodriguez Vega, Apuntes, 99-101. In 
Rodriguez' opinion, even the coffee rich were not a rigid 
upper class. He says they were more accurately described 
as "middle class men with money."
Other writers, however, described a more definite 
new class. See, for example, Navarro Bolandi, La 
generacjon del 48, 20-22; and^Alberto P. Canas, Los 8 ^nos 
Xsan Jose; Editorial Liberacion Nacional, 1955)» 9-10-
i
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Costa Rica's Caribbean port of LimSn.^ Among the great 
difficulties involved— the huge expense, the problems 
of building through the tropical forest and down the es­
carpment^- probably the greatest was the shortage of 
labor* Since Costa Ricans still had their aversion to the 
hot lowlands, thousands of West Indian blacks had to be 
brought in.
While the railroad for the coffee trade was under 
construction, Costa Rica developed its second leading 
source of foreign exchange— bananas. Minor C. Keith, the 
builder of the railroad, first introduced bananas 
commercially into Costa Rica's Caribbean lowlands. It 
is said that Keith wanted to insure freight income 
sufficient to warrant continued construction on the rail
if-3 Costa Rica's first railroad line had been a 
nine-mile stretch along the Pacific coast which was opened 
in 1857 * The railroad was immediately dubbed "El 
Burrocarril" because of its two-mile-per-hour speed. 
Although the "Burro" could hardly be called a successful 
venture, there was a cart road connecting the Meseta 
Central with the Pacific coast port of Puntarenas. But 
traffic between the highlands and the Caribbean port of 
limSn— the logical exit route for Costa Rican coffee—  
was possible only by' mule train until Keith's railroad 
was completed in 1890. Watt Stewart, Keith and Costa Rica; 
A 'Siographical Study of Minor Cooper Keith (Albuquerque! 
University of New Mexico, 1964), k~5»
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line-- an unpopular project in much of Ccsta Rica due to
the expense. Costa Rica's first banana exports were sent
to New Orleans in I878 and eleven years later, Keith
and another banana exporter founded the United Fruit 
h.h.
Company.
The arrival of the railroad and banana plantations 
brought the first significant settlement and development 
to Costa Rica's Atlantic lowlands. United Fruit developed 
large plantations back of Limon, and the West Indians who 
had come to work on the railroad stayed on to work for 
the banana company. Their descendants still form the 
majority of the population around Limona
Bananas soon rivaled coffee for the leading place 
in the country’s economy, but the "banana boom" on the 
Caribbean ccast was short-lived. Panama disease, which 
affects the plants' roots, spread through much of the 
Caribbean lowlands of the isthmus in the early part of 
the century.^ By 19^2 United Fruit had abandoned all 
its operations around lim&n and moved to the Pacific coast 
of the country where it has played a major role in 
developing the Pacific lowlandso Stagnant economic
Clarence F. Jones and Paul C. Morrison, 
"Evolution of the Banana Industry in Costa Rica,"
Economic Geography, XXVIII, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 2-3•
^5 Ibid., 5-8 .
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conditions around Limon as the banana company began its 
shutdown in the 1 9 3 0's are considered one of the reasons 
the Costa Rican Communist Party had its initial success in 
this area.^
The history of Costa Rica's relationship with the 
controversial banana company has been something of a 
success story. Costa Rica has been neither as submissive 
nor as truculent in its dealings with United Fruit as have 
many neighboring countries. One possible explanation is 
that Costa Rica's considerable internal stability has 
given her a freer hand in dealing with United Fruit than 
governments in many other Latin American countries have 
had. Another explanation is that Costa Rica is less 
dependent on bananas because of the well-established, 
native-owned coffee industry.
Political Development-, before 1940
Costa Rica's political history, like her social 
development, was a product of colonial experiences.
During the colonial period, Costa Rica was a part of the
46 While the economic decline of the area during 
the 1920's and 1930's thus may have aided the Communist 
movement, United Fruit's final pullout hurt the movement, 
because it dispersed the banana workers and broke up 
Communist-dominated unions.
Captaincy General of Guatemala, a subdivision of the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain. As the least-populated, most 
distant and poorest of the five colonies in the Captaincy 
General, Costa Rica was ranked only as a gobierno at the 
end of the colonial period, while the other four provinces—  
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua— all held 
a higher status.^ However, Costa Rica's isolation from 
viceregal affairs proved to be a great benefit to the 
country in the national period, because it had given the 
colony a tradition of independence and greater freedom of 
action than that found in the other colonies of Central 
America.
Probably because the central government had never 
had much importance for the people, the independence move­
ment was not strong in Costa Rica. In 1521, Costa Rica 
learned that Guatemala had declared independence from
Spain, and after some hesitation, Costa Rica adhered to
48the declaration. The country was then briefly a part of
Lq
the Central American federation. 7 However, this attempt
^7 Parker, Central American Republics, 259*
48 Biesanzry Costa'-gi'can-life'; 9 .
49 Costa Ricans had to choose between the empire 
created by Mexico's AgustSn Iturbide or the Central American 
federation. Most people from the colonial capital of 
Cartago favored the Mexican connection. Those from San 
Jos4— by then, the largest city— preferred to join the 
federation. The question was decided on the battlefield 
where the .josefinos carried the day. As a result, Costa 
Rica not only joined the federation but also it was decided 
that the capital would be moved to San Jos£ where it has 
remained. Accounts of this episode are given^in Canas,
Los 8 3-nos, 7-8,* and Navarro Bolandi, Generacion del 48. 16.
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at uniting all the former provinces of the Captaincy 
General of Guatemala failed, as have numerous later attempts 
to create a single Central Amerioan nation.
Costa Ricans have shown little interest in such 
unions. Perhaps they fear a repeat of the colonial
experience when Costa Rica was the remote edge of the 
<0viceroyalty, or they may remember the early federation 
when Costa Rica was dragged into the quarrels of other 
Central American states. In any event, the desire for 
independence from Central America seems to have been 
stronger than the desire for independence from Spain had 
been. Talking with Costa Rican strongman Braulio Carrillo 
in 1339, John Lloyd Stephens noted this sentiments
50 Thomas Karnes calculates that Costa Rica has 
sent delegates to less than one-third of the approximately 
two dozen conferences called since 184-2 to discuss the 
formation of a Central American federation. While the 
other four countries could form a union without Costa 
Rica, Karnes notes that this is seldom considered and 
thus Costa Rican isolationism has been a major.cause for 
the repeated failure to form a single Central American 
nation. Karnes, The Failure of Union; Central America, 
1824-1960 (Chanel Hills University of North Carolina, 1961), 
243-49.
Costa Rica also was reluctant to join the Central 
American Common Market formed in 1961 because of her fear 
of again being caught on the periphery of Central American 
trade routes and because of a fear of competition from 
countries with cheap labor. Costa Rica agreed to join 
only if Panama were invited to join— but Panama never 
accepted full membership. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Central 
Americai A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University, 
1976), 251-52j and. C. Harvey Gardiner, "Costa Rica: Mighty 
Midget," Current History (Jan. 1 9 6 6), 11-12,
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He was uncompromising in his hostility 
to General Moras-Sn and the Federal Govern­
ment [the Central American federation]. 
and, in fact, it seemed to me that he was 
against any general government, and 
strongly impressed with the idea that 
Costa Rica could stand alone.-5
After achieving full independence in 184-8, Costa 
Rica spent several years struggling against the filibuster 
William Walker who played havoc with much of Central 
America in those years. The Walker episode was one of 
Costa Rica's few experiences with significant foreign 
invasion. It may be that the absence of a tradition of 
insecurity and invasion explains Costa Rica’s low incidence 
of military dictatorship, in comparison with her neighbors 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Costa Ricans political 
history was more stable than her neighbors'. There were
51 Stephens* Incidents of ...Travels I, JoO.
52 James Busey believed that, in the absence of 
a history of invasion, Costa Rica had had less reason 
than Nicaragua to develop a strong, army. Busey,
"Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua," 
Western Political Quarterly, XI, No, 3 (Sept. 1958), 64-9.
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electoral irregularities and attempts against the 
government,  ^but Costa Rica had fewer turnovers of 
governments and her periods of strongman rule were 
shorter and less frequent than was the case anywhere else 
in Central America.
One of the country's few military presidents, 
General Tom&s Guardia, controlled Costa Rica from I870 
until his death in 1882. Although more stable than other 
Central American countries, Costa Rica was not a 
constitutional democracy in that period and Guardia's 
dictatorship was thus unusual only because of its length. 
General Guardia was typical of strongmen in other parts 
of Middle America during the late nineteenth century, 
such as Porfirio D£as of Mexico (1876-1 9 1 1} and Juste 
Rufino Barrios of Guatemala (I873-I8 8 5). Such 
autocrats often considerably advanced their countries'
53 In 1961 James Busey calculated that between 
75 and 100 attempts had been made against the government 
of Costa Rica, of which twelve had been successful. Most 
of the others were minor affairs, often in the comic-opera 
level.
Busey figured that Costa Rica had had from 46 to 
50 different presidential administrations with only two 
presidents holding power for an extended length of time. 
During the same period El Salvador, the Central American 
country usually considered second to Costa Rica in terms 
of social and political development, had had 122 different 
administrations* Busey, T?he Presidents of Costa Rica,"
The Americas. XVIII (July 1961), 60-61.
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material well-being by lessening the power of the landed
aristocracy over the national economy and encouraging
94the growth of industry and commerce.
Basing his actions on the writings of positivism, 
TomSs Guardia seems to have had a considerable commitment 
to his country's economic development, if somewhat less 
to its political evolution*Proof of this commitment 
can be found in his continual efforts to raise money and 
arouse support for the San JosS.-LimSn railroad project 
which he began soon after taking power. At one point, for 
example, Guardia took some of the country's leaders on a 
horseback excursion down the eastern escarpment to point 
out some of the difficulties in the construction and to
96dramatize the benefits to be expected from the rail line. 
Guardia's efforts are of interest, not only because of their 
importance to the rail line, but also because they indicate
54 For a brief discussion of the role of these 
late nineteenth century ■-liberals in Central America, see 
Woodward, Central America, 151-56*
55 Despite his dictatorial tendencies, however, 
Guardia promulgated the Constitution of 1871 which had a 
strong chapter on basic human rights. This document, the 
longest-lived of any of Costa Rica's constitutions, was in 
force until 1948 and used as the basis of discussion during 
the preparation of the current 1.9-49 constitution. RubSn 
Hern&ndez Poveda, Desde la barra: como se .discutio v emiti5 
la constituci-6n polltica de 1949 (San JosSt Editorial 
Borase, 1953), 116-17 *
56 Stewart, Keith and Costa Rica, 39*
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that he felt the need, to gain support of influential 
sectors of the population« Apparently Guardia's control 
was not so complete that he could ignore the opinions of 
leading opponents.
Many writers date the beginning of Costa Rica's
political maturity from the election of 1 8 8 9."^  The
election has been called "the birth of Costa Rica's
civic consciusness’^ ® ana "the first fully free election
in all Latin A m e r i c a . I n  that year President Bernardo
Soto guaranteed that freedom of the press would be
respected, and the election was preceded by an active
campaign. After some hesitation, Soto then yielded power
60to the victor, although he had backed another man,
The election of 1889 was important in Ccsta Rican 
political history because it roughly marked the beginning 
of popular interest in politics and signaled an increasing 
role for public opinion in the political process. The 
significance of the date should not be exaggerated. Costa
57 Claudio Gutierrez Carranza, irEnsayo sobre las 
Seneraciones costarricenses 1823-1953,’* Revista de la 
Universidad de Costa Rica, X Nov. 195*0, 57*
58 Bonilla, "El costarricense, "
59 James, Latin America, 72h.
60 A show of force in support of the winning 
candidate helped the president decide to accept the 
election results. Canas., Los S anos, 10-11,
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Rica, like most other countries, remained in the hands
61of "los de arriba,” hut a large step had "been taken
toward participatory democracy and peaceful transition
of governments.
Some Costa Ricans have called the years from I889
to about 19^0 the "Age of Gold” in their country's
82political history. It was during this period that the 
country gained the reputation for being democratic and 
tranquil— the "Central American Switzerland" described in 
Costa Rican songs. Like many popular nations, this view 
had some basis in fact. The country was more peaceful and 
forward-looking than most Latin countries. Basic human 
rights established in the 1371 constitution were generall 
respected. Literacy increased rapidly as a result of 
late nineteenth century laws which provided for free, 
compulsory education. A sizeable middle class developed 
in urban areas.
This was also a period of considerable stability. 
The number of violent attempts against the government
6l Three quarters of a century after 1889, Daniel 
Goldrich pegged the children of "los'.de arriba"— the 
"upperdogs"— as those still mcst likely to inherit political 
power in Costa Rica. Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment; 
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicago-! Rand 
McNally, 1.9&&), 2,
62 Canas, Los S anos, 11.
**;
2
32
62declined after 1889■ Popular interest in political 
affairs was high: It has been estimated that about four- 
fifths of the registered voters cast ballots in an
n ii-
average presidential election during this period. Yet 
most elections were non-competitive in nature. Without 
having to resort to violence, the "coffee elite" could 
generally determine presidential candidates. The
6 *5president played a large role in selecting his successor, J 
and with his support, a candidate could usually line up 
wealthy men who would sign bank notes for campaign 
expenses. Once the president and the country's leaders 
cast their lot with a candidate, his victory was virtually 
assured, although he usually faced one or two minor
63 In 1961 Busey calculated that only two of the 
21 administrations since I889 had secured power clearly 
by force, (There have been no successful attempts against 
the government since 3usey wrote.) Prior to 1889, he 
figured that seven of 25 administrations had taken power 
by force. Busey, "Presidents,” 60.
6k El Diario de Costa Rica, July 2k, 1953- B1 
Diario thought that about”one-fifth of Costa Rica's total 
population was registered for an average election between 
I889 and 1953 and that around eighty percent of those 
registered voted.
65 Burt English says that "as a general rule, 
each outgoing president ’willed* the political and 
economic support that had kept him in office to a 
successor who then used that support to win a controlled 
or influenced election.” English, LiberaciSn Nacional 
in Costa Rica (Gainesville, University of Florida, 1969)
7-
opponents at the polls.
The system thus tended to restrict political 
leadership positions to men who were members of, or had 
the support of, the wealthy class. The determining
factors in politics, one writer said, were "money and
66the more or less frank sympathy of the Government."
In a bitter critique of his country's politics, Mario
Sancho observed in 1935:
Anyone today who aspires to run for congress 
and doesn't have eight or ■sen thousand col ones 
with which to fatten the purse of the party, 
or, failing that, the protection of^a rich 
man, is dreaming of the impossible. {
Once in office the president had few institutional
checks on his power. The constitution tended to
concentrate power in the executive. Local government
was weak; congress was not completely subservient, tut
the president could usually make his writ run. One
Costa Rican observer, looking back on the system in effect
under the 1871 constitution, characterized it as "republican
66 Sancho, Suiza Centroamericana, Jj-9-50*
67 Ibid., 5 6 . The coldn is the Costa Rican 
currency.
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68Louis XlVism." Yet none of the presidents of these 
years— except during one authoritarian interlude in 1917- 
1919— overstepped the bounds of custom to rule by fiat.
The country's conservative traditions and cautious approach 
toward political and social problems may have acted as an 
unwritten check on the president. Another check was the 
free press which was increasingly influential as literacy 
rates and newspaper circulation figures rose. The 
opposition papers took their watchdog role seriously and 
were often outspoken in their criticism of the government. 
Still another factor discouraging strongman rule was the 
influence of the country's other political leaders for 
whom the president was no more than primus inter pares.
In a small, isolated country where everyone seemed to 
know the president, social and political pressures could
68 Rodrigo Facio, "La constituciSn polltica de 
19/4-9 y la tendencia institucional," Revista de la Univer- 
sidad de Costa Rica, XIII (July, 1956)> 100, Russell 
Fitzgibbon, however, noted in 19^1 that:
Most Costa Rican presidents have been able 
to exercise a considerable influence over 
their government; but in that country, 
government falls far short of approximating 
the one-man institution which exists for all 
practical purposes in the other four states 
[of Central America.
Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Executive Power in Central America," 
The Journal of Politics, III, No. 3 (Aug. 19^1). reprinted 
in Asher N. Christensen, (ed,), The Evolution of Latin 
American Government (New York: Henry Holt," 1951)> 413*
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be very real. It was expected that the president would 
move forward only along lines on which there was general 
agreement.
The penalty for failure to play the game by the
rules was illustrated in 1917 when President Alfredo
GonzSles Flores was ousted by his Minister of War
Federico Tinoco— one of only two occasions since I889
in which a Costa Rican administration has seised power
69clearly by force a 7 Gonz&les had violated several
traditions# He had tried to impose a direct income tax
opposed by most of the country's elite and he had
alienated public opinion by restricting freedom of speech 
70and the press. Tinoco, however, also violated tradition
by setting up what one writer calls "the only true
71dictatorship that Costa Rica has known.” Unable to
69 The other was the Junta de Gobierno which came 
to power in 19^3• Busey, "Presidents," 60,
70 Canas blames Gonz&lez1 downfall on the elite, 
noting that "for the aristocracy of San Jos£, he was a 
vulgar provincial who, to top all evils, had decided to 
levy a tax on them." Canas,■ T jo s  8  Anos, 1 2 .  Navarro 
Bolandi is even more adamant; "The dictatorship of the 
Tinoco brothers [Federico Tinoco's brother was his chief 
adviser] was a direct consequence of the power and affairs 
of the oligarchy: the only cause for the coup d'etat was 
the direct tax." Navarro Bolandi, Generaci-on deT™4-8, 55*
Jones, however, considers popular resentment of 
GonzSlez' undemocratic ways the major reason for his 
ouster. Jones, Costa Rica, 26-27.
71 Canas, Los 8 Anos. 13 .
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secure recognition from President Woodrow Wilson and 
faced with internal opposition, Tinoco was forced to resign 
in 1919> ending an unusual and unpleasant episode.
In contrast to Tinoco, most of the leaders of this
period at least aspired to the ideals which the election
of 1889 represented for the country— free speech, orderly
72government and indirect democracy. A number of the 
presidents in this so-called "Generation'of 1389" were men 
of great ability, including two popularly known as the 
"Olympians" because they were- sc highly regarded in Costa 
Rica. These were Cleto Gonzalez Viques, who served as 
president from 1906 to 1910 and 1928 to 1932, and Ricardo 
JimSnez, who served three terms— 1910-191^1 192^-1928, 
and 1932-1936. Under the leadership of such men, the 
political system was able to adjust to considerable 
change in the environment and during the 1920's and 1 9 3 0's 
a number of progressive measures, most of them centering 
around labor regulations, were enacted
72 Rodrigo Facio described the leaders of the 
"Generation of 1889'* as "philosophically liberal, 
socially conservative, intellectually brilliant and 
constitutionally and temperamentally personalistic.”
Facio, "La constitucion poL£tica," 110.
73 For a listing of early social and labor 
legislation, see "La polftica s o c i a l Surco, IV (May- 
June, 1944),
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A Reform Party founded in the 19201g urged a much
faster pace of social and economic reform but had only
7Z1
limited success. ' The level of public support was
still fairly high for the traditional style of government
with its small-steps approach to reform, and while the
Generation of 1389 continued to enjoy this kind of backing,
bold action was unlikely.
As the Reform Party declined in influence, the
issue of social reform was championed by the Communist
Party founded in 1929 by a young law student, Manuel 
7 5Mora0' The Communist Party was probably Costa Rica's
74 The Reform Party never won the presidency 
but played a significant role in dramatizing social 
problems. The movement suffered when its leader Jorge 
Volio lost credibility after the election of 1924 which 
had to be decided by congress when none cf the three 
candidates— Volio, Ricardo Jimenez and Alberto Echandi—  
received an absolute majority. In maneuvering reminiscent 
of the Adams-Clay-Jackson "corrupt bargaining," Volio 
threw his support to JimSnez and thus deprived Echandi, 
generally regarded as the rightful winner, of the presidency. 
Fernandez Guardia, Cartilla historica, 140; Navarro 
Bolandi, Generacion del 48, 64~
It was indicative of the still incomplete develop­
ment of Costa Rican democracy that a number of Echandi's 
supporters suggested he launch a revolution. He is 
supposed to have replied that "the presidency is not worth 
one drop of Costa Rican bloodo” A number of Costa Ricans 
have commented on the difference between Alberto Echandi's 
qudefc acceptance of the congressional verdict and the 
more scrappy political style of his son Mario who later 
served as president from 1958 to 1962.
75 Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin 
America (New Brunswickj Rutgers University, 1957). 38^°
first permanently functioning, ideologically based
76political party. Mindful of its tenuous position 
within conservative Costa Rica, the party maintained 
a moderate line and emphasized economic issues. Mora 
acted as something of a gadfly, trying to arouse popular 
sympathy by criticizing the government in terms Costa 
Ricans could accept. For example, ridiculing both, his 
country's economic and political systems, Mora once 
commented that "we don't have a lot of bread here, but 
then we have no shortage of circuses,"^
■The party achieved its first major success in 
1933 when Mora was elected to congress. The following 
year, the party scored another victory by organizing a
?6 Most parties were ad hoc arrangements rushed 
together to support a single presidential candidacy and 
then disbanded. Among those commenting on the then 
personalistic nature of Costa Rican politics and the 
lack of permanent parties is Charles Proctor, "Political 
Systems," in Charles P. Loomis (ed.), Turrialbai Social 
Systems and the Introduction of Change (Glencoe; Free 
Press, 1953) 220-22.
77 Mora quoted in Sancho, Suiza centroamericana,
'zn 
j  1 *
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large-scale strike among United Pruit Company workers
rpQ
along the Caribbean coast. During the strike,
President Jimenez met with Mora, had a frank discussion 
with him, and afterwards ordered United Fruit to negotiate 
with the banana workers.*7^
78 Costa Rica, with a small internal market and 
poor mineral and fuel resources 1 has little industry and 
could hardly be said to have a cohesive or conscious 
industrial working class— a fact which helps to explain the 
historical weakness of the labor movement in Costa Rica, 
particularly on the Meseta Central. Costa Ricans on the 
Meseta have shown little interest in unions and most of 
those formed soon folded because so few people attended 
the meetings*■ 3y the 1930's lowlands banana workers came 
closest to representing a Costa Rican proletariat and it 
was here that the labor movement achieved its first 
success and has traditionally been strongest.
The labor movement in the lowlands was dominated 
by the Communist-oriented Confederacion de Trabajadores 
de Costa Rica formed in 1943• Reform-minded members of 
the Costa Rican clergy,disturbed by the Communist 
orientation of the confederation, formed a rival 
Catholic-oriented labor confederation in 1945* The 
Communist labor confederation was dissolved by law in 
1948 and, for a time, the Catholic organization was the 
largest in the country, but it largely merged its member­
ship and organization with that of the National Liberation 
Party in the 1950's and, in the opinion of many observers, 
labor lost out in the merger. By the 1960’s, Charles 
Denton saw a "stark picture" for organized labor, with 
only one collective bargaining contract in force anywhere 
in the country. For discussions of the Costa Rican 
labor movement, see Denton, Latin American Politics; A 
Functional Approach {San Francisco: Chandler, 1972),
137-33b ' Alexander, Communism, 383-390. The Catholic- 
oriented labor confederation describes its objectives in 
Ccnvencion Rerum Novarum, No, 1 (May 1, 1945), 1-4.
79 Alexander, Communism. 384-85*
JimSnez' response was interesting in that it showed 
that the country's conservative leadership, while deploring 
the existence of the Communist Party and occasionally 
seeking to limit its activities, had made the more or less 
conscious decision to permit the Communists to take part 
in the life of the country. The Communist Party's slowly 
growing strength, however, was symptomatic of the fact that 
segments of the population felt that the country's political 
system was no longer providing a satisfactory answer to 
"basic problems. These segments included members of the 
middle class who felt the lack of economic opportunities 
in a country still largely run by the "coffee elite;" also 
holding this view were portions of the working class, 
particularly coastal banana workers who had been politicized 
by the Communist-dominated labor movement in that region.
Class antipathies were not strong in.the country as 
a whole, however, and the government probably would have had 
a fairly good rating on a legitimacy scale. Despite pressure 
for wider political and economic opportunities, Costa Rica’s 
traditional system might therefore have been maintained 
intact for some time longer had it not been for a reform 
movement directed from above which began during the 19^0 's 
and proved to be a more serious threat than either the 
Reform Party or the Communist Party.
CHAPTER II 
ULATE * 3 EARLY YEARS
Family and Early Life
Just two years after the watershed election of 
1889, Otilio Ulate Blanco1 was "bora in the town of 
Alajuela, capital of the Costa Rican province of the 
same name, on August 25, 1891, He was the only son of 
Ildefonso Ulate, whose ancestors were from Spain, and
1 Much of the information on Ulate*s early life 
comes from interviews with him in San JosS on July 27 and 
28, 1967 and from several interviews with his daughter, 
Srta. Olga Marta Ulate, in San Jos6 in June, 1974, Also 
helpful was "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate,** a tape-recorded 
collection of reminiscences prepared by friends and 
political associates after his death in 19?3<»
2 El Diario de Costa Rica. Feb„ 6 , 1948 and 
Nov, 8, 19^9; "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate.H A number of 
sources have given various incorrect dates for Ulate*s 
birth. The Costa Rican embassy in Washington believed it 
was 1892, and a U,S0 government reference source listed 
it as I897, Other reference works— Who*s Who in Latin 
America and Encyclopedia of Latin American History— gave 
1&95 and in 19^9 the New 2ork Times gave his age as 54, 
also indicating an 1895 date. At the time of Ulate*s 
death in 1973• however, the New York Times gave his age 
as 8 2, which would indicate an 1&91 date, it seems 
logical to accept 1891 * the date given by Ulate's El 
Diario and the "Homenaje,” as correct.
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kz
Ermida Blanco, the daughter of a French immigrant who 
had settled in Costa Rica and opened a retail shop,^ 
Although he was known as Otilio from birth, Ulate*s true 
baptismal name was Luis Emilio Rafael, a fact later noted 
by political opponents who half-seriously charged that 
the man could not be trusted because he used a false 
name. As they put it, "His name is not *Otilio® and he 
is neither an 'Ulate' nor a 'Blanco.*1* This frivolous 
charge was based on Ulate9s use of the nickname "Otilio" 
and on spelling changes which his forebears had made in
h,
his paternal and maternal surnames,
Ulate*s birthplace of Alajuela lies about fifteen 
miles from the national capital San Jos6 , in the 
northwestern comer of the Meseta Central. Although he 
was not from San Jos€, Ulate did not grow up in isolation 
from the life of the capital,, The difference between the 
cultural level of the national capital and that of the 
rest of the Meseta Central was not as great as the gap
3 Orlando Cato, "Un periodista a la presidencia 
de Costa Rica," El Diario de Costa Rica. Nov. 8 , 1949.
4 Ulate's paternal great-grandparents had
changed the spelling of the Spanish family name "Eulate"
to "Ulate." Soon after his arrival from France, Ulate's 
maternal grandfather had also changed his name from
*Le Blanc" to "Blanco," probably in an effort to pave 
the way for his acceptance into nineteenth century Costa 
Rica's insular society, ' Olga Marta Ulate interviews.
Those unfamiliar with Spanish surname usage
should note that two surnames are normally used— the 
father's last name (here, Ulate) followed by the maiden 
name of the mother (Blanco).
h3
between capital and countryside In most Latin American 
countries. Due to the Meseta's small size and the high 
population density throughout the region, the major towns 
were not isolated communities separated by desnoblado 
areas> as is the case, for example, in northern Mexico, 
Traffic between the four chief towns of the Meseta (San 
JosS, Alajuela, Heredia and Cartago) was regular, and 
personal and cultural contacts were frequent during the 
years when Ulate was growing up in Alajuela,
In 1891, the year of Ulate*s birth, the railroad 
between San JosS and the Caribbean port of Li.mdn was 
completed, greatly facilitating the Meseta Central's 
coffee trade, Alajuela was surrounded by coffee 
plantations and, just to the west of the town, lay the 
country's chief sugar cane planting region,-7 so that the 
town was a convenient market point. At the turn of the 
century, the town had only a few thousand inhabitants,^ 
but it was one of Costa Rica's more prosperous cities
5 Preston E, James, Latin America (New Yorki 
Odyssey Press, 1959), 713-l4,
6 According to the 1927 census, the city of 
Alajuela had a population of 6,707, and the total 
population of the province of Alajuela was 97,577* The 
last census before 1927 had been taken in 1892, when the 
provincial population totaled 57,203* If the city 
population is calculated as growing at the same rate as 
that of the province as a whole, then the city of 
Alajuela had a population of just under if-,000 around the 
time of Ulate*s birth. See Costa Rica, DirecciSft 
General de Estadlstica y Censos, Censo de poblacifin de 
Costa Rica, 11 de mavo de 1927 (San Jos6 1 Ministeriode 
Economia y Hacienda, I960), 36, 6 1,
and had a number of wealthy families,
Ulate was born into a middle class family that 
was neither wealthy nor especially prominent socially. 
This was a somewhat unusual background for a future 
president of Costa Rica* a provincial country in which 
public life was largely managed by a small group whose 
relationships had an almost familial quality about them. 
Ildefonso Ulate, Otilio*s father, was a telegraph 
operator who briefly served as a lieutenant in the Costa 
Rican army. He made an unsuccessful bid for election as 
a deputy to the legislature from Alajuela.(Family lore 
has it that the election was handled unfairly and he was 
"robbed" of victory). Shortly after that, Ildefonso
Q
Ulate apparently suffered a mental breakdown. He died
around 1908, leaving little money for his widow, his son
Otilio, and a young daughter named Lidy, who died
o
several years later.7
7 Charles Denton thinks the pattern is little 
changed today. He argues that the country*s public 
school system is used to inculcate obedience in lower 
class children, while children of the "prestige" class, 
who attend private schools, are made to feel they have 
a right to share in the political process and to make 
demands on the political system, Ulate's family would 
have been marginal members of the very small prestige 
class, as Denton defines it. Charles Denton, Patterns 
of Costa Rican Politics (Boston* Allyn and Bacon, 1971) 
90-100.
8 Olga Marta Ulate interviews.
9 "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate."
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Otilio Ulate attended primary school and 
secundaria— roughly equivalent to a middle school— at the 
Instituto de Alajuela and then enrolled in the Liceo de 
San JosS, a high school in the capital* After his 
father*s death, however, Ulate felt he should not 
continue in school while his mother, who had a small 
clothing shop, took in sewing and sometimes worked all 
night, For this reason, he left the Liceo 'oefore his 
last year and never earned a high school degree, With 
little formal, education and no financial hacking when 
he hegan his career, Ulate*s later successes proved him 
to he, as Costa Rican historian Ricardo Fem&ndez Guardia 
said, "a perfect example of what is called in English a 
self made mano"^’
Ulate*s family does not seem to have played a 
great role in his life, perhaps because his father and 
only known sibling died while he was young, Possibly the 
family member with whom he had the closest relationship 
was a daughter, Olga Marta Ulate, Otilio Ulate never 
married, but he had a long-term relationship with Olga's 
mother and recognized his children, Olga was especially
10 Cato, wUn periodista,"
11 Ricardo FernSndez Guardia, HE1 nuevo 
presidente,* El Diario. Nov, 8 , 1949*
k6
interested in politics, and he involved her in political 
matters and sometimes took her on trips abroad.
Olga had a stabilizing influence on Ulate, a man 
of mercurial temperament. He had a great enthusiasm for 
whatever he was doing, a .ioie de vivre. and was jovial 
and liked parties, Ulate is remembered with fondness at 
his favorite "watering holes" around San JosS, particu­
larly the dining room of the Hotel Europa where he often
12spent an evening relaxing with friends. Ulate's 
personality was very different from that of his onetime 
political ally, JosS Figueres, a difference which may 
have contributed to the antagonism which eventually 
developed between the two men.^
Despite his usually expansive nature, Ulate was 
moody and sensitive to slights, of which there was no 
shortage during a long political career. He was capable 
of considerable compromise! but where he perceived points 
of honor to be involved, Ulate had the Spanish 
aristocrat's sense of hidalguez. He was inclined to put
12 The desk manager of the Hotel Europa, for 
example, seemed to take great pride in telling this 
writer that "this was Ulate's favorite place in town, and 
he was often here,"
13 Although very pleasant in personal dealings, 
Figueres is a rather strait-laced man who, for example, 
once insisted that ice water rather than champagne be 
used to toast his incoming administration. See Judy 
Oliver, "Twelve Who Ruled in Costa Rica* The Junta of 
19^8" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1963), 23.
k?
principle above financial and other considerations, a 
tendency which led to the break-up of several profitable
Ik
business relationships# In fact, it is doubtful 
whether he would have been able to launch a successful 
career as a journalist had it not been for his unusual 
creativity and his fiery, moving style of 'writing#
Journalism Career 
Julio Suflol, Ulate*s young friend and protege in 
the newspaper business, says that "Otilio Ulate had the 
two great Latin passions— politics and journalism,"1  ^
both of which had interested him from his early days# 
While he was a student, Ulate and a group of classmates 
published a weekly school paper. When he decided to 
drop out of the Liceo in order to help his mother, he
1^ Ulate*3 onetime business associate Julio 
Suflol relates that Ulate refused President Figueres' 
offer of reimbursement by the Junta government for damages 
to his finca La Vieja during the 1948‘ revolution, saying 
that "where there is payment, there is no glory#"
Interview with Julio Suflol, San JosS, June 5» 197^# (The 
government did reimburse citizens, including the members 
of the Junta, who had suffered financial losses as a 
' result of the revolution#)
Olga Marta Ulate corroborates Suflol *s story and 
also recalls that in 19^8 a group of cattlemen formed a 
cooperative society to help save La Vieja from financial 
ruin# The cattlemen, however, supported Mario Echandi in 
the 1970 elections and, when Ulate refused to back 
Echandi, the society broke up and Ulate was left with ^00 
manzanas of his formerly 1.000-manzana farm# It is also 
said that Ulate broke up a newspaper partnership over a 
disagreement in principle#
15 Suflol interview#
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was drawn to the newspaper business* He began in
Alajuela where his first job was that of rolling
l6newspapers by hand, but he eventually found a position
as a reporter in San JosS*
San Jos6 was an exciting place in which to begin
a journalism career in those days* Costa Rica had a long
tradition of freedom of the press, and governments
generally honored it, although there were occasional
17attempts to exert official pressure on the media* In
-6  SI Diario. Feb* 6 , 1948 and Nov* 1, 1949.
1? Among the many writers who have commented on 
the freedom of the press in Costa Rica in this period are 
Biesanz, Costa Rican Life. 340s and Jones, Costa Rica. 3 3. 
James Busey somewhat later also found that*
Insofar as press freedom is concerned, there 
can be no question that Costa Rican journalists 
write as they please— often with a smaller sense 
of responsibility than might be desired, but 
certainly free of all official control or 
influence*
James Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder 1 
University of Colorado Series in Political Science No* 2 , 
1962), 35.
Despite the general pattern of a free press, 
however, there have been a number of incidents involving 
government pressure on the newspapers* For example,
Marvin Alisky noted that the Inter-American Press 
Association stepped in when President Jos6 Figueres 
attempted to reduce press criticism during the invasion of 
1955* Ulate*s papers La Hora and El Diario were among 
those which the government briefly subjected to censorship. 
See Marvin Alisky, "The Mass Media in Central America," 
Journalism Quarterly. XXXII (Fall 1955)» 481*
1*9
addition, newspaper writers fcnew They could have a real
impact on public affairs because the country had one of
the highest literacy rates in Latin America* Costa Rica
also had the highest proportion of newspaper readers in
Central America and, despite having the smallest
population of the five countries, Costa Rica had the
18largest press circulation* This led to a proliferation 
of newspapers in the capital, although— as is often the 
case in Latin America— there were few in the rest of the 
country*
Newspapers opened and folded fairly often, but 
there were usually several San JosS dailies operating at 
any given time, just as there are today* The different 
papers covered a wide range of editorial opinion, but all 
devoted a great deal of space to political developments, 
often carrying the full text of lengthy speeches, 
congressional debates or letters to the editor.
Most papers were closely identified with one 
political party or politician, and their coverage was 
usually biased. Their * examinations'* of political issues 
often turned on petty points, and sometimes boiled down 
to nothing more than personal quarrels or vendetta. Yet 
most of the papers were willing to accept advertisements 
from their political enemies and often ran uncut versions 
of angry letters to the editor, including an occasional
18 Alisky, "Mass Media," 481.
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10letter from the President of the Republic# 7 Thus,
newspapers insured a high public interest in the
questions of the day and offered an entree to influence
for someone like Ulate, who otherwise would have had few
opportunities*
Ulate worked for a number of San JosS papers
during the next few years, moving to positions of greater
responsibility as his writing abilities developed* Julio
Suflol said of his writing, "He was the best journalist
Costa Rica has had* His prose was excellent# It was
20always polemic, but beautiful*"
Ulate became co-owner and co-editor of La Tribuna, 
but he eventually had a disagreement with his co-owner, 
Jos^ Maria Pinaud, and bought Pinaud*s share of the
p * l
paper around 1932* In about 193& Ulate bought Costa 
Rica's oldest paper, El Diario de Costa Rica, which had
19 It was the custom in Costa Rica for the 
president to respond openly and directly to press 
criticism. Presidents most frequently answered through 
articles or letters printed in their own favorite papers, 
but they sometimes wrote letters to the editor of an 
opposition paper. Modern examples of such exchanges were 
Ulate's dispute with President Figueres during the 1955 
invasion, which Ulate later publicized through his Hacia 
donde lleva a Costa Rica el Seflor Presidente Figieres? 
(San JosSi Universal, 1955) t and President Mario 
Echandi's exchange with La Reoflblica over the question of 
presidential meddling in the autonomous institutes# 
Echandi also published his remarks in his Los hombres 
pdblicos frente a los dineros oflblicos (San JosS*
Imprenta Nacional, 19^2)# "
20 Suflol interview*
21 Cato, "Un periodista!" Olga Ulate interviews#
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been founded in 1919. Soon after buying El Diario. he 
divested himself of his other newspaper interests and 
concentrated on building up the Diario. In 19^0, when 
the paper was well launched, he opened an afternoon 
paper, La Hora. as a late-news appendix tc the Diario. 
While Ulate was publisher of both papers, he was editor 
only of El Diario. Another man, Guillermo Calvo Navarro, 
edited La Hora but its editorial line followed closely 
that of El Diario. For many years the two papers were 
printed on the same presses and their finances were 
merged, but it was always El Diario that was Ulate's 
great love in journalism.
With Ulate as editor, El Diario de Costa Rica 
grew-to be the country's largest and most influential 
paper, with an estimated circulation of 3 0 ,0 0 0 at its 
apogee, around 19*^ 6. Ulate's daughter— admittedly a 
partisan source— feels that it "had a monopoly on the 
intellectual life and writing of Costa Rica in those 
days." Like most Costa Rican papers, it devoted a great 
deal of space to political developments. However, unlike 
most other papers, El Diario avoided political affiliation 
and maintained an independent editorial line. This
22 Olga Marta Ulate gave this estimate of 
circulation. The Political Handbook gave an estimated 
circulation figure of 19,000 in 1952. Walter H, Mallory 
(ed.), Political Handbook of the World* Parliaments. 
Parties and Press (New York*: Harper Bros, for Council on
Foreign Relations, 1952), ^5*
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stance reflected Ulate*s sense of independence, as well 
as his political ambitions and his desire to avoid tying 
the paper to the fortunes of any particular party. In 
19^9 the New York Times noted that "he has always been an 
independent as a newspaper man, a rare thing in Latin 
America.
In addition to directing his own papers, Ulate 
occasionally served as correspondent for other publi­
cations during his extensive travels, and in 19^5 he
spent several months as an AP war correspondent in 
2h
Europe. Ulate was always a hard-hitting writer. He
critically evaluated each Costa Rican government and
often engaged in running debates with Costa Rica’s
presidents, including those in whose administrations he
2held an occasional public position. J He soon earned a 
reputation for editorial honesty, which boosted his 
papers' circulation and allowed him to have considerable 
influence.
Beginnings of his political career 
The recognition that Ulate gained as a journalist 
helped launch his political career. He first entered
23 New York Times. Nov. 9» 19^9. 
2b Ibid.
25 Cato, "Un periodista.M
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politics in 1917» when Minister of War Federico Tinoco
overthrew the government of Costa Rica and seized control
of the country, Tinoco issued a call for elections for a
Constituent Assembly and Ulate, running on an independent
26ticket, was elected as a delegate from Alajuela,
However, he soon concluded that the country was in the
control of a dictatorship and, after serving only a
month or so, he quit his seat in the assembly. He then
was briefly arrested for suspected anti-Tinoco activities
2 7but was soon released, '
While concentrating chiefly on his newspaper
work for the next 25 years, Ulate continued to have a
role in public affairs. He served as secretary for
Costa Rica's diplomatic mission to the other Central
American states and later served on a mediating
commission which worked to avoid armed conflict in
28Central America, During 1928-29» Ulate seems to have 
served briefly with the Costa Rican mission in
26 Otilio Ulate interview, July 27* 1967,.
27 New York Times. Nov, 9, 19^9«
28 Fernandez Guardia, "El nuevo presidentei" 
Cato, HUn periodista,"
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29Spain. 7 On his return to Costa Rica, he got back into 
politics, serving in the national legislature as a 
delegate from Alajuela. Ulate had lived in San Jos€ most 
of the time since he left school, but he ran for congress 
from his native province, Alajuela, where he owned a 
finea and maintained a residence.
Although he served several terms in congress, 
both before and after his presidency, Ulate never took an 
active interest in the work of the legislature. He seemed 
to regard having a seat in the assembly simply as a means 
of keeping his name before the public, not a particularly 
responsible attitude. For example, Lie. Fernando Lara 
Bustamente, a leader of the Partido Uni<5n Nacional, says 
that Ulate attended only one session of congress during 
one four-year congressional term to which he waa 
elected after his presidency. His only reason for 
attending that session was to vote for Lie. Lara
29 Ronald Hilton (ed«), 'rfho’s Who in Latin 
America. 3rd edition (Stanford* Stanford University 
Press, 1945), Part II (Mexico and Central America), 14. 
Ulate later briefly served as Costa Rica*s ambassador to 
Spain during the early 1970*s when, to the surprise of 
his friends, he accepted the position offered by his 
political opponent, President Jos§ Figueres. Alberto 
MartSn, an independent observer, thought Ulate accepted 
the position out of civic duty. Viewing things 
differently, Ulate*s longtime political associate 
Fernando Lara thought Ulate should not have accepted the 
appointment, especially since he had earlier rejected an 
identical offer made by Lara who was foreign minister 
during the late 1960*s. Interviews with Lie. Alberto 
Martin on June 8 , 1974 and with Lie. Fernando Lara on 
June 9, 1974.
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as president of the Legislative Assembly.
During his early political career, Ulate seldom 
played an active role in party politics. He preferred to 
run for congress on independent tickets and developed no 
strong party affiliation until he founded his own 
National Union Party around 19^*^  This preference for
independence may have stemmed in part from a disappointing 
experience in 1930 when Ulate served on the Central 
Committee of the newly-formed National Regeneration Party, 
This party, advocating a moderate reform program, 
nominated a prominent Costa Rican, Lefin CortSs, for
president. CortSs accepted the nomination and began h.is
campaign but withdrew a few months later in order to 
support his opponent, former president Ricardo JimSnez 
Oreamuno. The rapid rise and fall of political parties 
was common in Costa Rica, but Ulate was chagrined by 
CortSs* making a deal with Jimgnez and he never had good
relations with CortSs after that time,-^2
30 Lara interview.
31 "Homenaje a Otilio UlateiM Busey, Notes. 2 3.
A forerunner of the National Union Party was the 
Democratic Party founded in 19^1 by Lara and another 
young lawyer, Eladio Trejos. The Democratic Party was 
Le6n Cortgs* vehicle during his unsuccessful bid for the 
presidency in 19^4 and later merged with National Union,
32 Theodore S. Creedman, "The .Political „ „ 
Development of Costa Rica, 193^-19^" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Maryland, 1971)» 58-59.
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Information on Ulate's early life is sketchy.
As he told foreign reporters shortly before his 
inauguration in 19^9 » he was "a man without a.
I t - S ' S
biography. The limited nature of his political 
activities in the early years gave few indications of the 
later rapid rise in his political fortunes. The nature 
of Costa Rican politics during the 19^0's placed a 
premium on Ulate's unusual combination of political and 
journalistic talents, however, and gave him an 
opportunity to catapult himself into the leadership of 
the Opposition movement.
33 El Diario. Nov. 1, 19^9*
CHAPTER III 
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM
Calderfln Guardia and Social Reform
The decade of the 19^0's confronted Costa Rica's 
traditional political system with its most serious 
challenges since the system had assumed its modern form 
shortly after the election of 1889. The first challenge 
came during the administration of Dr. Rafael Angel 
CalderCn Guardia, a socially prominent physician who 
appeared to offer continuity rather than change when he 
was elected president in 19^0 . He had the backing of 
President Le6n CortSs and most of the country's leaders, 
and had run on the ticket of the National Republican 
Party which had won the last two presidential elections. 
Despite his orthodox means of coming to power, CalderSn 
Guardia soon indicated that he planned to depart from 
traditional ways, at least on the question of social 
reform.
In his inaugural address, Calderdn called for a 
more equitable tax structure, greater attention to the 
neglected lands beyond the Meseta Central, a land 
distribution program and a low-cost housing program, and
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1
a modern system of social security. While Calderfin said
that he meant to avoid government activity in those
spheres open to private capital, he nevertheless outlined
an ambitious program and one which differed significantly
2
from the usual piecemeal approach to social problems.
1 There had been some social legislation before 
Calderfinfs term and his critics, anxious to prove that 
social reform in Costa Rica did not begin with Dr, 
Calderfin, compiled a list of earlier legislation.
Examples were the setting of a maximum working day (1920); 
a law on work accidents (1 9 2 5)» minimum wage law (1933)?
a law for the protection, of mothers and children (1 9 3 3)* 
and registry of labor organizations (1937). "La politics, 
social," Surco, IV (May-June 19*4*0 , *41. Surco was a 
publication of the Center for the Study of National 
Problems; this issue is especially interesting because 
it is devoted to a critical analysis of the Calderfin 
Guardia administration, written just as Calderfin was 
leaving office.
Founded in 19*40, the Center was an organization 
of young intellectuals, most of them associated with the 
University of Costa Rica, who proposed to undertake a 
nonpartisan examination of Costa Rican public issues, In 
19*45, however, the group abandoned its nonpartisan stance 
and joined with the Democratic Action Party to form the 
Social Democratic Party, the most intransigent of the 
political groups opposing Calderfin.
2 John Patrick Bell, Crisis in Costa Ricai The 
19*4-8 Revolution (Austin* University of Texas Latin 
American Monographs No. 2*4-, 1971), 27» Although dealing 
primarily with factors leading to the 19*4-8 revolution,
Bell provides a good brief account of the Calderfin 
administration. A pro-Calderfin account written by one of 
his supporters is Josfi Albertazzi Avendano, La tragedia 
de Costa Rica (MSxico* privately printed, 1951)« The 
standard liberacionista version, highly critical of the 
Calderfin administration, is Alberto F. Cafias, Los 8 afios 
(San JosS* Editorial Liberacifin Nacicnal, 195517 1 7-6 2.
59
Calderfin's ideas had "been formed in his early
y e a r s . H e  was from a devoutly Catholic San JosS family
and, while studying medicine in Europe, he had been
influenced by the ideas of social reform expressed in the
papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragessimo Anno.
Ke became concerned about Costa Rica's poor and seems to
have developed a sense of mission with regard to his own
role- in improving their lot. As he explained later, "X
reduced the entire program of my government to a simple
but extremely important statement: 'to raise the
economic, moral and cultural level of the working 
b
classes.'"'
The cornerstones of Calderfin's social program 
were a social security system, a Labor Code and a chapter 
of constitutional amendments providing a legal basis for 
these and future pieces of social legislation,*’ The
3 Calderfin traces the development of his social 
thought in his El gobemante y el hombre frente al 
uroblema social costarricense (San JosfiT"privately 
printed, 1942), especially 3-2 6,
4 Ibid>, 2b, Italics in the original.
5 Other Calderfin programs designed to help the 
poor were a law for the protection of Indians, National 
Bank-sponsored agricultural cooperatives, a plan for the 
distribution of some unused public lands to landless 
peasants, and a housing program. Costa Rica’s first - 
income tax law, passed in 1947 during the administration of 
Calderfin's successor Picado, is also generally considered
a calderonista reform because of the close relationship 
between the Calderfin administration and that of his 
handpicked successor.
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first of these programs which Calderfin proposed to the 
Costa Rican legislature was the social security system, 
said to be the first such plan in Central America. Under 
Calderon's proposal, all agricultural and industrial 
workers under sixty years of age would be covered by the 
social security insurance program, with the employer, 
employee and the state making compulsory contributions.
The proposal met resistance in the National 
Assembly but, due to the large sway the president had 
over the Costa Rican legislature in those days, Calderfin 
was able to get the bill passed. The system began to 
operate in the four major cities of the Meseta Central in 
19^2 with provisions for the eventual extension of the 
program throughout the country.
Later that year, in his annual May 1 congressional 
address, the President submitted his second major piece 
of social legislation— a proposed chapter of social 
guarantees to be added to the constitution as amendments. 
The amendments were not specific, but were a general 
statement of principles about the state’s obligations 
toward public well-being and a definition of the social 
limits of private property. They allowed the state to 
set up cooperatives, establish a social security system 
and enact legislation regulating labor conditions and
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union activities.
In presenting his social guarantees chapter, 
Calderfin tried to portray his program as "being in line 
with Catholic thinking and with developments in other 
Latin American countries. Insisting that Costa Rica 
must not try to withdraw from the "universal currents" 
of the age, he defined his government's policy as that 
of "absolute respect for private property within the
n
limits of public necessity."''
Once congress had given provisional approval to 
the constitutional amendments— a second vote was required 
when the new congress convened— Calderfin felt he had a 
basis for introducing his Labor Code, the first such
Q
modem comprehensive code in Central America. Pushed 
through congress in 19^3 » the proposal was a codification 
of new and existing labor laws. The code provided for
tie creation of a Labor Ministry and labor courts to
handle worker grievances, guaranteed the right of labor 
to organize and made collective bargaining mandatory in
6 Rafael A. Calderfin Guardia, Mensa.ie del 
Presidente de la reoublica Doctor -don Rafael A Calderfin 
Guardia al uoder legislativo introduciendo el -proyecto de 
reforma a la Carta Magna, para establecer el capltulo de 
garant-Ias sociales CSan Josfii Imprenta Nacional, 19^2), 
15-lb.
7 Ibid., 3, 5.
8 Howard I. Blutstein, et. al.. Area Handbook
for Costa Rica (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970), 252.
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case of disputes. The code included little that seems 
radical today, hut it was loudly protested at the time by 
critics who were already inflamed by Calderfin*s earlier 
reform measures and his arm-twisting methods of getting 
his program approved.
As soon as the nature of his program became 
clear, members of the business community and large 
landowners began a vocal criticism of Calderfin which 
continued until the revolution of 19^8. Although many of 
them probably would have opposed social reforms under any 
circumstances, Calderfin made matters worse by his manner 
of governing. He did not seem to have a good grasp of 
economics or public finance and large-scale programs of 
public works and services were begun without adequate 
provision for their financing.^ Just at that time, a 
number of Costa Rican thinkers, many of them associated 
with the Center for the Study of National Problems, were 
beginning to advocate economic planning and a larger role 
for technocrats in government. Calderfin's personalistic, 
disorganized methods of running the country offended them.
9 Stacy May et al.. Costa Ricas A Study in 
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952), 2 81. Interestingly, the Twentieth Century 
Fund Study Group made a similar observation about some of 
the programs begun by the Governing Junta of 19^8-1949 
whose members had been among Calderfin's most severe 
critics on the issue of economic planning.
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Calderfin had no effective system for overseeing 
such important functions as the letting of government 
contracts on the basis of competitive bids. Although he 
himself did not get rich at public expense, some of his 
subordinates did, and opponents could pin the charge of 
corruption and maladministration on his government,
This did not sit well in a country with a tradition of 
frugality in government,
Calderfin was further hampered by factors beyond 
his control, principally caused by the war, Costa Rica 
had the largest volume of foreign trade of any Central 
American country, much of it with Western Europe, Hence, 
the country was hit hard by the wartime severing of trade 
ties and suffered from shortages and inflation. Inflation 
was exacerbated by the influx of American dollars in 
connection with the construction of the Pan American
10 "la labor de fomento," Surco, IV (May-June 
1944), 70-74-, See, in ...particular, the list of "contracts 
without bids" on page 71.
11 Costa Ricans of all classes had generally
expected their governments to operate on low budgets.
The tradition of frugality in government can be traced to
the country's colonial period of generalised poverty in, 
which- even the governor, according to some accounts, haa
to grow his own crops. Deeply rooted in this tradition, 
Costa Ricans did not fully appreciate the changing nature 
of government expenses and the budgetary difficulties 
faced by a wartime administration.
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highway, by far the largest public works project Costa
12Rica had ever undertaken.
The charges of corruption and mismanagement,
Calderon’s heavy-handed way of dealing with congress and
his apparent willingness to use the social legislation to
further his political purposes alienated Costa Ricans who
logically should have supported Calderfin's program, such
as the young men of the Center for the Study of National 
13Problems. J Otilio Ulate, who was skeptical about 
Calderfin's social legislation but was chiefly alienated 
by what he viewed as Calderfin's undemocratic methods, 
also turned against the President and, through his 
influential newspapers, Ulate eventually became the chief 
spokesman for all the anti-Calderfin forces.
12 Joaquin Garro, Las decadas del siglo veinte 
y otros temas (San Josfi: Impr'enta Vargas., 1966), 18;
John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1954), 247-43.
13 For example, in what seemed particularly 
fortuitous timing, the Social Security System went into 
effect, amid much government fanfare, just days before 
the 1942 off-year congressional elections. While Calderfin 
thus used the social programs to gain popular support, 
his commitment to social welfare was genuine. He wanted 
popular support to guarantee the success of future social 
legislation. The Opposition charges-of Calderfin’s 
demagoguery were in this sense not fair. Surco, the 
Center's organ, was especially critical of Calderfin's "nar­
cissistic , excessive, personalistic, panacea-like, 
deifying propaganda about the social legislation,"
Anxious to prove that their hearts were in the right 
place, the editors of Sure'o added that "it is not that we 
are denying the importance of [social:] legislation.... 
what we are opposing is the demogogic, politicking, absurd 
pretension of calderonistas and Communists that it is
a 'conquest' of Dr, Calderfin." "La politica social," 40.
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Having alienated important supporters, Calderfin 
was afraid he might be unable to push the rest of his 
program through congress. After some hesitation, he 
turned to the Communist Party and agreed to a limited 
alliance, concluded on the basis of an understanding with 
Communist Party chief Manuel Mora, who had been in control 
of the party since its founding and could be expected to 
deliver. No Communists were given positions in the 
cabinet, but it was decided that Communist deputies in 
the legislature would back the executive program 
provided Calderfin agreed to make further efforts toward
\h,
social reform.
In 19^3, having reached an agreement with 
Calderfin, Mora dissolved the Communist Party (the Bloque 
de Obreros y Campesinos), thus making the agreement more 
palatable to members of Calderfin’s National Republican
ic
Party. J In trying to maintain an accommodation with 
the government, Mcra was in keeping with the wartime 
practices of Communist leaders elsewhere. After 
dissolving the Bloque, Mora immediately formed another
14 Ricardo FernSndez Guardia, Cartilla histfirica 
de Costa Rica (San Josfi: Imprenta Lehmann, 1967) , 154-.
Independent observers disagree as to the extent of 
Communist influence in the Calderfin and Picado admini­
strations. FernSndez Guardia believes that their 
influence was considerable and writes that one of 
Picado's ministers left the government after unsuccess­
fully attempting to control high-handed Communist 
employees (p. 157)•
15 Caftas, Los 8 aflos, 9^*
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party, Vanguardia Popular. Vanguardia's origins were 
generally known, but the new party nevertheless was more 
acceptable to the Costa Rican people because neither the >- 
name nor the party's history was as overtly Communist 
as that of the Bloque.
CalderSn's alliance with Mora was further 
encouraged by statements made by Costa Rica's archbishop 
Victor Sanabria whose opinions were important to the 
devout CalderSn,. Sanabria praised the Vanguardia-backed 
social legislation and said in a public letter that he 
could find nothing wrong with a Catholic joining the 
Vanguardia Popular Once having made a pact with 
Mora, Calderdn found it difficult to turn back, because 
the pact itself alienated still more former CalderCn 
backerso As his other supporters defected, CalderCn 
became even more closely associated with the Communist 
Party in the public mind. In retrospect, this "pact with 
the devil" was an expensive tactical blunder.
Another matter which cost the President support 
was his treatment of Jos€ Figueres, a coffee grower who 
strongly denounced the government in a July 19^2 radio 
speech. Figueres was arrested and eventually forced to 
leave the country, as Costa Rica's first political exile 
since the Hinoco days. Figueres was the only man 
Calderon exiled, and CalderCn permitted constant criticism
16 Alexander, Communism. 3 8 8.
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of his administration in the press and congress, but 
the Figueres incident did much to brand the President a 
dictator.
The furor over Figueres*. ouster must be seen in 
the Costa Rican context. While the exile of any person 
from his country is deplorable, in many countries it is 
a common means of dealing with political opponents. 
Calderdn's record of one political exile and no political 
prisoners during a four-year wartime administration must 
have been one of the better civil liberties records in 
the Hemisphere and in most other parts of the world. 
Despite its many shortcomings, however, Costa Rica was 
an extremely civilized country in which the sort of 
treatment given Figueres was unacceptable.
All of these factors worked to undercut CalderSn's 
position, but his ultimate downfall was due to public 
misgivings about his commitment to Costa Rican democracy. 
Costa Ricans were accustomed to a certain amount of 
official pressure during political campaigns, but 
Calderdn overstepped the bounds of custom and lost 
public confidence. He continued to have many followers, 
as evidenced by his good showing when he ran for 
president ten years after the revolution of 19^ -8. The 
perception that he had subverted democracy, however, 
became sufficiently widespread that a small group of 
revolutionaries could count on the acquiescence of most
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of the people when they "began an armed revolt.
In particular, the election of 1944 drew passive 
critics into active opposition and made liberal and 
conservative opponents of the regime willing to work 
together to prevent Calderon from serving a second term, 
CalderSn was constitutionally unable to succeed himself 
in 1944 and he picked congressional president Teodoro 
Picado, a law professor, as his successor. It v/as widely 
assumed that Picado was a stand-in for CalderSn who again
1 rt
intended to run for president in 1948*
Picado*s chief opponent in the 1944 race was 
former President LeSn CortSs (1936-1940) who by then had 
broken with CalderSn. CortSs had the backing of much of 
the anti-CalderSn group but others, such as Ulate,
declined to give active support to CortSs because of his
XSown record of authoritarian government. The campaign 
was marred by violence. Just a week before the election, 
one man was killed during clashes between partisan 
groups in San JosS, Ulate, who blamed government forces 
f.or harrassing the Opposition, announced that he was 
closing El Diario-and La Hora in protest. Vowing not to 
resume publication "until public liberties are restored,"
1? Ligia Estrada-MolinaTeodoro_Picado . 
Michalskyi Su aporte -a’ la historiografia (San JosS: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1967)""• 201j Arturo Castro Esquivel, 
Jos-S Figueres Ferrer; El hombre v su obra (San JosS: 
Imprenta Tormc, 19555\ 57. ~
18 Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica. Ill,
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Ulate editorialized: "It is evident that we have
entered into a dictatorial regime in which the
Communist Party takes part in the exercise of authority;
and our conviction is that independent papers should not
19be published under these conditions." ^
Election day was also violent, with four killed 
in the country. After the votes were counted, the 
government announced that Picado had won about 90,000 
votes to some ^6,000 for CortSs, While it is impossible 
from this vantage point to know who won the race, it 
seems clear that Picado's margin could not have been 
that great.
Soon after Picado became president, Figueres
20was allowed to return to Costa Rica, and Ulate resumed 
publication of his newspapers. ~ Picado was a 
conciliatory man of considerable ability, but his 
efforts to maintain national unity were crushed between
19 El Diario de Costa Rica. Feb, 8 , 19^. Ulate 
noted that El Diario, the country's oldest paper, had 
never before suspended publication in the 25 years since it 
was founded. He added that salaries of employees would 
continue to be paid while the papers were closed.
20 Castro, Josg Figueres Ferrer. 62,
21 El Diario actually ceased publication only 
for a short period of time, probably about two weeks, 
after" which Ulate'allowed members of the Center for the 
Study- of National Problems to put out the paper.
According to his daughter, Ulate himself resumed control 
of the paper after about a six months' absence.
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the CalderSn group and what came to "be called simply
"the Opposition." The problem was compounded by the
presence of an element of intransigence not typical of
Costa Rican politics in the past. Perhaps because they
viewed their objectives as so important for the country,
the reformers of the 19^0 *s were not inclined toward
compromise. CalderSn had made it plain that his
dedication to social reform overrode his commitment to
democratic government and that he was willing to exert
pressure to see his goals realized. CalderSn’s most
outspoken opponents, JosS Figueres and his supporters in
the Social Democratic Party (PSD), were even more
determined than the president. They viewed things in
black and white terms and condemned the government in
blanket fashion. Figueres said that ’everything" about
the administration was bad and spoke about the need to
"destroy completely" calderonismo. In a public speech
on his return from exile in 19^4, he described the
country as enveloped in a night of darkness, claiming
that the sun would begin to shine again only with the
22founding of a new Second Republic. Such attitudes 
made compromise difficult.
Nevertheless, compromise might have been 
achieved and revolution avoided, if more moderate
22' Castro, JosS Figueres Ferrer, 63-6 6.
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members of the Opposition, such as Ulate, had managed
to keep the upper hand within the movement. The
Opposition drew only a minority of its support from the
pro-Figueres Social Democratic Party; its major strength
came from Ulate's National Union Party and from the
Democratic Party, then headed by LeSn CortSs. In 19^5
all these parties merged to form Compactaci8n Nacional,^
Thus, all the anti-Calder6n forces were united in a
2b
"strange alliance" composed of groups with widely 
divergent goals; the young men who wanted to modernize 
and reform Costa Rica and traditional leaders who simply 
wanted to end Communist influence in the government and 
restore democracy. As post-revolutionary years would 
prove, the two groups were united only by their 
opposition to CalderSn and not by any fundamental 
consensus on the way the country should be governed.
Compactaci-Sn Nacional was defeated in the 
congressional elections of 19^6 but had high hopes for 
the election of 19^8 . Since Cort-Ss had died in 19^6, a 
convention of all Opposition forces was held in February 
19^7 in order to choose a presidential candidate. At
23 Ibid.. 71.
2^ Claudio GutiSrrez Carranza, "Ensayo sobre 
las generaciones costarricenses, 1823-1953«M Revista de 
la Universidad de Costa Rica, X (Nov. 195^)» oTT
the convention Ulate emerged, as the nominee, after 
defeating the other chief contenders— Figueres and 
Fernando Castro Cervantes, a businessman from the 
Democratic Party. Alberto F, Caflas* description of the 
balloting gives an idea of the base of support of each 
candidate ;
It seemed evident from the first ballot that.., 
the big capitalists, the conservative mentalities 
favored Castro; the mature intellectuals and 
young businessmen were for Ulate; and the 
students, young intellectuals and "hotheads” 
voted for Figueres. But Ulate carried the 
numerical advantage. 25
Figueres, who received the least number of votes of the
three, was eliminated after a second ballot; most of his
supporters probably then voted for Ulate rather than
Castro, whom they considered "excessively conservative."
CalderSn, as expected, was nominated by the
National Republicans and a bitter campaign was underway.
Although denouncing Calderon and his pact with the
Communists, Ulate indicated his support for CalderSn's
social legislation, assuring voters that:
Our government will maintain in force the laws 
that recognise the social rights and. work rights 
of the working and peasant forces....The people 
have a right to just retribution for work, the 
application of social justice, education for their 
children and, above all, the right to health,27
25 CaF.as, Los S a fio s . 85.
26 Ibid.
27 El Diario, Feb. 6, 194.8 .
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The election took place on February 8, 19^8.
On the 2 8th the Electoral Tribunal announced its official
finding! Ulate led by over 10,000 votes and was awarded
the victory, subject to confirmation by congress as
28required by law. There are indications that CalderSn 
planned to concede the victory to Ulate but that reports 
of Opposition fraud during the elections made him change 
his mind. There were charges that Opposition voters had 
deliberately stalled and loitered at the polls in order 
to prevent calderonistas from voting before the polls 
closed, Sensitive to this charge, El Diario on 
February 13 maintained that "it was ulatismo which, to a 
sizable extent, did not get to vote,.let's be done 
with the farce to the effect that calderonistas and 
Communists were unable to vote." Although some of the 
charges were probably true, it seems unlikely that the 
outcome of the election would have been different.
Whatever CalderSn's original intentions may 
have been, on March 1 the calderonista-dominated 
congress, undoubtedly carrying out his will, voted to
28 Ibid. , Feb. 29, 1 W .  The Electoral 
Tribunal reported 5^,931 votes for Ulate to for
CalderSn. One member of the three-man tribunal, 
however, said he had not had sufficient time to count 
the votes and withheld his signature from the decree 
announcing Ulate*s victory.
29annul the election.  ^ This action played into the hands
of JosS Figueres who, since the time of his exile, had
been planning to launch a revolution against CalderSn
and seeking an event which would guarantee the necessary
10level of public support.
29 Apparently the calderonista congressmen 
planned to try to have CalderSn elected first designate—  
equivalent to first vice president— when the new congress 
convened on May 1, Past Costa Rican custom had been for 
the congress to "call" the first designate to serve as 
acting president for fcur years in the absence of a 
president. Albertazzi, La tragedia, 83.
30 That the congressional action was the pretext 
rather than the reason for the revolution is the finding 
of Charles D. Ameringer:
Although there appeared to be a cause-and- 
effect relation between the nullification 
of Ulate's election and the initiation of 
military action by Figueres, the war was 
no spur-of-the-moment act— there had.been, 
as Figueres had said, a six-year period of 
"gestation."
Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Sxile (Coral Gables: 
University of Miami, 197^)» 75«
A similar conclusion is reached by John Patrick 
Bell who has carefully traced the development of 
Figueres' plans for revolution and his success in 
thwarting compromise between CalderSn and more moderate 
Opposition leaders. Bell, who is more "critical of 
Figueres than most, describes his motives:
He had dedicated years of his life to the 
conspiracy and had overextended the credit of 
his commercial enterprises in order to help 
finance the effort..,.He stood to lose most if 
the revolution failed. If it succeeded, he was 
assured of a prominent position in Costa Rican 
politics and was likely to become the arbiter 
,of the nation's destinies, as well as an 
international figure of some stature.
Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica. 132.
75
The Revolution of 1948
Although Figueres, who was probably motivated
not only by personal ambition but also by concern for
his country, had long ago decided to resort to 
81revolution, his plans did not take final form until
December 1947. At that time he joined the Caribbean
Legion, a group of conspirators who aimed at the
82overthrow of dictators in the region.-'
The group's arms came to be stored in Guatemala, 
whose President Argvalo was sympathetic to their aims. 
When Figueres began his revolution on March 10, materiel 
and military officers were flown from Guatemala to assist 
the revolt.^ With the aid of the Legion, but with an
31 Liberacionista Caflas describes Figueres after 
1944: "His occupation is now that of a conspirator..,, 
Figueres insists that the reigning clique will not be 
expelled by means of the ballot." Caflas, Los 8 aflos, 6 8,
32 Figueres* connections with the Legion went 
back further than December l6 , 1947 but that date was 
significant because at that time Figueres joined with 
revolutionaries from Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic 
in pledging mutual support for efforts to "destroy the 
ruling dictatorships in their fatherlands," The agreement 
was formalized in a "pact of alliance/" reprinted in 
Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa Rica el Seflor 
Presidente Figueres? tSan JosS: Universal, 1955)» 18-21,
For a discussion of the Legion*s role in Costa Rica see 
Ameringer, Democratic Left, 72-87.
33 Ibid.. 7 6. On the Legion's role in Costa Rica 
also see Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: 
Quadrangle, 1 9 6 7), 161-62; FemSndez Guardia, Cartilla 
histCrica, 162. As noted below, the OAS found Legionnaires 
receiving-government aid in Costa Rica.in December 1948. .
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army composed largely of Costa Ricans, Figueres was able 
to force Picado and CalderSn to flee to Nicaragua in six 
weeks. Picado still had control of the government and 
much of the country when he gave up the fight, but he 
was deeply disturbed by the 2 ,0 0 0 casualties, the growing 
Communist influence in the government since the 
revolution began and by Figueres' threat to launch air 
raids against San Jose. Picado agreed to open 
negotiations with Figueres who demanded initially that he 
be named first designate to the presidency, thus 
insuring that control of the government would pass 
directly to himself on Picado*s resignation.-^ Picado, 
however, apparently rejected this plan because six days 
later, on April 19, 1948, the President and a Figueres 
representative signed a pact in which Picado agreed to
34 Communist influence increased during the 
revolution because the Communists put up the most 
determined resistance to Figueres. Workers' militias 
were formed which were often more effective than 
government troops. Fern&ndez Guardia writes that 
Vanguardia Popular was the only political faction to 
fight for the government. Cartilla histSrica. 162.
35 "Memorandum de los jefes de la rebeliSn como 
base para la capitulacifin del gobiemo de Picado," dated 
April 13, 1948, reprinted in Marco Tulio Zeledfin, 
Historia constitucional de Costa Rica en el bienio 
1948-49 (San~Josg7 privately printed. 1950). 29-30. 
Figueres * comrades-in-arms Alberto MartSn and Fernando 
Valverde were to be named second and third designates, 
respectively, according to the memorandum.
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yield the government to Santos Le6n Herrera, at that 
time third designate to the presidency! the revolu­
tionaries, for their part, promised to maintain the 
social reforms and to respect the lives and property of 
those who had supported the government during the 
revolution.^ Thus, Lefin Herrera was the nominal head of 
the country until May 8 , traditional inauguration day in 
Costa Rica, when he turned the government over to 
Figueres— who had, in fact, been the obvious power behind 
the throne during the brief interim government«
It is interesting that Ulate did not sign the
peace pact and was not included in the negotiations.
Once he launched his revolt, Figueres assumed the
leadership of the anti-government forces and bypassed
Ulate, the presumed president-elect. Ulate had been
reluctant to turn to revolution, and it is said that
Figueres believed that those who had failed to take up
arms lost any claim to the leadership of the 
37Opposition.
The decision to go to revolution seemed to 
reflect a good deal about one's political philosophy, the 
relative importance- he ascribed to different political 
values. Most of the traditional politicians were
36 "Facto de la Embajada de MSxico," reprinted 
in Zeledfin, Historia constitucional, 30-3^.
37 Interview with Luis Alberto Monge, Aug, 19,196?.
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hesitant to overthrow the government and plunge the 
country into what obviously would be a violent struggle» 
given the bitterness felt on both sides. Those who led 
the revolution were the "students, young intellectuals 
and ’hotheads'” whom Canas describes as supporting 
Figueres at the 19^7 convention. Thus, by excluding 
those who took no part in the revolution Figueres also 
excluded those whose political philosophy differed 
significantly from his.
Figueres, however, recognized that Ulate had 
considerable support in the country and he signed a pact 
with Ulate on May 1. Ulate agreed that a Revolutionary 
Junta would exercise legislative and executive powers from 
May 8 , 19^8 until November 8 , 19^9» during which time a 
constituent assembly would draw up a new constitution. 
Figueres recognized Ulate’s election as president and 
agreed that at the end of the Junta administration he 
would surrender the presidency to Ulate who would then 
serve his four-year term as first constitutional president
oQ
of the "Second Republic. With this agreement, the path 
was cleared for Figueres to assume direct control of the
38 "pacto Ulate-Figueres,” reprinted in Zeledon, 
Historia constitucional, 35-36. The pact stipulated that, 
subject to approval of the constituent assembly, the Junta 
might extend its tenure six months if it considered the 
extension necessary in order to complete its work. It was 
also stipulated that the assembly should ratify Ulate's 
election as- president.
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government.
One historian has charged that by signing the 
pact Ulate provided "the key which opened the door to the 
de facto r e g i m e , U l a t e ' s  motives for this action are 
a matter of conjecture. He probably realized that he 
had little choice but to sign the pact if he wanted 
Figueres, who was in control of the country, to recognize 
his right to the presidency. Beyond his personal 
ambition to become president, Ulate was perhaps loath to 
do anything to encourage further unrest in the country 
and was thus willing to lend a semblance of legitimacy to 
the Junta. In addition, Ulate probably did not 
anticipate that once in office the Junta would depart so 
diametrically in its program from the traditional path, 
and consequently was not fully cognizant of the 
significance of the event.
It is occasionally reported that Figueres offered 
the presidency of the Junta to Ulate before deciding to 
take the position himself. These reports, however, are 
not consistent with Figueres' attempt to gain power 
directly from Picado; any such offer to Ulate must have 
been a -pro forma one, made in such a way as to let Ulate 
know he would have no power in the Junta. That Ulate, a 
strong advocate of constitutionalism, would reject an
39 ZeledCn, Historia constitucional. 9.
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offer to head an extra-legal government could have been 
anticipated.
The question seems to have been not whether Ulate
would head the Junta but whether Figueres ever intended
to turn the government over to Ulate. Indications are
that Figueres at first did not plan to recognize Ulate's
election but, rather, to void the 19^8 elections and hold
new ones. Ulate himself thought this. He believed
that Figueres signed the Ulate-Figueres Pact only because
Figueres had decided he might otherwise find it impossible
to govern. Reporting substantially the same facts but
with a different interpretation, Junta minister Gonzalo
Facio says: that:
Ulate always thought, incorrectly, that we 
meant to deny him the presidency. We only 
meant that he was to have no part in the 
Junta. We would then hold new elections but, 
since none of us was going to run, Ulate 
would have been the logical winner.iJ-0
Jos6 Figueres and the Second Republic
Choosing his cabinet from among his supporters in 
the revolution, Figueres created a twelve-man governing 
committee which he called the "Founding Junta of the
kO Interviews with Otilio Ulate, July 27, 19^7 
and Gonzalo Facio, Aug. 8 , 196?•
ZlI
Second Republic. The high-sounding title of the
committee reflected Figueres' view of the provisional
government's rolet He did not simply plan to oust
calderonismo from Costa Rica but to create a new political
and social order to replace the old one which he thought 
1^ 2was obsolete. The most forceful of Figueres* ministers, 
such as Economy Minister Alberto MartSn and Social 
Welfare Minister Benjamin NdJiez, shared this attitude. 
Mart-Sn explained that he regarded the Junta government as 
an opportunity to give the country a "golpe de timdn a la 
izquierdar-a^-.yank of the helm to the left. Such an 
approach helps to explain the exclusion of traditional 
political leaders. The presence of leading lights from 
the "first republic" might have put a damper on the 
Junta's plans.
Since there was no constitution in force and no 
congress in session, the provisional government had few
41 The members of the Junta are listed in La 
gacetat diario oficial, afio LXXj. No. 105 (May 11, 1948).
42 See Castro, JosS Figueres Ferrer. 227-40, for 
Figueres* statement on his view of the need for 
transcendent change in Costa Rica.
43 Interview with Alberto MartSn, Aug, 13, 19&7. 
After a disagreement with Figueres, MartSn resigned from 
the Junta early in 1949 and- subsequently took no part in 
the activities of the National Liberation Party formed 
by Figueres and his supporters.
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ZlZIt
checks on its powers. Ruling the country through
decree-laws, Figueres and the Junta were able to bring
about far-reaching changes in Costa Rica during their
brief turn in office.^
Figueres' actions caught the country's elite off
guard. Following the revolution, they had expected to
return to the "normal"— in other works, pre-194-O— way of
4*6running the country. They were unprepared for a 
new-style government which aimed at a reorientation of 
the system. In the end they would find that the 
Figueres Junta brought changes in many ways more drastic 
than the social reform legislation of CalderSn.
Ironically, by aiding the Opposition movement and 
acquiescing in CalderSn*s ouster, Costa Rican 
traditionalists had paved the way for an even more serious 
challenge to the established order.
The Junta's first actions were aimed at ferreting 
out enemies and crushing potential sources of counter-
44 The chapter of the 1871 constitution which 
guaranteed civil liberties remained in force while the 
new constitution was in preparation.
4-5 Much of the information on the work and goals 
of the Junta came from interviews with Junta members JosS 
Figueres, Daniel Oduber, Benjamin NflHez, Alberto MartSn, 
Uladislao Gimez, Francisco Orlich, Radi Blanco and 
Gonzalo Facio during the summer of 1967- For a more 
detailed study of the Junta see Judy Oliver, "Twelve Who 
Ruled in Costa Ricas. The Junta of 194'8-4-9'’ (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1 9 6 8).
4-6 Interview with Daniel Oduber, Aug. 21, 19&7•
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revolution. The Junta outlawed the Communist Party— its
47major adversary during the revolution; dissolved the
pact with Picado on the grounds that Picado's followers
48had not fulfilled their part of the bargain* and fired
llQ
a number of government employees and judges who were 
believed to have been supporters of CalderSn. The 
civil servants were often replaced by university-trained 
experts who did much to create the nucleus of a profes­
sional civil service. But the new judges, according to 
one observer who was generally sympathetic toward the 
Junta, were chosen with an eye to their political 
affiliation.^
To deal with calderonistas the Junta created two 
special tribunals whose judgments were not subject to
47 Costa Rica, ColecciSn de leyes, decretos, 
acuerdos v resoluciones, 'Segundo'Semestre de 194&-(Shn 
Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1949)» No, 105 of July 17.
48 The Junta said Picado followers had violated 
the pact by not turning in their arms and protecting 
citizens in their control area after the signing of the 
pact. Ibid. , Primer de 194.8, No. 77 of June 22.
4-9 The decree stipulated that anyone who had held
any form of public employment from May 8 , 1944 to May 8 ,
1948 could be fired without the severance pay required in 
the Labor Code. Portions of the Labor Code which 
contradicted the decree were rescinded by the decree 
itself. Ibid.. No. 7 of May 8 .
50 Ibid., No. 3 of May 8 and No. 8 of May 12.
51 Joaquin Garro, Veinte afios de historia chica
(San Josl: Imprenta Vargas, 1967J 21.
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appeal. One of these tried CalderSn and Picado employees 
and supporters suspected of having persecuted their 
adversaries during the 1940-48 period when "terror was 
enthroned;" and the other tribunal confiscated property 
of calderonistas who were believed to have enriched 
themselves at public expense. The second of these 
special courts, the Tribunal of Probity, was empowered to 
operate on a presumption-of-guilt basis, confiscating 
property and holding it until the owner came to court to 
prove rightful ownership. Since many CalderSn supporters 
had fled the country and some were denied readmittance or 
felt it unsafe to return, it was often difficult for them 
to regain their property. ^
The special tribunals were the blackest mark on 
the Junta’s record and were widely condemned in Costa 
Rica, particularly in the Constituent Assembly, which met 
from January to November 1949 and which, in addition to
52 ColecciCn de leves. Primer de 1948, No. 16 of 
May 19 and No. 4i"~of June 2.
53 Fo** example, the minutes of the Junta meetings 
record that Manuel Mora was denied permission to return
to the country. Junta Fundadora de la Segunda Repdblica, 
"Actas de las Sesiones" (unpublished transcript), entry 
for Feb. 8 , 1949. Actually, few Costa Ricans were denied 
readraittance but some felt, rightly or wrongly, that it 
would be unsafe for them to return to Costa Rica at that 
time. Among them was former calderonista congressman 
JosSu F.ernSndez .who. took his family to Honduras and 
remained there for two years. Interview with FernSndez, 
July 10, IO6 7,
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writing the new constitution, acted as a sort of nonvoting
parliament. Typifying the assembly criticism of the
tribunals, Representative Vargas Fern&ndez said:
The fact that I am energetically condemning 
them Qthe tribunals] does not mean that I am 
defending criminals or those who sacked the 
public treasury, but I believe that these 
delinquents should go to the common tribunals. 
Humanity recoils against special tribunals. 
Unfortunately, there has been revived in 
Costa Rica something which represents a 
retrogression to the Middle Ages.5^
The existence of such courts had been forbidden
in the Consitution of 1871 which the Junta had abrogated
on assuming office the provecto, or proposed new
constitution, which the Junta itself submitted to the
constituent assembly also prohibited the creation of
extra-legal courts. Yet it should not be inferred that
the Junta initiated a reign of terror. The courts
handed down no death sentences and did not conduct a
roundup of political opponents. It is said that they
did not even manage to recover a large amount of
property, causing Junta member Alberto MartSn to lament
later that "it was the worst scenario for us, We were
considered thieves, but we didn't make off with the
money.
54 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 194-9, 
Actas, I (San Josg: Imprenta Nacional, 1953), 371*
55 ColecciSn de' leyes. Primer de 1948, No. 2 of
May 8 ,
56 Interview with Alberto MartSn, Aug, 13, 19^7«
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A number of the Junta's economic measures drew as 
much fire as the creation of the special tribunals.
More than any Costa Rican president of the past, Figueres 
aimed at giving the government a leadership role in the 
economy. He favored a planned economy with extensive gov­
ernment direction— a balance, as he saw it, between 
capitalism and socialism. Figueres wanted to improve the 
living standards of the Costa Rican poor but rather than 
attacking the social problem directly, as CalderSn had, 
Figueres put greatest emphasis on economic reorientation, 
believing that a planned economy would yield abundance 
for all.^ Although his mastery of economics has 
been questioned, there was little doubt about the 
sincerity of his intentions.
The Junta came into office anxious to begin a 
program of public works, social services and economic 
reorganization but found it difficult to put such a 
program into effect. The economy had been in poor shape 
even before the revolution, and many business activities 
and government programs had come to a standstill during 
the revolution. The government's sources of revenue 
were limited and these were strained even further when 
the Junta decided that the government would assume the 
cost of the revolution, indemnifying those who had
57 JosS Figueres, Cartas a un ciudadano (San 
uosti Imprenta Nacional, 1956)* 51«
8?
suffered losses.
After about six weeks in office, the Junta
members discussed the difficulties of "fulfilling the
primordial ends of the revolution" within current
eg
budgetary limits, and decided to issue two decrees 
which raised a storm of protest among the elite. The 
decrees nationalized all private banks and imposed a 
ten percent capital levy on all resident persons or 
economic entities, Costa Rican or foreign, with a capital 
worth of 50*000 colones (about $9*000),^ The capital 
levy affected only the wealthy, many of whom had financed 
the anti-Calderfin movement and were furious at the Junta’s 
"ingratitude." They did everything in their power to 
circumvent the tax and were largely successful, because 
the law was difficult to enforce.
The tax probably had a negative effect on economic 
development because, as the Twentieth Century Fund Study 
Group who visited Costa Rica in 1950 noted, it led to 
the withdrawal of bank deposits, to hoarding and 
channeling of funds into easily concealed, and often
'58 ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 19^8, No. 33 
of May 25.
59 Junta Fundadora, "Actas, 11 entry for June 15, 
19^8. ,
60 ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 19^8 f No. 70 
and 71 of. June 21. . The government'paid generously for 
•the bank stocks at a cost of 70 million colones.
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6 *i
non-productive, outlets. In this way it reduced the 
volume of hank deposits and worked at cross purposes 
with the bank nationalization decree which was designed 
to put more money at the disposal of investors.
Costa Rican banks had been set up to facilitate 
foreign trade, and about two-thirds of their loans went 
to merchants and traders, with coffee planters absorbing 
a large portion of the loans available for agriculture. 
Figueres wanted to make more money available for long­
term capital investment in industry and diversified 
agriculture, and he was also anxious to establish a 
firmer grip over fluctuating prices and interest rates. J 
The nationalization of the commercial banks and the 
creation of a state-directed banking system would, 
as Figueres saw it, further these ends.
Under the new system, banks did gradually begin 
to direct more of their money toward agriculture and 
industry, but the nationalization decree was not followed 
by other legislation defining the functions of the banks
61 May, Costa Rica. 253*
62 Ibid.. 255.
63 JosS Figueres, Forque fueron nacionalizados 
los bancos comerciales (San Jos^j Imprenta Nacional, 
19^8), 4-5.
89*
under the new system and thus full utilization of the 
national banking system was not possible until a later 
period.
Less dramatic than the economic measures but 
probably of greater benefit to the country were a number 
of administrative reforms carried out by the Junta,
Costa Rica was in need of such reformj governmental 
inefficiency was by no means unique to the CalderSn 
administration. Part of the problem lay with the 
country's poorly organized governmental machinery and 
underpaid civil servants. The government had an ad hoc 
character, the personnel and policies changing at the end 
of each administration. The Junta was fairly successful 
in imparting a degree of stability and professionalism 
to the bureaucracy, despite the Junta's own early 
disruptive measures, such as the wholesale firing of 
political opponents.
The Junta reorganized the haphazardly structured 
ministries, raised government salaries, and took the first 
steps toward the creation of a civil service system and a 
comptroller general's office. Several government 
dependencies were transformed into autonomous institutes, 
one of Figueres' fondest schemes for decreasing the power
6^ U.S. Embassy, San Jos§, "Annual Economic 
Report for 1950*" prepared April 5, 1951*- Despatch No,
839, V.
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of the executive over government operations. ^  The 
autonomous institutes were government corporations, 
roughly similar to TVA. A few of them had existed in 
Costa Rica "beginning in 1914,^ but the Junta was the 
first government to introduce autonomous institutes on a 
large scale. ^
The men of the Junta put great store in the new 
constitution as a means of institutionalizing the 
administrative changes they had begun. The Junta had 
some clashes with the Constituent Assembly, the great
65 Jos6 Figueres, "Unity and Culture," in 
Harold Eugene Davis (ed.)f Latin American Social Thought 
(Washington: The University Press of Washington, D.C., 
1961) ,  480.
66 Rodrigo Facio, "La constitucion politics de 
1949 y la tendencia institucional," Revista de la 
Universidad de Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 108.
67 The idea behind the creation of the autonomous 
institutes was an admirable one and probably in many cases 
the system has worked well. The institutes, however, have 
led to some duplication of effort and confusion, and the 
numerous charges of presidential "meddling" indicate that 
the institutes are not always as autonomous as they were 
intended to be. 3y 1966 even the National Liberation Party 
had had second thoughts about the system and the party’s 
program that year urged "recognition of different degrees 
of autonomy.1! Partido Liberacion Nacional, Nuestro 
programs de traba.io. 1966-1970 (San JosS: Imprenta Vargas,
i9 60), :-4. For discussions of the autonomous institutes, 
see Joaquin Garro, La derrota del Partido Liberacion 
Nacional (San Joslr Imprenta Vargas, 1958), 12-14;and 
Mario Echandi, Los hombres pftblicos frente a los dineros 
publicos (San Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1962), 9-2^,
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6ftmajority of whose .delegates were supporters of Ulate
rather than the Junta, and many of whom were vocal
69critics of the Junta. The assembly, in a move which 
infuriated the Junta members, rejected the Junta's 
•proyecto as the basis for discussion in elaborating the 
new constitution and chose instead to use the 18?1
68 In December 19^8 the Junta held elections 
for representatives to the Constituent Assembly, The 
results were as follows 1
Partido Uni-fin Nacional (pro-Ulate)  ...... .3^ deputies
Partido Constitucional
(believed to be pro-Calder6n)......... 6 deputies
Partido Social Demficrata ( p r o - J u n t a d e p u t i e s  
Partido Confraternidad Nacional (regional)...1 deputy*
Garro, Veinte afios, 3 6.
Yery similar results came from elections held in 
October 19^9 for .two vice presidents and 4-5 congressmen 
to be installed when Ulate was inaugurated in November. 
In the October elections, Ulate*s National Union Party 
won both the vice presidential posts and 33 of the ^5  
deputy positions. The Constitutional Party finished a 
poor second and the Social Democrats came in third. 
Ulate, the presumed president-elect, had not had to 
stand for election. The Junta, in accordance with the 
Ulate-Figueres Pact, had recognized Ulate*s election.
New York Times. Oct. k, 19^9 s and John Martz, Central 
America; The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill; 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 230.
69 The best source* of information on the 
Constituent Assembly is Rubfin HemSndez Poveda, Desde la 
barra; cfimo se discutifi v- emitifi la Constitucifin 
Pollticade 19^9 ISan Jose: Editorial Borrase, 1953)•
Desde la barra is based on HernSndez Poveda's daily 
column in La Prensa Libre on the assembly events.
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70constitution. Each section of the proyecto was
carefully considered, however, and in the end the
majority of the innovations found in the proyecto were
71incorporated into the 19^9 constitution.( Chief among 
these were the abolition of the army;^ the outlawing of 
Communist parties; female suffrage; autonomy for the 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal; provisions for a civil 
service system; and a number of measures designed to 
reduce executive power. Among the last were provisions 
for autonomous institutes and a somewhat greater role 
for municipal bodies and the national legislature; 
popular election of vice presidents instead of the 
appointment of presidential "designatesand a 
provision requiring ex-presid'ents to- wait eight years
70 HemSndez Poveda,. Desde la barra. 1 1 6,
71 Ibid.. 152-53.
72 The decision to abolish the army was largely 
a symbolic gesture, but also led to some reduction in' 
government.expenditures. On December 1, 19^8. Figueres 
announced the disbanding of the Army of* National 
Liberation— the army of the republic had been disbanded 
following its .defeat by the revolutionary forces— but 
said that a 1 ,0 0 0 man national; police'*'force and. 7 00-man 
Coast Guard would be maintained. New York Times. Dec. 2, 
19^8 , Thus, the army was abolished in name, but not in 
fact. One observer reports that these public security 
forces have since carried out. many of the functions 
normally performed by armed forces and that they, in 
this sense, constitute an army. Wayne Lamond Worthington, 
"The Costa Rican Public Security Forces; A Model Armed 
Force for Emerging Nations?," (unpublished M.A, thesis, 
University of Florida, 1966), 135.
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"73before standing for reelection to the presidency. ^
During its eighteen months in office, the Junta 
issued 844 decree-laws which significantly affected 
Costa Rican life. Although they were not innovators in 
the area of social reform, the men of the Junta kept 
CalderCn's social reform program intact which was more 
than Costa Ricans had ejected. And the Junta made large 
and permanent changes in the political system and 
administrative machinery, as well as in the government’s 
role in the economy,
What was the role of traditional political 
figures during the Junta period? Most of them became 
critics of the Junta, but due to the Junta's uniquely 
powerful position, opponents of the regime could do little 
more than register ineffectual protest. Otilio Ulate 
soon became- disenchanted with the Junta program, but only 
later did he become openly and harshly critical of 
Figueres and his group. Ulate seems to have felt bound 
by the pact with Figueres, to the extent that he several 
times publicly defended the Junta when it was under 
attack. During one short-lived revolt against the Junta,
73 On the 194-9 constitution see Facio, "La 
constituciSn polltica;" HernSndez Poveda, Desde la barra; 
and HernSn G. Peralta, Las constituciones de Costa' Rica 
(Madridi Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1 9 6 2), 111-18,
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when it appeared* that the rebels would offer Ulate the 
presidency, Ulate said that he was "lOOfo behind 
Figueres" and refused to back the revolt.^ When 
CalderCn forces led an abortive invasion from Nicaragua 
in December, 1948,^ Ulate offered to help the
76government and served briefly as a member of the Junta.
Ulate made no attempt to pressure the Junta out 
of office prematurely. He even went along, when the Junta 
members requested a six months* extension— which they 
later decided not to use. Speaking to the Constituent
74 New York Times, April 3» 1949.
75 'Ehe invasion was due as much to poor Costa 
Rican-Nicaraguan relations as to Calderon's desire to 
overthrow Figueres. The OAS team sent, at Costa Rica's 
request, to investigate the incident was critical of 
both countries, Nicaragua was blamed for failure to 
prevent CalderCn*s invasion. Costa Rica was censured for 
harboring members of the Caribbean Legion who aimed at 
the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. For the 
OAS report see Robert Burr, The Dynamics of World Power;
A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy. 
1945-1973. Ill (New York: Clelsea House, 1973), 106.
76 ColecciCn de leves. Segundo de 1948, No. 301 
of Dec.. -11. Ulate may .have been more of a thorn-in the 
Junta's side than a help, because he thought .the 
government was taking heavy-handed measures during the 
invasion. For*-example, on December 20, nine days 
after the invasion, Ulate asked that civil liberties 
suspended during the emergency be restored, but the 
Junta did not vote to restore them until January 1 0,
Junta Fundadora, "Actas," entries for Dec, 20, 1948 and 
Jan, 10, 1949.
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Assembly in support of the Junta request, Ulate
explained that:
I have some discrepancies with the Junta,.. 
but I could not bring myself to deny my 
confidence to those who have won it through 
struggle and danger and who have since 
dedicated themselves to national service. 77
While Ulate*s Diario did occasionally criticize the
Junta, in the main Ulate seems to have waited until he
78could have a turn at the helm,1
77 Asainblea, Actas, I, 175*
78 El Diario gave fairly balanced treatment to 
the Junta. Covering the controversial bank nationali­
zation decree, for example, the newspaper quoted Chamber 
of Commerce figures and business leaders as expressing 
concern, but also printed a quite favorable commentary 
from another source. El Diario. June 22, 23 and 2 6 , 1948,
CHAPTER XV 
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION: I
THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM
Ulate*s Political Beliefs and Program
Better than any Costa Rican since Ricardo 
JimSnez, with whom he has been compared,**" Otilio Ulate 
represented the ideals of 1889. As he made clear from 
the day of his inauguration, Ulate believed in Costa 
Rica*s traditional way of life and thought that further 
radical transformations of the country were not 
desirable at that time. He had a Burkean belief that 
change should evolve naturally from existing institutions 
and customs and he felt that timing was important in 
determining what path was appropriate. Ulate was not a 
natural innovator, concentrating instead on making 
existing programs and institutions work well.
Illustrative of his practical, straightforward approach 
was his remark, just before taking office, that he wanted 
the government to operate like a business.
1 ..Costa Rieaii'historian/Carlos* KelSndez and 
Ulate*s-sometime-political associate Mario Echandi both 
noted similarities between Ulate and Ricardo Jimgnez whom 
Ulate admired. Interviews in San JosS, June, 197^.
2 El Diario de Costa Rica, Nov, 1, 19^9.
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Ulate*s chief political tenet was his belief in 
democracy and civil liberties. Violations of the suffrage 
produced an intransigence which was otherwise rare in 
Ulate. For example, despite his opposition to the elec­
tion of Teodoro Ficado as president in 19^* Ulate would 
not give full backing to Picado's opponent Ledn CortSs 
because of CortSs* authoritarian reputation.*^ Ulate*s 
criticism of the Calderfin regime had early centered on 
Calderfin's undemocratic methods of keeping power and 
dealing with political opponents, and this was the key 
theme that El Diario hammered home throughout the Calde- 
r6n years. There were other political figures with whom 
Ulate had more serious ideological differences, but his 
distaste for Calder(5n*s undemocratic practices was such 
that the usually amiable and conciliatory Ulate avoided
h,
personal contact with Calderfin for the rest of his life,
3 John Patrick Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica: The 
19^8 Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Latin 
American Monographs No, 2^, 1971), 111.
4 In the mid-1960*s Ulate found it politically 
expedient .to effect a temporary political coalition be­
tween his National Union Party and Calderfin's National 
Republican Party for the 1966 elections, Ulate*s friend 
Dr, Jorge Vega said, however, that throughout the lengthy 
negotiations and political campaign Ulate avoided direct 
contact with Calderon, interview with Jorge Vega, San 
Jos§, June 5, 197^* Ulate did have a ceremonial meeting 
with Calderdn when President. Mario Echandi brought to­
gether the three protagonists of the 19^8 revolution—  
Ulate, CalderCn and Figueres— for a symbolic gesture of 
national unity in i9 6 0. Interview with Mario Echandi,
San Jos§, June 6 , 197^.
Ulate's most deep-seated and consistent political 
commitment, then, was not to program or to party, hut to 
the political process itself. As he explained his 
feelings:
X have a passion for free suffrage, a 
devotion to free suffrage, and on this 
point I have never had any vacillation or 
any weakness. I think suffrage can redeem 
America from dictators,5
It had been the tradition in Costa Rica for the 
president to oversee, and to a certain extent, to 
influence the electoral process; hut under Presidents 
CortSs and CalderSn the interference became more 
pronounced. Thus, Ulate's view— perhaps a hit simplis-' 
tic— was that the threat to Costa Rican democracy began 
at that time. Criticizing an attempt in 19^3 to increase 
presidential control over the electoral machinery, Ulate 
said: "When the first step is taken, the ones that
follow lead to the precipice.,.the path of diminishing 
the suffrage right leads, necessarily and fatally, to the 
single party.
Ulate felt that the president should not even 
show a preference toward any candidate, because "like
5 Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa Rica 
el Sefior Presidente Figueres? fSan JosSt Imprenta 
Universal, 1955), 31.
6 Ibid., 32.
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Caesar's wife, the president must not only be honest, he 
must appear honest.' Commenting on President Cortes' 
support of CalderSn's candidacy in 1939, Ulate complained 
that Costa Rican democracy was weakened just by the
Q
association of the government with a political party.
Otilio Ulate thought that the principal test of
a democratic government was its willingness to guarantee
civil liberties to its citizens. He felt that suspension
of civil liberties was justifiable only in emergencies
which were "imminent and of vast proportions" or else
such suspensions could come to be used as a political
g
instrument to carry out persecutions.
As we have seen, Ulate criticized CalderCn 
openly on the grounds that he neglected to assure the 
safety of citizens in political activities, once closing 
his newspapers in protest. Ulate's criticism of the 
Junta's suspension of civil liberties because of 
perceived threats of national security was less 
pronounced, but he did press the Junta to shorten the
7 Interview with Otilio Ulate, San JosS,
July 27, 1967.
8 Ulate, Hacia donde, 31,
9 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del presidente 
constitucional de la retyfiblica de Costa Rica, a la 
honorable as amblea legislativa, el 1° de Mayo, de 1952 
(San Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1952)7 3-
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periods of emergency rule. 10 Coming to power after a
decade of authoritarian, or undemocratic, rule, Ulate
put stress on returning the country to constitutional
democracy. He took great pride in telling the Legislative
Assembly, in his last annual report as president, that
constitutional liberties had been suspended "not one day,
nor one hour, nor. one minute" during his tenure. 11
Along with restoring constitutional government
and democracy, Ulate hoped to put an end to the bitterness
caused by the revolution. He believed that history had
shown the wisdom of granting amnesty after conflicts and
that Costa Rica, in particular, had followed this path;
Throughout the whole history of the country, 
at the end of armed conflicts, the conqueror 
has managed to achieve a reconciliation and 
has been benevolent with the vanquished, 
granting him political amnesty. 12
This spirit of conciliation, he believed, helped to
account for the country's relatively tranquil history.
Ulate's belief in amnesty was part of his
conviction that, with few exceptions, all had the right
to participate in the life of the nation. As he told the
10 See, for example, Junta Fundadora de la 
Segunda Republica, "Actas de las sesiones" (unpublished 
transcript"), entry for Dec, 2 0 , 19^8 , cited in chapter 3 .
11 Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie. 29.
12 Ulate, Hacia donde. 30,
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Costa Rican legislature in asking for a general amnesty
for CalderSn supporters, Costa Rica must demonstrate that
13"there is equality of opportunity for all." Ulate.also 
let it he known that those who had fled the country after 
the overthrow of Picado could return during his
Ik
presidency. When there were complaints about Manuel 
Mora*s return, Ulate simply said that he would enforce 
the constitution, which allowed all Costa Rican, citizens 
freely to leave and return to the country.^
Ulate*s attitude toward Mora stemmed from his 
belief that the nation was strong enough to accommodate 
differences and to withstand challenges. A practical 
governor, rather than an ideologue with a specific 
program to put into effect, he was more liberal in his 
attitude toward opposing groups than was, for example, 
the Junta of 19^8-19^9. The leaders of the Junta had 
turned to revolution to defend democracy, but once in 
power the Junta had shown a reluctance to share the 
freedom it had sought to save. One is reminded of Guido
13 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie. ba 
lb El Diario. Dec. 17, 19^9.
15 Ibid.. Jan. 29, 1950. Such a provision had 
been included in the chapter on civil liberties of Costa 
Rican constitutions at least as early as 1 85 9, HemSn 
Go Peralta, las constituciones de Costa Rica (Madrid* 
Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1962), 4-00, 465.
10 2
de Ruggiero's comment concerning the sometime intolerance
of liberal parties:
It often happens that the very energy with 
which Liberals defend their own cause destroys 
their calm estimation of the difficulties and 
makes them unjust toward their adversaries 
and therefore in the last resort, dogmatic 
and illiberal. 16
While Ulate was more tolerant of political 
opposition, his record with regard to the Communist 
Party was not entirely consistent. He defended the 
right of individual Communists to civil liberties but 
showed some ambivalence about the Party's right to 
participate in the political process. Although always 
opposed to Gommunism, Ulate had been an early defender 
of the Party's right to carry on political activities 
and, during the 1939-19^0 presidential campaign, he 
even found himself on the same side of the fence as 
Mora when they both backed Ricardo JimSnez' candidacy,^ 
As the Communist Party's influence in the 
government grew after 19^2 , however, and Ulate's concern 
over' GalderCns pact with the Communists increased, his 
statements about the Party's right to exist became more 
equivocal. He once went so far as to praise the 
legislature's decision to outlaw Vanguardia Popular as a
•16. -Guido de. Ruggiero, “The History of European 
Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959)» 360,
1? JimSnez eventually withdrew from the race and 
did not contest Calderon Guardia at the polls.
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"just and prudent" move# On a later occasion, however,
Ulate said that a Communist Party should he allowed to
function in Costa Rica and that Costa Rica could afford
to let the Party take its chances at the polls, ^  Still
later, when a proposal to legalize the Communist Party
in time for the 1970 elections was heing discussed,
Ulate expressed the opinion that "Communism is not a
current problem for Costa Rica" and hence there was no
20need for a campaign against it. And in a diary of 
random political thoughts which he kept during his later 
years, Ulate scored the use of "anti-Communist atti­
tudes...as a justification for the economic and social 
paralysis in which our countries are living at the 
present time."^'
Ulate's views thus seemed shaped by the circum­
stances. His close associate Lie, Fernando Lara says
that Ulate always believed that Communists should be
22allowed to form a Party and function in Costa Rica.
18 Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie. 11.
19 New York Times. July 25, 1953*
20 Recording of Ulate*s response to a newsman’s
question, "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate."
21 Otilio Ulate, unpublished diary, Otilio Ulate
Papers.
22 Interview with Lie. Lara, San JosS, June 5,
197^0
While -this may he true, he did seem willing to support
the ban against Vanguardia Popular because of his
conviction that that party was responsible for much of
the discord of the 19^0 *s.
Other than his belief in constitutional democracy,
Ulate never espoused a definite political philosophy.
In the tradition of Costa Rica's personalistic leaders,
he disliked the idea of adherence to a set ideology,
citing Miguel de Unamuno's statement that "of all
tyrannies, the tyranny of ideas is the most odious."
Ulate explained his thinking:
i have more faith in personalistic parties 
than in ideological parties. Costa Rica 
owes more to her illustrious leaders, 
through their teachings and public actions, 
than to principles.23
In part, Ulate's reluctance to see the
development of ideologically-based political parties in
Costa Rica may have been due to his unwillingness to
release the strong personal hold he retained over his
own National Union Party until his death. Ulate's
opposition, however, went deeper than that; he was
skeptical about the very nature of ideological parties,
believing that they were used to keep one group in power
on the pretext of providing continuity of policy.
23 Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie,
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Ulate wrote!
Alternation in power is an essential 
condition of Costa Rican democracy,,■ 
neither with the pretext of the continuity 
of a regimen of ideas..,nor with any other 
pretext should governmental groups try to ’ 
pass one government to another.24
Judging from his experiences during the 19^0's with the 
Communist Party, Ulate also believed that such ideolo­
gical parties were divisive and led to conflict rather 
than conciliation. In the style of 1 8 8 9, Ulate*s 
objective was government by consensus in which, whenever 
possible, the government tried to obtain the acceptance 
of the country's leadership and major segments of the 
population for major initiatives before launching them.
In a sense, however, Ulate longed for a past, approach to 
government to which his own political methods did not 
belong. Ulate had risen to national prominence through 
his fiery editorials, and he remained all his life a 
tough scrapper, launching verbal attacks against 
politicians and programs he disliked.
Although he claimed to eschew ideology, Ulate did 
have a coherent approach to national problems. Ke 
believed in the private enterprise system, once 
describing this as a major difference between his views 
and those of JosS Figueres* National Liberation .Party
2k El Diario.- Feb. 10, 1953.
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whose proclivities for government control he 
2 5distrusted,  ^ In a speech at Columbia University, Ulate
esqplained his opposition to all forms of statism:
Every growth of the state comes at the 
expense of society, of its vital forces, at 
the cost of its historical spontaneity,,,.
At the present time the democracies are 
committing the error of delegating to the 
state certain functions of prepotency and 
absorption normally found only in totalitarian 
regimes. 26
One of Ulate’s chief complaints about the Alliance
for Progress was that it placed too much faith in the
governments of Latin America and made no allowance for
the participation of the local private sector in
27development programs. ' Ulate*s attitude toward other 
aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations was a mixture 
of two impulses. In the main, Ulate admired the United 
States, which he considered the country where democracy 
had come nearest to perfection.
But Ulate was critical of some aspects of 
American foreign policy, such as support for dictators 
within the hemisphere. Ulate was opposed to any 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries 
but felt that Latin dictators, because of their military
25 - Otilio Ulate, response to questionnaire from 
newsman Sidney Lens, Aug. 31, 1963, Ulate Papers,
26 Otilio Ulate, "Responsible Freedom in the 
Americas! The Individual and the State," Vital Speeches. 
XXI (Oct, 195^-Oct. 1955), 969-70.
2? Sidney Lens questionnaire; Lara interview.
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connections, had a natural advantage in competition with 
democracies and that democratic governments should he 
given all aid consistent with correct relations. In a 
speech to the Inter-American Press Association in New 
Orleans, he expressed his view that "as long as the Inter- 
American system gives equal treatment to dictatorship
and democracy, tyrants will prosper and overcome
28democracy.
Ulate thought that many Latin dictators owed
their origin to United States arms sales and military
assistance, which he particularly opposed because of his
fear of militarism in the region. Ulate*s message to the
United States was that*
Countries in which democracy is just talcing 
root, such as ours, should not be militarized 
because that weakens a country's institutions, 
puts suffrage in danger and tempts would-be 
dictators, nor is there any need for arms and 
an army because...the Inter-American System 
has the necessary material elements for the 
defense of countries which suffer aggression. 29
Ulate also had disagreements with the United
States over economic matters. Like many Latins, he
believed that some of the vast amount of U.S. economic
assistance to Europe after World War II might better have
28 Hispanic American Report. VIII, No. 11 
(Dec. 1955)•
29 Ulate, Hacia donde, 8 .
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been spent in Latin America. And he shared another
common Latin concern about the preponderant influence of
U.S. companies and multinational corporations over the
economies of the smaller Latin countries, such as Costa
Rica. Ulate's approach to government, however, was a
pragmatic one, and he believed that at Costa Rica's
stage of development private foreign investment was
necessary. Defending his position to villagers whose
town had just been electrified with the aid of foreign
capital, Ulate said:
I also suffered from ultra-nationalism, 
irreconcilable with foreign capital— to 
which one always attributes an absorbing 
and imperialistic tendency--when I did not 
have the responsibility of the office which 
I now hold...but, seeing things from the 
inside, one has to think whether our means 
are sufficient and whether, disdaining 
foreign capital, we are harming higher 
interests which we have no right to dispose 
of arbitrarily. 31
Ulate was generally fair to foreign investors, taking
the position that, as long as foreign capital was needed,
it should have the same treatment as Costa R i c a n . H e
said that Costa Rica should ask "just retribution" from
the foreign investor but also offer him security for his
30 Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan Marshall y nueva 
politics intemacional americana," America. LVI (Jan.- 
June.1958), 8 .
31 El Diario. Aug. 8 , 1950.
32 Sidney Lens questionnaire. See also Stacy 
May, Costa Rica. 295-96, 301.
33investment.
Ulate prided himself on having the same sort of 
evenhanded approach in his dealings with foreign 
countries. Despite his "belief that democracies should 
deny military assistance to dictatorial regimes, Ulate 
believed it was the duty of a head of state in other ways 
to maintain correct relations. As a private citizen he 
had frequently criticized Nicaragua's Luis Scmoza and 
Guatemalan strongman Jorge Ubico, and even allowed exiles 
from Guatemala to use column space in his paper to 
express their views. As head of state, however, he 
considered it his duty to avoid involvement in partisan 
causes, and asserted that "the president cannot act in
3ii
the same way as the journalist."^
Ulate was for this reason critical of Figueres' 
support of the Caribbean Legion and opposed the decision 
of Figueres, who was president of Costa Rica in 195^» to 
boycott the tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas 
as a protest against the P€rez Jimgnez r e g i m e . L i k e  
the leaders of. many small countries, Ulate believed that 
Costa Rica should rely heavily on international 
organizations for defense and economic assistance. He
33 El Diario. Aug, 8 , 1950* 
3^ Ulate, Hacia donde, 22. 
35 Ibid., 1^-15.
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disliked Figueres' action "because he thought it cast 
Costa Rica in the role of detractor of the inter- 
American system.^
In truth, Ulate never had much interest in the
domestic politics of other countries, either as president
or as a journalist. His editorials against Somoza over
the years were directed against Nicaraguan intervention
in Costa Rican affairs rather than against Somoza's
domestic policies. In the main, he was interested in the
politics of other countries only in so far as they
related to Costa Rica, believing in the "traditional
37serenity and isolation of the ticos, He was part of 
a national tradition that had a "Middle Kingdom" view 
of Costa Rica, seeing the country as unique in Central 
America, superior to its neighbors and best kept aloof 
from their quarrels.
Ulate's admiration for Costa Rica and its 
historical development made him reluctant to advocate 
radical change, and this attitude may have influenced his
36 Figueres persisted despite Ulate*s views, 
writing to the Secretary General of the OAS that Costa 
Rica would not attend the Caracas meeting "until there 
is a change in the human rights conditions prevailing 
there." Jos£ Figueres, Letter to the Secretarla General 
de la Qrganizacion de Estados Americanos, Feb, 17, 195^» 
Partido Liberacidn Nacional Papers,
37 Ulate, Hacia donde, 2k» Ticos is the nickname 
for Costa Ricans.
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approach to social problems. It is difficult to 
pinpoint Ulate's beliefs on the social reform issue 
because, like most Costa Rican leaders of the past, he 
had no clear program of social reform, only a series of 
responses to particular problems. like most of the 
Opposition, he had spoken out against CalderCn's social 
legislation, but like the others he had given no very 
concrete reasons for his views.
Ulate probably shared the feelings and the 
dilemma of most of Costa Rica's traditional leaders in 
this regard. They did not like Calderfin's new, mass- 
scale social welfare programs— either because they feared 
the Labor Code would threaten their prerogatives, or 
because they believed that such programs were not a 
proper government concern. At the same time, most of 
them subscribed— at least verbally and in many cases 
quite sincerely— to the popular conception of Costa Rica 
as a land of few class antagonisms and of mutual concern 
for the public well-being. They did not feel comfortable 
opposing the legislation, especially since CalderCn had 
invoked the name of the Church and presented his program 
in highly moral terms. Thus, no one wanted to speak 
against the legislation per se. Rather than attacking 
the reform.in-:principle, detractors focused on secondary 
considerations, pointing out--quite correctly— that the 
programs were poorly financed, were sometimes headed.^ .by
112
Communists, and were "being used by Calderfin for political
purposes. These were the views of Costa Rican
conservatives of good faith in the early 1940's and the
views to which Ulate probably subscribed.
By the time of the 1948 election the situation
had changed. The social reform laws, once on the books,
gradually began to seem like part of the environment, at
least to less intransigent members of the elite, such as
Ulate, who had always been more concerned about
CalderCn's undemocratic practices than about the
legislation. During the 1948 campaign Ulate, either
because he realized the laws were popular or because he
had decided the programs would work well once divorced
from calderonismo, pledged to maintain existing social
welfare legislation. Still condemning CalderGn, while
endorsing his program, Ulate vowed*
The Opposition will maintain and defend 
the Social Legislation [but],, .S ocial 
Legislation must not be the resource of 
a single party for distribution as a favor 
but rather an effective progress of an 
economic democracy, 38
The sincerity of such statements was open to 
question, since Ulate's supporters included businessmen 
and landowners who continued to oppose social reform.
The degree of influence these people had with Ulate over 
the years is a matter of conjecture, but they may simply
38 El Diario. Feb. 6, 1948.
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have hacked the business like Ulate as the lesser of
evils. Ulate was not inclined to yield to pressure; as
we have seen, he suffered considerable financial losses
over matters of principle, and he was not at all wealthy
when he died. Ulate seemed genuinely concerned about
the poor and once stated that Latin American democracy
could best be preserved by a strong social reform
movement.^9 Entries in his political diary indicate
areas of concern and also show Ulate's practical, one-
by-one approach to problems:
Nobody has worried about rural housing,,,,
It is embarrassing to think that the project 
for Rural Sanitation of the Health Department 
has not been carried out at a national level,... 
All the districts of the Republic should be 
included in a plan to provide rural housing 
with latrines, sc that each one of the 
peasants of Costa Rica will have a latrine 
with the appropriate hygienic conditions.,..
So many demagogues, every four years, 
dramatise the necessity for Agrarian Reform, 
but none of them has presented a project 
that explains how to carry it out.^O
Ulate himself, however, was not given to the
formation of systematic, government-directed programs of
social reform. He had the conservative's concept of the
negative role of government— that government was
primarily designed to clear obstacles to the natural
39 Television address by Otilio Ulate, May 2, 
1962, cited in a letter to Ulate from Benjamin Nufiez, 
May 5» 1962, Ulate Papers.
^0 Ulate, unpublished diary, Ulate Papers.
course of life. Coining to office after the traumatic 
19^0's, Ulate put greatest emphasis on restoration rather 
than new avenues of government activity, In his first 
annual message to congress, Ulate described his chief 
goals i
I seek only one more glory: that when I
leave office, those who voted for me and 
those who did not will both be of the 
opinion that I guarded as my own two 
properties of theirs: the freedom of
suffrage, -with the other fundamental
■ freedoms; and the public treasury. With
confidence rebuilt, the rest was less difficult. 
My first task, therefore, was to restore 
the Nation's confidence,4l
The Situation in the Country
Otilio Ulate faced ma.jor problems when he assumed
power from the Pounding Junta of the Second Republic on
November 8, 19^9» The atmosphere in the country during 
the past several years had been more conducive to 
destroying the first republic than to building a second, 
The corruption and maladministration of the CalderSn 
years, the poorly financed social programs and public 
works of CalderSn and Picado had left a legacy of 
financial disorders which the Junta had not been able to 
alleviate and which, in some cases, had worsened under 
the Junta. There had not been a balanced budget since
^1 Ulate, 1950 Mensa.is.
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. 42194-0. As the Twentieth Century Fund Study Group 
pointed out, ."public finances in Costa Rica were in a 
sorry state" during the 1940's. ^
Costa Rica's internal debt had increased 
dramatically since 1948, chiefly as a result of the
i4.iL
revolutionary costs and bank nationalisation. The
foreign debt had not been serviced since 1942. Costa
Rica's commercial debt was such that the foreign trade
on which the country was very dependent was threatened by
h.c
a serious foreign exchange problem. The shortage of
foreign exchange was so severe that one congressional
deputy said simply, "No hay divisas— there is no foreign 
46 'exchange" with which to pay for further imports.
42 U.S. Embassy, San Jose, "Annual Economic 
Report, 1949," prepared April 17, 1950, Despatch No. 3891 
1-2; and "Annual Economic Report, 1950," prepared April 5, 
1951, Despatch No. 839» 4.
43 Stacy May et al.. Costa Rica; A Study in 
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952J, 281.
44 U.S. Embassy, "1949 Report," 2, 35*
45 U.S. Embassy, "1949 Report," 1-2, 29-30;
"1950 Report," 4-5, 33-34-.
46 El Diario, Feb. 17, 1950. See also El Diario 
of Dec. 2, 1949 for a discussion of the "disastrous 
situation" which Ulate's undersecretary of. finance said 
he found on entering office.
Junta Minister Gonzalo. Facio protested such 
characterizations. He claimed that the economy was in 
even worse shape when the Junta took office and that the 
Junta had actually made some improvements. El Diario,
June 13, 1950.
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This deteriorated economic situation was in part 
the result of government attempts to finance social 
welfare programs, but these programs were not in good 
working order when Ulate took office. Many of the programs 
had never been given sufficient funding and, in addition, 
many of the programs of the CalderSn years had broken down 
during the revolution, and the Junta had been able to 
revive only a part of them. The labor movement had also 
suffered a setback during the Junta period when one of 
the country's two major labor confederations, the Confede- 
racion de Trabajadores de Costa Rica, was declared illegal 
because of its Communist orientation. State-decreed wage 
increases were theoretically in force in much of the 
country in 19^9, but high inflation tended to nullify 
their effects•
Costa Rica had to import several basic foodstuffs 
at a relatively high cost to consumers, and partly for 
this reason, the average Costa Rican had a diet 
significantly less nutritious than that of the average
LlQ
American. The government had no basic agricultural 
program, despite the importance of such a program in an 
agricultural country. One of the purposes of the bank
^7 Franklin Parker, The Central American Republics 
(Londom Oxford University Press,196^), 291.
4-8 May, Costa Rica, ^4-48 .
11?
nationalization had "been to provide additional credit
for diversified agriculture, "but comprehensive 'oank
legislation had not followed the nationalization, and the
role that the nationalized banking system was to play
Llq
was not clearly defined. 17
Political and social cleavages in the country 
were perhaps as serious a problem as the economic 
dislocations. A long period of tension had culminated in 
the revolution, which had been the bloodiest in Costa 
Rica's history. Costa Rica, as we have seen, had had 
fewer internal disturbances than other countries in 
Central America and, of the revolts that had taken place, 
many were minor affairs with little or no loss of life. 
The 19^8 "revolution of national liberation" was 
something different. Some 2,000 men-’0 lost their lives 
during the six weeks' revolt, a number roughly equivalent 
in terms of the country's population to ten times the 
number of Americans who died in the Vietnam war. Pro­
government forces had sustained almost all of the 
the casualties, with less than one hundred from among 
the revolutionaries.
^9 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1950,"
h.
50 Costa Rica's population in 1950 was 600,875. 
Costa Rica, DirecciSn General de Estadistica y Censos, 
Censo de noblacifln, 22 de mayo de 19SO (San JosS: 
Ministerio da Economia y Hacienda, 1953), 5^.
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In the circumstances, conciliatory measures by 
the victorious revolutionaries seemed called for, hut 
it is not the nature of revolutionary governments to show 
charity to the vanquished. The Junta— which still 
perceived a threat to the country from calderonistas and 
Communists— was no exception. A number of Junta measures 
rubbed salt into the wounds of caldemnistas. Calderfin 
followers were particularly embittered by the Junta's 
decision to void the general amnesty pact signed with 
President Ficado, a decision taken so early in the Junta 
period as to raise doubts about whether the pact was 
signed in good faith. Chief opponents of the Junta—  
CalderCn, Mcra and oxhers— remained in forced or self- 
imposed exile during the Junta period, thus providing a 
continuing source of anti-government feeling. Plots 
against the Junta government, arrests, suspension of civil 
liberties and an invasion by exiled elements had all 
helped to keep tension high throughout the Junta period.
Public confidence in the government was low. 
Business circles were angered by CalderCn's social 
legislation and then stunned by the Junta's bank 
nationalization and capital levy, which were far more 
serious to them. Business activity declined and was slow 
to recover after the bank and levy decrees in June, 19^8, 
thus further contributing to the country's economic 
problems.
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Many Costa Ricans perceived government actions 
of the past decade as a threat to democracy. The Junta 
had done much to restore faith in democracy by holding 
two fair elections and abiding by the results— which 
were unfavorable for the Junta. The Junta itself, 
however, ruling through decrees and without a congress 
or constitution, probably added to Costa Ricans' perception 
of their government as becoming authoritarian. Accustomed 
to a less assertive government, Costa Ricans during the 
Junta period felt somewhat uncomfortable waiting for 
what was called the "gacetazo" or "blow from the official 
gazette,"-'
If Ulate faced problems, he also came to office 
with certain advantages. The Junta, through its 
Institutional reforms and several far-sighted suggestions 
for the constitution, had laid the groundwork for a 
governmental system and bureaucratic structure better 
equipped to meet the needs of the Costa Rican state. 
Political developments also favored Ulate. It could be 
argued that CalderSn and the Junta, however questionable 
their methods, had undertaken needed reforms and that 
Ulate was now coming in with clean hands to collect the
51 The Junta issued an average of three decree-
laws every two days during the 13-month government,
Because laws were so numerous and because no congress was
m  session to debate proposals, there was sometimes no
notipn in the country that ..legislative action was under 
consideration until a new decree was published m
La Gaceta.
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spoils. Simply by standing for democracy, order and 
tolerance, the new president had a broad appeal to Costa 
Ricans of all classes. Judging from the lopsided 
victories his party had won in the two elections held 
during the Junta administration, the country appeared to 
have endorsed Ulate even more completely than when he ran 
for president in 19^8, Thirty-three of the forty-five 
congressmen elected to the new congress installed at the 
time of his inauguration were members of Ulate's National 
Union Party, and Ulate himself is said to have come'into 
office with greater popular support than any previous 
president.^2
Costa Ricans wanted to believe in Ulate, a man 
who had built his reputation on the defense of civil 
liberties. Both of the forces which had challenged Costa 
Rica's traditional system— the calderonistas and the 
Figueres group— were at least partially discredited. 
Ulate's administration, therefore, appeared to offer the 
traditional system Ulate represented a chance to reassert 
itself.
52 New York Times, Nov. 9, 19^9
CHAPTER V 
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION: II 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY
Economic Reconstruction and Development
Ulate made it clear from the first that he 
regarded the economic situation as the country's 
paramount problem and the one which would absorb most of 
his attention, at least initially. He also stressed that 
the economic issues to be addressed first would be those 
involving a restoration of the country's financial 
position. Development programs would have to wait until 
the house was set in order.
In farewell remarks to employees at the office of 
El Diario. Ulate stated some of his immediate goals, 
giving particular attention to the foreign exchange 
problem,^ Costa Rica had a backlog of over $17 million 
in unpaid commercial debts, as compared to the country's
p
international monetary reserves of less than $6 million.
1 El Diario de Costa Rica. Nov, 1, 19^9*
2 U.S. Embassy, San JosS, "Annual Economic 
Report, 1950," prepared April 5i 1951* Despatch No. 339* 
3^.
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This was an unhealthy, if not unusual, discrepancy for a 
small nation so dependent on foreign trade. Costa Rica 
had begun having balance of payments difficulties during 
the war, but at first the adverse trade balance was 
offset by the influx of U.S. government expenditures in 
connection with the Pan American Highway and later by 
United Fruit Company's capital expenditures in the 
country. The Costa Rican government had always drawn a 
large percentage of its revenue from customs receipts 
and was reluctant to limit imports. As the situation 
continued with no effective action to reverse it, however, 
Costa Rica's currency, the colfrn. declined in value and 
this, in turn, worsened the inflation which already had 
been high for a number of years. Both the inflation and 
the trade imbalance were related, in part, to laws and 
governmental machinery inadequate to deal with the 
country's problems.
The Ulate administration's first major act, 
therefore, was the proposal of a Law for the Control of 
International Transactions. First, the law created two 
markets for foreign exchange. For purchasers of imports 
considered most important for the country, there was a 
market through which dollars could be obtained at the
3 Stacy May, et. al.. Costa Rica; A Study in 
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952)» 286,
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official rate; for all other imports, a "free" or "street"
market v/as created in which importers could obtain
dollars for a greater number of colones at rates
determined by supply and demand. In addition, the law
placed "surcharges" of 10, 55» 75 or 100 percent on
imports, the figure varying according to the country's
bneed for the item. By thus discouraging imports in 
excess of the country's ability to pay for them, the 
government was able to eliminate the backlog of requests 
for foreign exchange in April, 1951; subsequently, Costa 
Rica began building foreign exchange reserves.-’
The law considerably increased the cost of most 
imports; thus it was not popular and was frequently
b Costa Rica, ColecciSn de leves. decretos. 
acuerdos v resoluciones, Primer Sernestre de 1950 (San 
JosS: Imprenta Nacionai, 1950), No, 11^8 of March 28,
Ulate suggested such a law even before he came 
into office, but before it could go into effect, the 
United States had to agree to waive rights granted under a 
1936 commercial treaty in which Costa Rica and the U.S. 
gave preferential treatment to each other. Because most 
of Costa Rica's exports had ready markets abroad, the 
country found it did not need preferential agreements, and 
the United States agreed to terminate the agreement in 
order to help Costa Rica improve its poor economic 
situation, "after U.S. approval was granted, the law
went into effect in April, 1950. By that time, the 
commercial debt had grown to over $20 million. See The - 
Department of State Bulletin, the Official Weekly Record 
of United States Foreign Policy, XXII, No, 565 (May 1, 
1950) and XXIY, No. 616 (April 23, 1951).
5 Costa Rica, Banco Central, Segunda.memoria 
anual, afto 1951 (San JosS: Imprenta Torino, 19525 , b5*
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criticized in the national press.J Ulate himself 
acknowledged that it was "perhaps the most drastic legal 
disposition that has been dictated in the country.'1^
The government, however, persevered with the program, and
it was the finding of the U.S. Embassy that the results
8"more than justified the temporary sacrifices." Ulate 
tried to win some measure of acceptance for the law by 
insisting that it would be replaced, probably in about 
eighteen months, by less severe legislation. Since it 
was not customary for Costa Rican governments to give up 
lucrative sources of revenue, such pronouncements were
Q
received with skepticism. In September 1951, however, 
the government announced that the situation had improved
6 See, for example, La NaciSn. Feb. 27, 1951.
7 Qtilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del nresidente 
constitucional de la reoflblica de Costa Rica a la 
honorable asamblea 1egislativoel 1^ de 1951 fSan Jos§: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1951), 7*
8 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1950," 
3 6. The Ulate administration shared in the country's 
hardships. Time noted on Jan. 2 3 , 1950 that Ulate, 
"proclaiming that 'a little Franciscan poverty' was 
necessary if the 1950 budget were to balance, slashed 
his own salary by 23% (to $570 a month)."
9 Costa Rica, Informe de labores de la asamblea 
legislativa del 8 de noviembre de 1949 al 30 de octubre 
de 1953 tSan Jos§» Imprenta Nacional, 195^), 50.
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to the point that the law could he rescinded.'1'0 The law
was replaced by a more moderate measure, the Law of
International Payments, which maintained the dual system
of foreign exchange markets but eliminated the import
surcharges.11
The administration of the foreign exchange law
was handled by a Central Bank created as an autonomous
12institute in January, 1950. Despite business community 
sentiment against the nationalization of the banks, Ulate 
did not attempt to restore private banks but simply tried 
to develop a coherent policy for the nationalized banking 
system whose operations had not been spelled out in 
legislation following the Junta's nationalization decree 
of June, 19^8. Legislation was also passed which defined 
the functions of the entire banking system and gave all 
of the banks a role in the granting of long-term loans for 
diversified agriculture, a chief stated aim of the Junta 
in nationalizing the banks. As a result of the Ulate 
administration's efforts, Costa Rica was left with
10 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1951," 
prepared April 8, 1952, Despatch No. 1102, 30,
11 Coleccifin de leves. Segundo de 1951, No. 1351 
of Sept, 28.
12 ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1950, No. 1130 
of Jan. 28,
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the "best credit system in Central America.
The Central Bank, as its name implies, was given
power to control the country's monetary flow and in
addition was charged with "directing the economic policies
14of the country and of its banking system." The Bank 
was also later given control over the servicing of the 
national debt. The Central Bank became a prime tool in 
the execution of the Ulate administration's economic and 
fiscal policies, being particularly helpful in orienting 
agricultural credit policies and stabilising the value of 
the col6n.
Like many underdeveloped countries, Costa Rica
had never had a strong central bank or federal reserve
and thus no very effective means of controlling the
money supply. Partly as a result of this, the country
had not been able to deal well with inflation and, like
many small Latin American countries, had suffered high
rates of inflation during and after the war. Ulate*s
Central Bank drew some press criticism on the ground that
the Bank was pursuing deflationary policies, but the
Bank maintained that it only aimed at a lower rate of 
16inflation. Ulate was sensitive to criticism about
13 Ralph Lee Woodward, Central America; A Nation 
Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)7 225.
14 U.S. Embassy, "1950 Report," 39.
15 Banco Central, Primera memoria. afio 1950, 6 2.
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inflation, once saying that his greatest concern was "to 
alleviate the cost of l i v i n g . V i r t u a l  price controls 
remained on "basic foods and, at one point, the government 
sponsored a program to set up rent-free markets in each 
town to which farmers could bring their produce or home­
made items to sell directly to consumers.1*'7 The program
1 8
did not work well, however, and Costa Rica continued
to suffer from inflation until 1952 when prices finally 
lo
leveled off. " The inflation, as in the past, was 
partly due to factors beyond Costa Rica's control, such 
as the Korean war. Ulate insisted in 1951 that Costa 
Rica's cost of living increases had been less than in 
most Latin cnuntries, and he cited figures in support of 
his claim.^
With the beginnings of sound banking and trade 
policies, the government was able to turn to the problem
16 El Diario, Aug. 8, 1950*
17 ColecciSn de leves. Segunao de 1951» No. 135^ 
of Oct.. 5*
18 Informe de labores de la asamblea, 53*
19 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1952," 
prepared March^r~-1£53, Despatch No. 828, 29.
20 Ulate, 1951 Mensa.ie. *1— 6, 22-23* United 
Nations figures cited by Ulate in his 1951 congressional 
address showed Costa Rica with a price index of 265 in 
September 1950, based on an index of 100 in 1937*
According to these figures, Uruguay was the only Latin 
American country with a lower rate of inflation during 
that period.
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of Costa Rica's debts# The level of internal borrowing
by the Costa Rican government had been rising for a
number of years. In 1949 alone the internal debt had
increased by seventy percent, chiefly as a result of the
Junta's decision to assume the cost of the revolution and
to nationalize the banks, giving bonds in lieu of the
21shares of the banks' former shareholders, Ulate
checked this trend, stating his determination to work
within the confines of the budget. In 1950 the
government began to reverse the internal debt picture,
ending the year with approximately a nine percent
22increase in the internal debt. Despite continual
payments on the debt, Costa Rica in 1950 also reversed
its pattern of imbalanced budgets and began to show
28budget surpluses. J The budget for 1950 had been set up
21 U.S# Embassy, "1950 Report," 38. The internal 
debt rose from 156,26^,844 to 2 6 7,7 6 1 ,7 8 9 colones during 
1949. . The foreign debt was reduced during 1949 by about 
12 million colones as a result of a repayment of an IMF 
loan and a regular payment on an Export-Import Bank loan. 
U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1949," prepared 
April 17» 1950, Despatch No. 389.. 35* The street, or true 
value of the coign in August 1949 was about US $.13 versus 
the official rate of about US $ .1 8 set by the government.
22 U.S. Embassy, "1950 Report," 3 8.
23 Ibid.. 37. The Costa Rican government had 
claimed a technically balanced budget for 1949, but the 
government's published figures on the regular budget did 
not include considerable expenditures under an "extra­
ordinary budget" which left government expenditures as a 
whole in excess of government receipts. See U.S, Embassy, 
"1950 Report," 4, and Stacy May, Costa Rica. 281-82.
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to balance, but due to careful control of government
expenditures and to revenues higher than anticipated, the
government ended the year with a budget surplus. In the
words of the U.S. Embassy, this was "a phenomenon
unexampled in Costa Rican public affairs for the last 
"2L
decade. Budget surpluses and a decrease in the internal
debt continued to be the pattern in Costa Rica throughout
the Ulate years. During the course of his term, Ulate
reduced, the total internal debt by 28 percent.2'’
The administration had a less satisfactory record
of handling the foreign debt, which had not been serviced 
26since 19^2, Although Ulate indicated an interest in 
coming to an agreement with foreign creditors soon after 
he took office, and discussions were held, no agreement 
was reached. Ulate did not resort to additional foreign 
borrowing, but the foreign debt continued to pile up as 
a result of unpaid interest accumulation. Finally, in 
late 1 9 5 2, the administration reached an agreement with 
U.S. creditors who held about 75 percent of the foreign
24. Ibid,., .37. .
■ 25 -Costa,- Rica's .internal', debt., was 191,968 . 
colones at the end of 1953» U.S, Embassy, "Annual Econo­
mic Report, 1953," prepared March 3, 195^, Despatch 
No. 658, 5.
26 U.S. Embassy, "19^9 Report," 2.
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27debt, and payments were resumed in 1953. By the end
of his administration, Ulate reduced the foreign debt by 
about twenty percent from its high of 168 million colones
oQ
at the end of 1952. Although the Ulate administration 
was slow in working out an agreement on the foreign 
debt, the ultimate agreement was considered acceptable 
by the U.S. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, and 
it did much to restore Costa Rica's credit rating.
In November 1951* as he reached the halfway 
point in his four-year term, Ulate announced a new focus 
in the administration's economic p o l i c i e s . A s  he 
explained, the first two years of his term had been 
devoted to stabilizing the country's finances and 
improving the credit rating. While maintaining these 
policies, Ulate now proposed to begin a large-scale 
program of public works and agricultural development.
The program emphasized the building of roads, dams and a 
new international airport to replace the inadequate San
27 Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 11 (Dec. 1952); 
New York Times, Oct. 30, Oct. 31, 1952 and Jan. 7, 1953*
The Times of London reported on. Dec, 8, 1952, that a 
similar offer was made to British bondholders who held 
most of the remainder of the debt,
28 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 5*
29 New York Times. Nov., 2, 1951; Hispanic 
American Report. Ill, No. 12 (Dec. 1951).
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JosS airport. The purchase of agricultural machinery 
was encouraged and other efforts were made to modernize 
agriculture with the objective of making the country as 
nearly self-sufficient as possible in basic food crops 
and meats. Industrial growth was encouraged to the 
extent that the limited internal market could support it 
but otherwise was not emphasized. The goal of the 
program was the creation of an infrastructure for a more 
modern economy and an improvement in the living standard 
of the average Costa Rican.
It was first announced that a loan in support of
the development program would be sought from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) However, IBRD was- reluctant to approve a loan
until the government had come to terms with its existing 
31foreign debt,-' so Costa Rica decided to go ahead with 
the program on the basis of internal revenue. Early in 
1952 the government reported an unexpectedly large 
budget surplus of over 22 million colones— the largest in 
the country's history according to the Central Bank.-*2 
The government announced that these surplus funds
30 Ibid.
31 U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 3 3.
32 Banco Central, Segunda memoria, afio 1951. 8 0.
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would be devoted to the development project and said that
foreign loans would not be needed,^ 3 Ulate was sensitive
about avoiding any appearance of yielding to foreign
pressure, and he seemed defensive when he said in a
public speech in January 1952 that Costa Riba would not
fall under the sway of any foreign economic power. He
said that he had made an offer to the World Ban k— nothing
was said about the IBRD— and would refuse any offer from
the bank which Costa Rica found unreasonable.-^" Three
days after this speech, on January 11, El Diario
reported that Costa Rica had decided that World Bank
assistance would not be needed, possible indicating that
unacceptable conditions had been stipulated by the bank.
Ignoring U.S. aid extended through Point Four programs,
Ulate later claimed that:
My government came to the end of its term 
without asking for or receiving a single 
dollar from the United States, because our 
little country, with a democratic system of 
government, permanent peace, a literate 
population and the house in order, was 
wounded by the demands of the World Bank.35
33 El Diario. Feb. 6 , 1952 and Sept. 23, 1952. 
The following year Costa Rica again had a record budget 
surplus— over Zh million colones. about one-half of 
which was assigned to the public works program.
3^ Ibid., Jan. 8 , 1952.
35 Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan Marshall y nueva 
pol-ltica intemacional americana," AmSrica. LVI {Jan.- 
June 1958), 6 ,
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Ulate had outlined an ambitious program, but 
one with sound financial planning. The development plan 
accomplished a great deal, particularly with regard to 
public works, which Ulate said were being completed at a 
faster pace than at any time in the country's history.
Ulate took great pride in the large numbers of roads, 
bridges, water systems, schools and other works built 
during the last two years of his administration, and his 
annual messages to congress detailed the works completed. 
Construction on the Pan American Highway, which had been 
halted in 19^5 , was resumed, and the highway completed 
almost to the Nicaraguan border* 7^ of particular 
importance was the opening of the section between the 
Meseta Central and Liberia, the capital of Costa Rica’s 
remote northwestern province of Guanacaste, Guanacaste 
had long been Costa Rica’s neglected province and was 
isolated during the rainy season. The opening of the 
all-weather highway was important in giving the farmers 
of the province a chance to market crops on the Meseta,
Other than the highway, the largest single 
construction project was the building of El Coco
36 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie. 15,
37 Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 13 (Jan.
1952) and VI, No, 5 (June 1953)* Hispanic American 
Report said in June 1953 that the highway was completed 
to within twenty miles of the Nicaraguan border.
13h
International Airport which was begun and almost
completed during Ulate's administration.-^® After some
delays due to problems with funding, construction was
also begun on another large project— a new thermal plant
to alleviate Costa Rica's chronic shortage of electrical 
39power. ^
While these development projects laid the
groundwork for future prosperity, greater immediate
benefit to the people probably came from the agricultural
improvement plan. Like many other countries whose
economies had developed on the basis of one or two export
crops, Costa Rica had to import large amounts of
foodstuffs— an arrangement which was costly to the nation
in terms of foreign exchange expenditures needed for other
purposes, and burdensome for consumers who had to pay
hohigher costs for the imported food. In an effort to 
encourage the growing of food crops, the government built 
irrigation systems, expanded credit facilities and
38 The airport was near enough to completion so 
that Ulate could land there on his return from a trip 
abroad in-June 1953« New York Times, June 29, 1953**
39 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," The 
shortage of oil, coal and other sources of energy made 
Costa Rica dependent on hydroelectric energy which had 
been in short supply for years. For a discussion of the 
problems involved in developing sources of electrical 
energy see Stacy May, Costa Rica, 158-69.
hO Ibid., hh.
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Jli
technical assistance to desired agricultural sectors
and guaranteed price supports. The agricultural plan,
as a whole, led to greater purchases of agricultural
machinery, improved livestock sanitation, and higher
crop yields. Early in 1952 the Consejo Nacional de
produceiSn, which handled the price regulation policy on
lio
food crops, announced that its silos were full. The 
following year the Central Bank reported that Costa Rica 
had produced its largest harvests ever of the three foods
it,*}
basic to the Costa Rican diet— heans, com and rice.
In 1953* after satisfying local demand, Costa Rica began
LlIl
exporting all three crops, and also attained self-
Lk
sufficiency in beef. J While some farmers had to sell 
their crops abroad at a loss, the large food crop yields 
generally were a benefit to the nation, increasing farm 
incomes and improving the nutritional quality of the 
diet of low income consumers. In the opinion of the U.S. 
Embassy, Costa Rica's rapid transformation from importer
41 The Central Bank reported in 1951* ,for 
example, that during the previous year a record numbered
loans had been extended to small farmers through the 
country's Rural Credit Boards. Banco Central, Primera 
memoria, a^o 1 9 5 0, 6 2.
42 Banco Central, Segunda memoria, afio 1951* 47.
43 Banco Central, Tercera memoria. afro 1952, 51*
44 Banco Central, Cuarta memoria. afio 1953, 51*
45 The country continued to import other food­
stuffs, particularly wheat, which could not feasibly be 
produced in Costa Rica. U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 7* 9*
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to exporter of "basic food crops was, to a great extent,
LA
due to government encouragement.
After 1951 Ulate*s efforts at financial 
restoration were coupled with the development program 
calling for large-scale outlays, yet Ulate was able to 
continue the record of budget surpluses, debt repayment 
and currency stabilization. It was said that Costa Rica 
at this time was enjoying the "highest level of prosperity
Ln
in its economic history," f How was the administration
able to achieve such success?
Part of the answer lies in the increased sources
48of revenue open to the government. Costa Rica's first 
personal income tax law was passed in 1947 * but not a 
great deal of money was collected in the first years of
46 U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 3 6. Unfortunate­
ly, Costa Rica in later years reverted to the status of 
importer of basic foodstuffs. In 1966 Charles Denton 
found Costa Ric's urban poor paying high prices for 
imported food. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 16.
47 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 2,
48 During the Ulate administration, for example, 
the government's annual receipts increased from 138 
million colones- in 1940 to 216 million in 1953*
Government revenues during the previous decade had grown 
from 42 million colones in 1940 to 118 million in 1949. 
Inflation during the 1940's was high, as shown by the UN 
figures cited by Ulate in his 1951 congressional address, 
but even allowing for the inflation rate cited, it can 
be seen that the government's real income had increased. 
See U.S, Embassy, "1950 Report," 6 0; and "1953 Report," 6 .
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tax's existence. Measures taken by the Junta and the 
Ulate administration helped to insure that a sizable 
portion of the tax was collected, although evasion 
remained a commonplace in Costa Rica as in most parts of 
Latin America. A more important new source of tax 
revenue came from the United Fruit Company's Costa 
Rican subsidiary ConrpaMa Bananera under the terms of a 
new contract signed with the government of Costa Rica 
and approved by the Costa Rican legislature in December 
194-9.^ The contract stipulated higher taxes for the 
company, and subsequent three-way discussions between 
the Ulate administration, United Fruit Company and the 
U.S, Internal Revenue Service resulted in an arrangement 
whereby Costa Rica received a larger percentage of 
Compafila Bananera's total tax payments.^
Still another form of taxation available to the 
Ulate administration came from the ten percent capital
4-9 ColecciSn de leves. Segundo de 19^9, No. 1126 
of Dec. 31- Negotiations for the contract began under the 
Junta but, after Ulate took office, the contract was 
rewritten in terms more favorable to Costa Rica. For Jos§ 
Figueres* favorable comments on .the re-negotiated banana 
contract see El Diario, Dec, 29, 19^9.
Another new source of revenue came from a contract 
with Union Oil Company, according to which Union paid the 
government for the right to explore for oil with certain 
rights to exploitation if oil were found,-. Exploration 
turned up no oil but did produce revenue, ..ColecciSn de 
leves. Segundo de 1951* No, 1382 of Nov, 9*
50 El Diario. May 19, 1950.
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levy ordered by the Junta, Proceeds from the tax were
collected in one percent annual installments, beginning
in 19^8. Ulate had been opposed to the levy when it was
first adopted, and as president he said on several
occasions that he intended to abolish the tax as soon as 
*51possible. Installments continued to be collected,
however, and Ulate did not request congressional
abrogation of the levy until 1953 when he asked that the
levy be rescinded immediately without collecting the
*52payment due for that year.
The request caused a heated debate in the
legislature where a number of deputies argued that it
was dangerous to the country's financial position to
abolish so lucrative a tax. ^ However, in the end the
assembly did vote to rescind the tax and no money was
cl,
collected on the 1953 installment,
t
Because he waited until 1953 to abolish the tax, 
critics claimed that Ulate sought to reap the benefits of 
the revenue during his term and, at the same time, take 
credit for ending an unpopular levy. Ulate countered
51 Ibid.. Aug. 8 , 1950 and Feb. 3. 1953-
52 Ibid. Feb. 3» 1953.
53 Informe de labores_de la asamblea, 57.
Co_lecci(5n de leyes, Segundo de 1953» No. 162^
of Aug. 21.
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these charges by contending that due to the financial 
situation confronting the government when he took office, 
he could not immediately end the tax. He said that even 
the Twentieth Century Fund Study Group, a team of 
American economists whose advice Ulate took seriously,
it
had warned against trying to end the tax precipitously. ^ 
Whatever their private advice to Ulate may have been, the 
Twentieth Century team found the tax harmful to the 
country*s development and advised that Costa Rica should 
make it clear that the country intended never again to 
resort to such a measure. ^
The Study Group found Costa Rica's taxation 
system, as a whole, outmoded and unsystematic. The 
government relied on a multitude of small indirect taxes,
55 El Diario, Aug. 8 , 1950* The Twentieth 
Century Fund Study Group visited Costa Rica in 1950 in 
connection with a detailed examination of the country's 
economy, one of a series of studies begun by the Fund 
about five years earlier. With the inauguration of the 
Point Four program such studies were useful in developing 
assistance programs for the countries in question. Many 
of Ulate's major economic measures— such as the creation 
of the Centrad. Bank and the passage of the law for the 
Control of International Transactions— were already 
initiated before the Group arrived and others were in the 
planning stage. The findings of the Group, however, were 
helpful to Ulate in formulating later economic plans.
56 Letter from Stacy May and the Twentieth 
Century Fund to the Manager of the Banco Central, June 27, 
1950» copy in Otilio Ulate Papers.
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many of them v/ith revenue allocated in advance to 
specific projects rather than to the general budget,-^  
Possibly acting on their advice, Ulate ended a number of
erg
these minor taxes along with the capital levy.-'
While abolishing these small taxes, Ulate
initiated a lucrative new one by placing a five percent
ad valorem tax on coffee entering beneficios. or
processing plants. Powerful coffee growers fought the
tax for almost a year after it was initially proposed,
but by January 1952 Ulate was able to persuade the
national legislature to approve the tax.^ Coming during
a year of a successful harvest, coupled with high prices
on the world market, the tax put no undue strain on the
coffee industry and contributed significantly to the
revenue needed for economic development. Because-of the
importance of coffee in the national economy, it has‘:
been said that "in Costa Rica, the best Minister of
6 0Finance is a good crop of coffee." Ulate was fortunate 
in governing the country during the record harvests of
57 Stacy: May, Costa Rica, 284,
58 El Diario, Feb. 3. 1953; U.S. Embassy, "1953 
Report," 4.
59- ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 1952, No. 1411 
of Jan. 19.
60 Interview with Carlos MelSndez, San Jos§, 
June 1,.1974.
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1952 and 1953r and. thus observers are correct in
attributing part of his economic success to the coffee 
6 ?
crops. It should be noted, however, that the country’s 
economic recovery began before these bumper crops— during 
1 9 5 0* when the crop was of average size, and 1 9 5 1, when 
Costa Rica's coffee harvest was said to have been "one of 
the smallest during the past ten years.
Ulate's development plans were also furthered by 
increased technical assistance from the United States and, 
to a lesser extent, from international organizations 3uch 
as UNICEF and FAQ. Point Four programs emphasizing 
agricultural training and assistance began operating in 
Costa Rica in 1951 in close coordination with the national 
development program« The San Jose government cooperated 
fully with these programs, and the New York Times stated 
in 1953 that Point Four programs in Costa Rica had 
"probably made greater progress than in any other Latin 
American country. " -J Of special importance was the work 
of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences
61 Banco Central, Tercera memoria. alio 1952, 51; 
and Cuarta memoria. ano 19537 ^9.
62 Joaquin Garro, Veinte afios de histor.ia chica 
(San JosSi Imprenta Vargas, 196?), 49.
63 Banco Central, Segunda memoria. afio 1951, 46,
64 U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 6 .
65 New York limes. Jan. 12, 1953.
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in Turrialba on the eastern escarpment of the Meseta
Central. The Turrialba school was the center for United
States agricultural research programs for all of Central
America, but during its early years the school devoted a
disproportionate amount of attention to Costa Rica and
66provided valuable advice on agricultural development.
A paramount factor in Costa Rica's economic 
resurgence was the Ulate government itself. The greater 
availability of credit and foreign exchange, the building 
of water systems and r.oads, the technical assistance 
programs and sound financial policies all'contributed to 
the revival of the economy* Ulate's policies not only 
achieved the specific ends for which they were designed; 
taken together, they worked to create a climate of 
confidence in the vitality of the country and stability 
of the government which is the best assurance for 
healthy economic development anywhere.
Social Legislation
The most stz’iking feature of - the Ulate 
administration's social legislation was the lack of 
hostility shown toward the reformist measures enacted
66 John D. Martz, Central America! The Crisis 
and the Challenge (Chapel Hill: Qniversity or north 
Carolina Press, 1959)* 235*
during the 19^0's. When they were first proposed, most 
of the measures had drawn fire from Costa Rican 
conservatives and sometimes from Ulate himself. Yet 
when he came to office, Ulate largely worked with existing 
programs rather than against them. A survey of the major 
social reform legislation of the CalderCn and Picado 
years— the social security system, the chapter of social 
guarantees added to the constitution, the Labor Code and 
graduated income tax— shows that Ulate made no attempt to 
rescind these measures. He did little to expand the 
scope of existing programs and some of them stagnated 
for lack of attention, but his administration provided 
the first adequate funding ever given a number of the 
programs.
Budgets during the Ulate years continued to 
devote about the same percentages as had the budgets of 
past administrations toward public education, public 
health and social welfare. Given the Ulate administra­
tion^ greater revenues, this of course meant that actual
expenditures on the programs rose during his tenure.
*
Despite the great significance which Costa Ricans of all 
political persuasions saw in the social welfare programs 
adopted during the 19^0's, the percentage of the budget 
devoted to welfare-related programs did not seem to undergo 
dramatic change. Budget allotments, by percentage, for 
these categories, in several selected years, were as
144'
67follows;
1928 1942 1947 1948 1953
Public
Education 1?.0 17.1 18.6 1 6 .5 14.4
Public Health and
Social Welfare 4.1 5*2 3»1 2.6 4,2
The Ulate administration also enforced existing
legislation which required the Minister of Labor to
review wages and set new minimum levels for each type of
economic activity every two years, and government-decreed
minimum wage increases averaging thirteen percent in
67 No systematic evaluation of the budgets of 
these years has been undertaken. Comparison of the 
budgets is difficult because ordinary budgets were 
sometimes supplemented with extraordinary ones which 
changed the relative weight given to all categories. In 
addition, budgetary categories have undergone changes 
which can sometimes render raw figures quite misleading. 
For example, the 1928 budget lists "public health and 
social protection" as one figure, whereas some later 
budgets break these figures into two separate categories, 
and still others list in the national budget a myriad of 
small budgetary allotments for local public health 
projects. With all due caution for oversimplification, 
however, budget figures for major categories may give 
a rough idea of the percentages of the budget allotment to 
social welfare programs. Information taken from Costa 
Rica, Direccifin General de Estadistica y Censos, Censo de 
poblaciSn de Costa Rica. 11 de mavo de 1927 (San JosS: 
Ministerio de Economla y Hacienda, I960, 84; Costa Rica, 
Centro de Control, Congreso Constitucional, Presupuesto 
de gastos del gobiemo de la renflblica. e.iercicio de 
1942 (San Jos§Y Imprenta Nacional, 1942), 146T Stacy May, 
Costa Rica, 282} and Costa Rica, Informe de la labor 
realizada por la oficina del nresuouesto durante el afio 
1953 CSan JosS; Imprenta Nacional, 1955J, 35-3b, 44.
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1950 and ten percent in 1952 were ordered. Minimum
wages established for the banana zones, where United
Fruit Company was the major employer, were substantially
higher than for any other region, as had been the pattern
in the past. 7 Since the 1930's, union activity had
been greater and wages usually higher among banana
workers in the lowlands, perhaps because the Costa Rican
government was more willing to support wage demands when
United Fruit, rather than some Costa Rican employer on
the Meseta Central, was paying the bill. The wage increases
nationwide fell slightly short of the increases in the
cost of living in that period, and workers with families,
as in the past, faced difficulties in maintaining minimum
healthy standards of living. Thus, workers' wages
continued to be poor and did not reflect the prosperity
of the Ulate years. Probably more by neglect than by
design, workers did not fully share in the "situaciSn de 
70bonanza"' which the country was experiencing.
68 U.S. Embassy, "1950 Report," 40; ”1952 
Report," 2 9 .
69 Ibid., "1950 Report," 40.
70 This was the Central Bank's description of 
Costa Rican economic growth in 1953* Banco Central, 
Cuarta memoria, ano 1953 > 57*
1*4-6
Workers, however, benefitted from the better-
financed social programs, particularly in the field of
education. One of the chief problems in education was
the shortage of schoolhouses. The number of Costa Rican
students had grown by 39^ between 19*4-6 and 1 9 5 0, and
71construction had not kept the pace. While the bulk of
his construction projects came in the last half of his
administration, Ulate announced a school-building project
as early as March 1950. Costa Rica had 88*4- primary
schools at the end of 19*4-9, and Ulate announced in 1953
that 317 new ones had been built during his first three
71years in office, El Diario called this the most rapid
nh,
school-building record in the country's history.
Rephrasing Costa Rica's standard boast about having more
schoolteachers than soldiers, Ulate claimed that there
7 *5were now more schoolhouses than soldiers, J
Attention was also given to higher education.
Land was acquired and plans made for the opening of a
71 Ulate, 1950 Mensa.ie, 2 6,
72 El Diario. March 19, 1950.
73 Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie, 15.
7*t El Diario. July 20, 1952.
75 New York Times. Sept. *4-, 1953. The New York 
Times reported that Costa Rica's 200th school was opened 
in September 1953, and the Kisnanic American Report indi­
cated a similar figure when it said in December 1953 that 
the Ulate administration had built 1,000 schools. These 
figures, however, seem too high in light of - the building 
rate described by Ulate in 1953 •
14-7
University City on the outskirts of San JosS to house the
76University of Costa Rica.' A number of new schools of
higher education were also founded, including an
agronomy school, a new College of Letters and Philosophy
attached to the university, a mechanical arts school and
a nursing program which attracted students from all over
77Central America. A number of farmer training programs 
were also begun in cooperation with U.S. agencies, 
especially the agricultural research institute in 
Turrialba.
Within the field of public health, the admini­
stration’s chief legislative measure was a General Law of 
Medico-Social Assistance, approved early in Ulate's 
tenure, which reorganized Costa Rica's public health 
programs and extended some of their operations. The 
law expressly said that "the state guarantees medical
assistance to all inhabitants" and that services would be
78free for those too poor to pay.r In providing such 
services, the government relied to a considerable extent 
on close cooperation with U.S. or international
76 ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1953, No. 1580 
of June 3* The university had been organized in 194-0 from 
several existing colleges, but its separate schools were 
still housed in different bu.ildings around tha city.
. 77 Coleccxfln de .leves, Segundo de 1950, No. 1231 
of Nov. 2 0; Hispanic American Report, IV, No. 10 (Oct. 
1951) and V , No, 5 (June 1952J.
78 Coleccign de leves. Primer de 1950, No, 1153 
of April 13,
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organizations offering technical assistance. A
Department of Nutrition was established to carry out
UNICEF-related projects, and a number of Costa Rican
public health programs were started under its auspices,
including a major school nutrition project.
A number of the new health programs emphasized
preventive medicine. By comparison with more developed
countries, Costa Rica had always devoted a relatively
higher percentage of the public health budget to
treatment and a relatively low percentage to prevention
of diseases, a self-perpetuating pattern which is
difficult to break, given a stable source of revenue.
With international assistance and larger government
revenues, the Ulate administration was able to begin
programs of prenatal care, mass vaccinations, and. public 
79sanitation. ' Point Four medical directors were
particularly helpful in guiding the creation and
operation- of programs of malaria control, water supply
and drainage systems, dispensaries and hospital 
80improvements. As the New York Times noted in 1953*
Costa Rica seemed to be taking good advantage of
79 Coleccifin de leves, Primer de 1951» Executive 
Decree No. 5 of May 8; Ulate, 1950 Mensa.ie. 29-31; 1951 
Mensa.ie, 10-12; 1952 Mensa.ie, 21-24; and 1953 Mensa.ie. 7-9.
80 New York Times. Jan. 12, 1953*
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international opportunities to improve public well-
. - 81being.
Institutional and Administrative Reform
As with social legislation, most of the 
institutional and administrative reforms undertaken 
during the Ulate years were based on earlier effort s. The 
Junta had begun a number of valuable reforms, but some of 
them had been instituted on a provisional basis or for 
other reasons had not been completed during the Junta's 
tenure. Many of these ideas were incorporated into the 
constitution, but constitutional terminology, of course, 
was general in nature, often serving only as an enabling 
act for future legislation. It remained for the Ulate 
administration, the first to assume office after the 
constitution was promulgated ,to put these concepts into 
concrete form. As in the case of CalderCn's social 
legislation, Ulate made no attempt to undo the basic 
program initiated by the Junta and, in many cases, Ulate's 
legislation was based specifically on Junta decrees. Nor 
was any attempt made to change Junta-inspired portions of 
the 19^9 constitution, despite the fact that 33 of the 
k-5 congressional deputies— a sufficient number to pass a 
constitutional amendment— were members of Ulate's PUN,
81 Ibid.
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The general theme of the new reforms— decreasing 
the power of the executive and decentralizing government 
functions— was accomplished chiefly through the creation 
of administrative "bodies with varying degrees of autonomy 
from the central government. While this was not entirely 
consistent with Ulate's personalistic approach to 
government, he fulfilled the constitutional mandates*
Along these lines, Ulate created the Central 
Bank as an autonomous institute and structured it in
Qp
such a way as to give it considerable independence. A
civil service system was also created which, it was
thought, might serve as a model for Latin America.^
The civil service system provided for examinations and
theoretically impartial recruitment; like most such
legislation, it included provisions making it difficult
for the executive to fire civil servants for political 
84reasons. A separate law gave employees of the
82 ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 1950, No. 1130 
of Jan. 28,
83 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 13» ColecciSn de 
leyes, Primer de 1953* No. 1581 of May 28.
84 Although there continue to be some reports of 
favoritism and corruption, observers ten years after the 
creation of Costa Rica's civil service system found Costa 
Rican civil servants were "careerists" and among the 
"most efficient and broadly educated" in Latin America. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Costa 
Rica (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19^2), 
15 1^7.
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legislative branch some of the same security of tenure 
as that given to executive branch personnel under the 
civil service law,®-*
An Office of Comptroller General was created to 
oversee government spending and, in order to give the 
Comptroller General independence from the executive 
branch he was to monitor, he was made responsible to the 
legislative branch. A Law of Financial Administration 
detailed the functions of each office of the government 
which handled public money, stipulating that one office
only, the Proveeduria General, was to buy supplies for
86all executive branch offices. Together, the creation of 
the Comptroller General position and the financial 
administration law were said to establish for the state 
"complete control" over its fiscal and financial
Qry
matters. { This characterization seems euphoric in view 
of some subsequent misuse of government funds in Costa 
Rica, but the new laws did decrease the opportunities for 
the sorts of fiscal irregularities that were prevalent 
during the CalderOn years.
85 ColecciCn de leves. Primer de 1952, No. 14-30 
of March 14-,
. 86 Colecclfin. de -leves. Segundo de 1950, No, 1252 
of Dec, 22} Primer de 1951, No. 1279 of May 2*, Primer de 
1952, Executive Decree No. 5 of Jan. 24-,
87 Informe de labores de la asamblea. 52.
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Culminating earlier steps toward removing the
electoral process from central government control, the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal was given autonomy and
separate funding. Other legislation more clearly defined
the functions of the lower levels of the electoral
machinery, particularly the Civil Registry and Electoral 
88Registry. Protection of individual rights from 
arbitrary government actions was also advanced through a 
law of anroaro-, a common Latin American legal concept 
providing a recourse similar in some ways to judicial
89review. '
Also in accordance with the constitution, laws
were passed which established a theoretically autonomous
90position for the municipalitiesy but here the efforts 
toward autonomy were only partially successful. Like 
most Latin countries, Costa Rica had never had a tradition 
of strong local government and it was difficult to create
88 Colecci&i de leves. Segundo de 1952, No. 1535 
and 1536 of Dec, 10.
89 ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1950, No, ll6l 
of June 2. For a discussion of the uses of amparo. which 
evidently originated with the Mexican constitution of 1917, 
see Alexander .T, Edelman, Latin American Government and 
Politics (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, ~~1965), 46^-68,
90 ColecciSn de leves. Segundo de 1951, No, 1378, 
No. 1^01.
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91one. There were no legislative bodies on the 
provincial level, and local government officials 
continued to look to San Jos§ for leadership and 
initiative. Ulate admitted that the municipalities 
continued to be dependent on the central government to a 
large degree. However, he believed that inter­
governmental relations were becoming more harmonious and 
that the projects on which San Jos§ worked in cooperation 
with the provinces moved forward more satisfactorily
under the system of somewhat greater independence for
92the municipalities.
Ulate wanted his administration to operate on a 
sound, businesslike basis, and he was cognizant of the 
need for a measure of institutional reform. Although 
Ulate believed that the most important key to good 
government was the selection of good governors, the 
net effect of institutional change during the Ulate 
years was to move Costa Rica in the direction of the
.91 As Amoldo JimSnez explained the problem:
A new, endemic and vigorous municipal spirit 
had not yet matured in the civic conscience 
and for that reason, it was illogical to 
expect from the new constitution precepts 
that expressed, clearly and with vigor, 
movements which were not yet well defined.
JimSnez, "El rSgimen municipal," Revista de la Universidad 
de Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 9^
92 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie, 5*
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creation of a rational government, in Max Weber's sense.
Foreign Policy
Ulate might have taken a page from George
Washington's farewell address in formulating his foreign
policy. He emphasized cordial, correct relations with
all countries but avoided involvement with partisan
causes, and especially opposed military pacts and
intervention in the affairs of other states. Like Costa
Rican governments of the past, the Ulate administration
had a strongly Western outlook on general foreign affairs
questions, particularly where Communism was concerned.^
Ulate declined to resume relations with the Soviet Union»
which the Junta had broken ,and during the Korean war the
government of Costa Rica lifted the ban against its
citizens' participating in military activities, in order
to permit Costa Ricans to volunteer for service with UN
ck
forces in Korea.
While he thus clearly supported the West in . 
foreign policy questions that were global in scope and had
93 Costa Rica has traditionally emphasized close 
ties with the West and Third World rhetoric is less 
pronounced there than in many Latin countries. This 
foreign policy stance had not altered during the 19^2-19^8 
period when Communists had some influence in the government.
9** Department of State Bulletin. XXIII, No. 5^9 
(Oct. 16, 1950); New York Times. July 28. 1950.
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little impact on Costa Rica, Ulate maintained a policy 
of neutrality in matters that were closer to home. Other 
than his friendship with the United States and support 
for Western democracies, Ulate largely confined his 
interest in foreign affairs to Central America where the 
thorny questions were relations with Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. The issues at stake in "both cases were 
legacies from the Junta, which had believed that Costa 
Rica should take a stand, pro or con, on each government 
and deal with it accordingly. The Junta viewed 
Guatemala's government as good, one with which Costa 
Rica should develop close ties. Nicaragua, on the other 
other hand, was ostracized and anti-Somoza exiles were 
made welcome in Costa Rica. Ulate had no such Wilsonian 
commitment to crusade for just causes.
The Figueres-Somoza quarrel had strained relations 
almost to the breaking point, and they remained that way 
until Ulate took office. Ulate did not develop close ties 
with the Nicaraguan government, but through several 
gestures he signaled that he wanted to relax tensions 
between the two countries. For example, he raised Costa 
Rica’s diplomatic mission in Managua to ambassadorial 
status.Nicaragua responded in kind and agreed to
95 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie, 27.
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return three Costa Rican planes which had been held
since 1948, when fleeing calderonistas had taken them
to Nicaragua.^
Ulate's most important step was a brief visit to
Nicaragua as part of a general tour of Central America
in June 1953. At the Managua airport Somoza greeted
Ulate with the usual Latin embrace, and he later
conferred the Order of Rubgn Dario on his guest.^
Although as a newspaper editor Ulate had often criticized
Somoza, a much-publicized photograph of Ulate's airport
abrazo with Somoza was used by Ulate's opponents in an
attempt to brand him as a friend of the dictator.
At the other end of the Central American political
spectrum was Guatemala, whose regime had aided Figueres
during the 1948 revolution and established very close
ties with the Junta government. As the government of
9 8Guatemala continued to drift to the left, other 
governments in the area became concerned and rumors 
circulated that the other four Central American nations 
were forming a military pact against Guatemala, The idea 
of unified action to deal with Guatemala had some
96 Ibid.. 28.
97 El Diario. June 28, 1953.
98 In 1951 Guatemalan President Juan JosS ArSvalo, 
who had supported the Caribbean Legion, was succeeded by 
Jacobo Arbenz, in whose government Communists and other 
extremists played a major role.
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supporters in the region. Nicaragua talked about the 
need for "coordinated" a c t i o n a n d  Honduras later 
permitted the revolution against Arbenz to be launched 
from Honduran soil.
For his part, Ulate disliked the trend of events 
in Guatemala, and Costa Rica at one point had so serious 
a disagreement with the Guatemalan ambassador that he was 
declared persona non grata.'*'00 However, Ulate refrained
99 El Diario. April 11, 1953-
100 Information on the Guatemalan ambassador’s 
expulsion is contradictory and incomplete. In June 1953, 
soon after Ulate left on a two-week trip to El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, Acting President Oreamuno 
declared Guatemalan Ambassador 0'Meany persona non grata 
and recalled Costa Rica's ambassador from Guatemala for 
further instructions. Justifying the move, Costa Rica 
claimed that 0'Meany had invited Ulate to visit Guatemala 
and that the invitation had been accepted for some time 
after the Costa Rican elections in July. However, the 
Guatemalan foreign minister, according to the Costa Rican 
account, denied that such an invitation had been extended 
and 0 'Meany followed suit by saying he had not invited 
Ulate to Guatemala. ColecciSn de leyes, Primer de 1953, 
Executive Decree No. 9 of June 2^ .
The stated Costa Rican version of the events seems 
unsatisfactory. A more likely reason for the expulsion, 
suggested by Ronald Schneider, is that the Guatemalan 
ambassador had aroused the ire of San JosS officialdom by 
involvement with local Communist activities. Schneider 
writes that from 1951 195^ many Guatemalan diplomats
were expelled from neighboring countries because of 
involvement with local Communists, and he reports that one 
Ambassador Jorge Arankowsky was expelled, from Costa Rica 
after addressing a Communist labor rally. Although Costa 
Rica lists the expelled ambassador's name as O'Meany— a 
name not bearing a particularly close resemblance to 
Arankowsky— it is possible that accounts have become 
garbled and that 0'Meany and Arankowsky were one and the 
same. See Schneider, Communism in Guatemala. 19^4-196^ 
(New York* Praeger, 1958)7 297*
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from criticism of the Guatemalan government and probably
showed more forbearance toward Guatemala than did any
other Central American head of state during that period.
In particular, Ulate stressed that Costa Rica would not
consider joining any Central American military alliance
which excluded Guatemala, In remarks made to Costa Rican
villagers in February 19531 Ulate said*.
The government has not received proposals 
for forming military pacts and even if we 
do receive them, we will not accept them, 
not even for the purpose of fighting 
Communism. We must keep our hands off the 
politics of sister nations.101
Shortly after that the Organization of Central
American States (ODECA), which all five Central American
countries had joined at the time of its formation in 1951»
decided to accept El Salvador's suggestion that the
problem of Communism in the region be considered at the
next meeting. The measure was clearly directed to the
matter of Communist influence in the government of
Guatemala, and Guatemala withdrew from ODECA, claiming
that the other countries were interfering in a member
102state's internal affairs. Ulate took the occasion to 
reiterate his determination to stay out of Guatemalan 
affairs. In public letters to Costa Rica's ambassadors
101 El Diario. Feb. 11, 1953.
102 Ibid.. April 3, 1953.
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in Guatemala and at the United Nations, he reminded all
concerned that:
the current government of Costa Rica has 
maintained inflexibly and clearly, in official 
word and deed, a cautious and correct conduct 
of cordiality in relations with all Central 
American countries and complete avoidance of 
any intervention or influence, no matter how 
slight, in the domestic politics of any of 
them. 103
A week later, representatives of the four remaining 
ODECA members met in San Jos§ to reaffirm their 
commitment to the organization and to ask Guatemala to
IOZl
reconsider its decision to withdraw. Guatemala, 
however, ignored their overture^-* and remained on bad 
terns with its Central American neighbors until the 
overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954.
Because of his belief that countries should not 
meddle in each other's affairs, Ulate was unsympathetic 
toward exile groups who launched revolutions against 
their governments from other countries. He said he could 
not understand "the tolerance with which some governments 
watch the development in their territory of plans for 
subversion to be carried to other countries.' Equally 
exasperated with the subversive exile groups themselves,
.103 Ibid.. April 10, 1953.
104 Ibid.. April 17, 1953«
105 Five weeks after this Declaration of San JosS,
according to El Diario, Guatemala had not responded. El
Diario, May 21, 1953.
106 Ulate, 1951 Mensa.ie. 20.
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Ulate once complained that Costa Rica had offered a haven
to exiles of various lands but that a few had repaid
this hospitality by encouraging Costa Rican youth to
support revolutions against the governments of their
native lands with no concern for the difficulties this
would make for Costa Rica.101*7 One incident of this
nature which incensed Ulate was an attempt by a group of
Hondurans to denounce the government of Honduras in a
Costa Rican radio broadcast,, The government of Costa
1 Oft
Rica decided to prohibit the broadcast. The Costa 
Rican Supreme Court, however, overruled the government's 
action on the ground that freedom of speech without 
prior censorship was the law in Costa Rica,^0^
107 El Diario, July 13, 1950• Ulate, however, 
continued to accept foreign exiles. Among those offered 
asylum in Costa Rica during the Ulate administration were 
Romulo Betancourt, who had sought refuge in Costa Rica 
in the past, and Juan Bosch, El Diario, March 11 and 12,
1952.
108 Ibid., July 13, 1950.
109 According to the UN Yearbook's account of the 
incident, the Hondurans had planned to broadcast a program 
commemorating the "massacre" of Hondurans at San Pedro 
Sula, for which they blamed the government of Honduras. 
Acting on a request from the Honduran ambassador, Costa 
Rica's undersecretary for foreign affairs circulated a 
memorandum to various radio stations, telling them not to 
broadcast the program. The Costa Rican Supreme Court 
voided the undersecretary's order, holding that it 
constituted a violation of free speech. United. Nations, 
Yearbook on Human Rights for 19*50 (New York, 1952), 57.
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Ulate was not convinced of the validity of the
Court's reasoning and later defended his position, citing
an experience of his own in which the roles had been
reversed. Ulate said that he, as a journalist, had
allowed Guatemalan exiles opposed to Guatemalan strongman
Ubico to use space in El Diario to condemn their regime.
Ricardo JimSnez, then president of Costa Rica, had
prohibited this, telling Ulate that he could say whatever
he liked about the government of Costa Rica, but could
not use his newspaper to get the government of Costa
109Rica into trouble with its neighbors. Ulate decided 
that JimSneZ was right and came to regard the curtailment 
of extreme media attacks against the domestic policies 
of neighboring governments as a legitimate activity of 
the government of Costa Rica, albeit one very seldom 
exercised by Ulate. That Ulate advocated responsible 
journalism and restraint on the part of the press is not 
surprising, but his willingness to sanction government 
curtailment of the freedom of the press, even for reasons 
of national security, seems strange in view of his own 
professional background and his commitment to civil 
liberties. It can only be explained by his desire that 
Costa Rica maintain a posture of absolute noninvolvement 
in the internal affairs of other nations, a position 
which was a cornerstone of his foreign policy.
• 109 Ulate describes his exchange with Jira€nez 
in his. Hacia donde lleva -a Costa Rica-el Seflor Presi-
dente Figueres? (San Josfi* Imprenta-Universal., 1955)> 22.
CHAPTER VI 
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION: III
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Ulate administration was a period of 
restoration more than of innovation. Relative to his 
predecessors in the 19^0's, Ulate introduced few 
controversial programs. Partly for this reason, a 
number of political and social sectors which had felt 
alienated from the government at one time or another 
during the past decade were brought back into national 
life, and hatreds born in the revolution began to fade.
It was logical that Ulate's businesslike approach should 
have met with approval from wealthy Costa Ricans and 
business circles, but, at the other end of the spectrum, 
Communists and calderonistas also found the atmosphere 
more favorable once Ulate took office. This was true 
despite the fact that the recently outlawed Communist 
Party was the one group whose activities were restricted 
to a considerable extent during the Ulate years.
Communists and Calderonistas
The role of Vanguardia Popular in the Calderdn and
Picado governments had made Costa Ricans suspicious of
Communist parties, a concern which was heightened by the
162
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Cold War atmosphere prevailing at that time. Nevertheless,
soon after he came to office, Ulate let it he known that
all Costa Ricans, whatever their political roles during
the 19^0*s, were free to return and many of them did.^
Calder6n and Picado declined the invitation hut Manuel
Mora, head of the outlawed Vanguardia Popular, returned
in the spring of 1950 and. immediately immersed himself
in lahor and political activities. By 1953 he was ahle
to reform and gain official recognition for a new
?Communist-oriented lahor confederation. Mora was one 
of the most astute political figures in the country, as 
well as an effective lahor organizer, and his influence 
was such that he was a continual headache for Ulate. The 
legal limits of Mora's activities were not entirely 
clear. The constitution prohibited the formation of 
Communist political parties, and the Junta had declared
1 El Diario de Costa Rica. Dec. 17, 19^9*
2 U.S. Embassy, San Jose, "Annual Economic 
Report, 1950," prepared March 1, 195^* Despatch No. 6 5 8,
15.. A large number of calderonistas also returned. 
Interview with Jos£ Fernandez, June 20, 19 6 7■
3 Article 98 of the constitution prohibited the 
functioning of parties which "tend toward the destruction 
of the foundations of the democratic organization of Costa 
Rica or that threaten the sovereignty of the country, all 
within the judgment of the legislative Assembly by a vote 
of at least two-thirds of its members, following a previous 
statement of opinion by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal." 
Costa Rica, Constituci6n politica (San Jos£: Imprenta 
Nacional, 196?) ■ "
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that the Communist labor organization, ConfederaciSn
iL
de Trabajadores de Costa Rica, was also illegal. At 
the same time, Costa Rica's 1949 constitution, like the 
previous one, had a strong chapter on civil and political 
liberties, which were guaranteed to all citizens. Under 
certain circumstances the guarantees could be suspended, 
but Ulate was determined to avoid that step,-^  Hence, 
the government kept a wary eye on Mora and on at least 
one occasion arrested him for a brief period, but no 
systematic policy of repression was carried out,
Ulate and Mora, however, by no means reached an 
accommodation. Ulate blamed the Communist leader for 
much of what had gone ’wrong in Costa Rica during the 
1940's; and Mora, for his part, regarded Ulate as a 
leader of the 1948 revolution which had ousted the first 
Costa Rican government in which he felt he had had a 
chance to see some of his goals reached. The two thus 
remained at loggerheads and engaged in verbal duels, as 
can be seen by an exchange of telegrams published in La
4 Franklin Parker, The Central American 
Republics (Londom Oxford University Press,, 1964), 291.
5 The president, with congressional approval, 
could suspend the guarantees or, if congress were not in 
session, could briefly suspend them on his own authority. 
Constitucifln polltica. Article 1^0.
6 Mora was arrested in August, 1950* in 
connection with a plot against the government, Hispanic 
American Report. Ill, No, 9 (Sept. 1950).
Hora in May 1950* Mora cabled the president to say that 
he had heard that, due to "political motives," the 
constitutional guarantees were going to be suspended and 
his house searched. He added that, even if the 
guarantees were not suspended he was "disposed" to permit 
a house search, but asked that the search be carried out 
by "decent" authorities who would not disturb sick 
family members in his house. Bristling at Mora's 
suggestion that "political motives" might persuade him 
to suspend the guarantees, Ulate replied.that there was 
no such plan. He informed Mora that he could rest 
assured that the Mora family was safer than "our 
anguished and persecuted families" had been during the 
period when "your group" participated in the government.'
On a number of occasions, the disagreement went 
beyond verbal exchanges. On several different occasions, 
Communist meetings were raided, and Communists were arrested 
in connection with a series of victimless bombings in
Q
San Jos£ in the early spring of 1951* The most serious 
incidents came in August, 1950 and April, 1951 when the 
administration uncovered plots to overthrow the government.
7 Mora's cable to Ulate and the president's reply 
are both published in La Hora, May 20, 1950.
8 Hispanic American Report, IV, No. k (April, 1951)*
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Q
Communists were implicated in at least the first plot .'
Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia's uncle, Prospero Guardia ,
was the apparent organizer of a coup which was to have
followed the wave of bombings in 1951 and. Rafael's
brother Francisco Caldertfn was said to be in charge of
supplying arms.10 Former President Calderdn, who had
organized the December, 19^8 invasion in an effort to
regain control of the country, was thought to be directing
the 1951 plot from Mexico, and to prevent any such plans,
the Mexican government announced that it would prevent
11arms shipments to Costa Rica. The uproar over the 
discovery of the plots soon subsided and those arrested 
were released.
Ulate was particularly concerned about subversive 
activity which had foreign connections. Before the 
revolution, many Costa Ricans had made a distinction 
between international Communism and the native comunismo 
criollo of Manuel Mora's party, which seemed less
9 Hispanic American Report. Ill, No, 9 (Sept, 1950); 
IV, No. 5 (May 19501. El Diario~ u g .  12 and 13, 1950 and 
April 5» 1951*
Harry Kantor later wrote that Communists were 
implicated in both of the plots. Kantor, Patterns of 
Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicagoi 
Rand McNally, 19^9)* 199* This statement, however, is not 
in agreement with contemporary accounts given in El Diario, 
the Hispanic American Report and the New York Times, which 
tied the Communists only to the 1950 plot.
10 New York Times. April 3, 1951•
11 Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 5 (May, 1951)*
threatening because of its Costa Rican origins. The
anti-Communist nature of the revolution and the feelings
engendered by it tended to blur this distinction, but the
Ulate administration's position on Communist activities
indicated that his government still acknowledged some
difference between the two. In 1953» for example, Ulate
told congress that authorities in the banana zone , a
longtime center of Communist labor activities, had seized
Communist literature which contained violent attacks
against the government and had delivered the material to
him* Ulate said that he had found no justification for
the seizure and had ordered the literature returned. He
added, however, that he considered material brought in
secretly from Soviet bloc countries to be a more serious
threat than that produced domestically and vowed that the
government would continue to prevent its entrance into 
12the country.
Literature of this nature had been taken from 
Manuel Mora's brother Eduardo in July, 1952 as he was 
returning from a Berlin meeting of a group called the 
Partisans of Peace, and other material related to the 
Partisans of Peace was seized when it arrived in the mail
12 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del Sefior Presidente 
constitucional de la repflblica don Otilio Ulate presentado 
a la asamblea legislative el. 1° de mayo de 1953 (San Jos§t 
Imprenta Nacional, 1953)* 11.
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13
from Mexico, The would-be recipient of the Mexican
lit
mail sued under the new law of amoaro to have the mail 
returned to him. The Costa Rican Supreme Court, however, 
held that the mail could be seized because it was 
"avowedly Communist" in nature and thus came under 
article 98 of the constitution which prohibited the 
formation and activities of. Communist parties. ^
The most far-reaching legal decisions during this 
period on the future role of the Communist Party were not 
made by the Ulate administration or the courts, however, 
but by the legislature. The constitution had entrusted 
the legislature with the duty of ruling on the legality 
of political parties suspected of Communist activities.
In 1950, soon after his return to Costa Rica, Mora tried 
to reform Vanguardia Popular and petitioned the legislature 
to set aside the Junta decree-law abolishing the party, 
Ulate did not take a stand on the matter, simply asking 
that congress exercise its authority and make a decision. 
Congress upheld the decree and said that Vanguardia could
13 El Diario. July 22, 1952.
1^ See chapter 5*
15 For a discussion of the case, see United 
Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for 1951 (New York, 1953)» 
53.
16 El Diario, July 11, 1950,
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17not operate in Costa Rica#
In 1953 Mora again tried to form a party, the 
Progressive Independents, with the hope of entering 
candidates for congress in the 1953 elections. This time 
Mora kept a lower profile and did not advertise his 
connection with the party. Another man was listed as 
the party's head in the petition for inscription on the
• j g
electoral rolls; and only 900 of the required 3,000 
signatories to the petition were former members of
Ip
Vanguardia. 7 The Supreme Electoral Tribunal thus
recommended that the party be recognized as legal and
allowed to enter the 1953 race. However, in a move said
to have been led by Figueres1 supporters, the legislature
ruled against the Progressive Independents and voted to
20strike the party from the electoral rolls. Ulate signed 
the congressional bill but, on this occasion, he spoke 
out. He said he felt he had no right to veto an action 
clearly within the legislature's purview but he expressed 
his personal preference for letting the Progressive
17 Ibid1. , July 27, 1950.
18 New York Times. July 15, 1953*
19 Harry Kantor, The Costa Rican Election of 1953'; 
A Case Study (Gainesville: University of Florida Latin 
American Monograph Series No. 5, 1958)» 36.
20 New York Times. July 15 and 25, 1953*
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21Independents take their chances at the polls. Ulate
probably expressed the feelings of many Costa Ricans
who viewed the constitutional provision as not quite fair
and were not sure that Manuel Mora and the Communists
should be permanently removed from political life.
Ulate's views, in general, were more conciliatory
toward Communists and calderonistas than were those of
most former leaders of the prerevolutionary Opposition.
In 1952, for example, Ulate asked congress to declare a
general amnesty for those guilty of political crimes
22during the CalderCn and Picado years. Congress turned
21 El Diario. July 25, 1953* The prohibition 
technically remained in force until 1976 but Communists 
were allowed to enter the 1970 elections under the banner 
of the Socialist Action Party (PASO), and Mora won a seat 
in Congress, See the Times of the Americas. Jan. 28, 1970; 
and a Jan. 19, 1977 report by the news service ACAN as 
published in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin 
American Daily Re-port. Jan. 21, 1977.
22 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie. Ralph Lee Woodward 
presents a misleading picture in describing Ulate as 
"ruthless" in his dealings with Communists, Ulate did seek, 
to limit Communist activities— which were prohibited by law. 
But, given the Cold War atmosphere of the time, the anti­
communist nature of the 19^8 revolution and the existence of 
Junta-initiated laws and constitutional provisions denying 
Communists the right to conduct political activities, Ulate 
was quite lenient in his dealings with the Communists, If 
the Ulate administration had a number of clashes with 
Communists, it was largely because Communists were 
allowed to resume a number of their former activities and 
hence there were more occasions for friction between the 
government and the party. See Woodward, Central Americai
A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
225.
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23down Ulate's request, u but he had made his views known 
and this may have contributed to the decreasing level 
of violence in Costa Rica. No plots against the 
government were uncovered after the spring of 1951 and. 
in 1952 Mora, in an interview with a visiting scholar, 
acknowledged that restrictions on Communists had eased 
and that he had been able to resume a number of his labor
2iL
activities since Ulate had taken office.
Formation of the National Liberation Party.
While Ulate's policies may have closed a number 
of political wounds, Jos£ Figueres and the former members 
of the Junta became disenchanted with Ulate as it became 
clear that ,while he would not dismantle existing programs, 
he was not going to proceed along the lines drawn by the 
Junta. The prerevolutionary Opposition forces had begun 
to drift apart soon after the revolution and, while Ulate 
and Figueres remained formally polite until their bitter
23 Ulate blamed liberacionistas for blocking the 
amnesty request. Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa 
Rica el SeKor Presidente Figueres? (San Jos§, Imprenta 
Universal, .1955^*30.
2^ Robert J, Alexander, Communism in Latin 
America (New Brunswicki Rutgers University Press, 1957)1 
390.
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split during Figueres' 1953-1958 administration, it was 
clear that they and their supporters were dividing into 
separate camps. After the Communists and calderonistas. 
Ulate's most severe critics were Figueres' supporters 
in the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the smallest and 
most reform-minded of the political groups which formed 
the prerevolutionary Opposition. The men of PSD gradually 
realized that Ulate intended to run the country pretty 
much in the way it had always been run, and that was not 
why they had gone to revolution.
This feeling was shared by Jos£ Figueres who, 
although not a member of PSD, held many similar views.
It was clear even before Ulate's inauguration that
25 Figueres joined the Social Democratic Party at 
the time of its formation in 19^5 but resigned a month 
later for reasons that were never entirely made clear,
Burt English says that irregularities later came to light 
in the Finance Department Figueres headed, but Figueres 
cited only "petty jealousies-'^  within the party leadership 
as his reason for resigning. Burt English, Liberaclfin 
Nacional in Costa Rica (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1971)', 37.
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p ^
Figueres planned to run for president in 1953» and 
Figueres needed a vehicle for his campaign* For both of 
these reasons, the National Liberation Party (PLN) was 
created.
Soon after Ulate assumed power, Figueres and 
his friends began holdings meetings which culminated in 
the official founding of PLN in 1951* On Columbus Day 
of that year, the party— in an unusual step for Costa 
Rica— issued a Fundamental Charter which stated its view 
of democracy and the role of the state. Concerned 
primarily with economics, the Charter envisioned a mixed 
economy which leaned toward socialism. The document
26 Because of the eight-year lapse required by 
the 1948 constitution Figueres would not normally have 
been eligible to stand for election in 1953* However, 
a special transitory article had been added to the 
constitution which exempted the Junta members from this 
eight-year requirement for the 1953 race only. The 
seriousness of Figueres* plans for 1953 may be indicated 
by the fact that he threatened to resign as President of 
the Junta when members' of the Constituent Assembly let it 
be known they were considering removing Figueres* special 
eligibility. Arturo Castro Esquivel, Jos5 Figueres Ferrer; 
El Hombre y su Qbra (San Jose: Imprenta Torino, 1955), 222; 
kubin-HernSndez Poveda-, Desde la barrai cfimo se discutiS 
v emitifl la constituciSn politica de 19^ *9 (San Jos5: 
Editorial Borrase,”1953)> 2 3 0. - Resignations and threats 
to resign were not foreign to Costa Rican politics, and 
often caused even opponents to rally around in.support.
For example, the members of the Junta, whose irregular 
status offended many Costa Ricans, three times threatened 
resignation and each time secured at least some face-saving 
concessions from their political opposition, rather than an 
acceptance of the resignations. See,in addition to Castro 
Esquivel, the New York Times. Oct.. 28-30, 194*9; and Junta 
Fundadora de la Segunda Repdblica, "Actas de las sesiones," 
entries for March 22, April 20 and April 21, 194*9.
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viewed Costa Rica's economic past as based on the 
profit motive and vowed to "complement and ennoble" this 
motive with "the spirit of service which gives impulse to 
an economy of abundance" and whose chief goal would be "the 
satisfaction of the needs of all."2'7 The charter assigned 
to the state the duty to help economically weak groups 
and said that the country's public administration and 
"the whole juridical order" should aim at the "constant 
realization of wellbeing" of the public.2®
In fulfillment of these goals, the charter recognized 
a role for private enterprise but said that "activities of 
public interest" should be carried out by autonomous 
institutes wherever a natural monopoly existed.2^
The leaders of Liberaci-6n viewed it as Costa Rica's 
first noncommunist ideological party which operated on a 
mass scale and a permanent basis. Emphasizing the 
ideological, nonpersonalistic nature of the party, PLN 
leaders describe the charter as having been drawn up and 
the party formed in a series of meetings held during 1950 and 
1951 at the fincas of JosS Figueres and Francisco Orlich;
27 Partido LiberaciCn Nacional, "Carta Fundamental,
12 de octubre de 1951" (mimeographed pamphlet, no date), 3 . 4. 
The Carta was updated,somewhat in 1 9 6 9.
28 Ibid'. . 5.
29 Ibid.
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and they point out the contributions made by men other
than Figueres,-^0 Benjamin Mftez, the Junta's labor
and social welfare minister, is credited with having
authored most of the social and Christian ideas in the
charter. Labor experts Alfonso Carro and Luis Alberto
Monge and former Junta ministers Daniel Oduber and
Gonzalo Facio are among the others said to have made
significant contributions. At least one student of the
party has agreed that PLN meets the requirements of a
modern political party as opposed to a coalition of men
brought together solely to support one man's political 
32career. He sees the party as having forced other Costa 
Rican political parties to adopt more structured, less 
personalistic approaches.
Is PLN really such a party? The ideas expressed 
in the- charter— particularly in the field of economics,
30 Much of the information given here on the 
formation of the National Liberation Party came from 
interviews in San JosS in the summer of 1-96? with PLN 
leaders. Particularly helpful in this regard were Daniel 
Oduber, Luis Alberto Monge, Jos§ Figueres, Uladislao GSmez, 
Benjamin Ndftez, Gonzalo Facio and Alfonso Carro. For a 
published account based largely on interviews with many
of the same people, see English, LiberaciCn Nacional. 
k-8-65.
31 Fr. MJiez says that the others later claimed he 
"slipped in a goal" ("met! un gol") by working so many of 
his ideas on Christianity and social questions into the 
Carta Fundamental. Ntttiez interview, San JosS, Aug. 11,
1967. , ,
32 English, Liberacifin Nacional. 146,
which was the charter's chief focus— are strikingly
similar to the personal views of Figueres as evidenced
hy his writings,^ PLN leaders, while agreeing that the
charter conforms largely to Figueres' views, see this as
due to a consensus of views rather than Figueres' 
rih,
imposition.-^ This explanation seems plausible because ' 
many of the charter ideas had been expressed earlier in 
the literature of the Social Democratic Party with which 
most PLN leaders had been affiliated,. The question then 
arises i If the leaders of the movement of National 
Liberation wanted a permanent ideological party to 
embody their views, why did they have to create a new 
party when the Social Democratic Party already existed?
PSD had been founded in 1945, had long supported views 
similar to those expressed in the PLN charter and had 
courageously defended the Junta program in the 1949 
Constituent Assembly against a majority sentiment favoring 
a more moderate approach.
It is said that PSD's poor showing in the elections 
held during the Junta period demonstrated that it would 
not be a satisfactory base for a mass party.^ Thus, 
the PSD ideology and membership, roughly speaking, were
33 For a-brief assessment of Figueres* political 
thought, see Judy 0. Milner, "Political Thought of JosS 
Figueres," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XVII, No. 1 
(June 1973). 1-4.
34 . Interviews with Uladislao GSmez and Gonzalo 
Facio, Aug, 1 and 8 , 1967.
35 English, LiberaciCn Nacional, 48,
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transferred to PLN which, with the charismatic Figueres 
as the single new ingredient of significance, became a mass 
party. PSD died soon thereafter. One cannot help 
wondering whether PSD itself could not have made a similar 
transformation if Figueres had joined it and whether the 
new party was created, in part, to ensure Figueres1 
control over the party from its formation.
Certainly some of PLN's opponents scoff at the idea 
of the party1s ideological base and its supposed distinction 
from the other personalistic parties of Costa Rica.
Otilio Ulate was of the opinion that JosS Figueres 
"always was and still is the .iefe mgbcimo of National 
Liberation. Party activity has given some indication- 
that Figueres had a preponderant sway over the party and 
was reluctant to accept party decisions which conflicted 
with his views. Despite occasional intraparty squables, 
the party has never nominated a presidential candidate 
who did not meet with Figueres* approval, and in 1970 
Figueres threatened to form a separate party if PLN
37failed to nominate him for a third term as president.
Ulate*s PUN, on the other hand, went against Ulate*s 
wishes in backing Mario Echandi for president in 1970
36 Interview with Otilio Ulate, July 27, 1967,
37 English, Liberaci-Sn Nacional. 7^°
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and Ulate took no active part in the election but 
continued as head of the party.
In light of these facts, can it be said that 
PLN is really a permanently structured ideological party, 
transcending the ista parties generally characteristic of 
Costa Rica? As far as the party’s structure is concerned, 
the answer would seem to be a qualified "yes." More than 
any other mass national party in Costa Rican history—  
with the possible exception of the Communist party— PLN 
has attempted to maintain a permanent existence and to 
function between political campaigns. It has made a 
greater effort than any other party to set up offices, 
committees of supporters and contacts with the people 
in all regions of the country, rather than concentrating 
its efforts in San Jos§ or, at the most, in the Meseta 
Central, as others have done.
The party has been more structured than other 
parties. It draws up platforms for each political campaign 
and issues statements explaining party positions. That 
"party positions" are usually synonymous with "Figueres 
positions" does not detract altogether from PLN's 
contribution to the development of a more coherent 
political process in which voters face clearer choices 
on election day,
The question remains as to whether PLN's central
feature is its support for a set of political beliefs or
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its support for Figueres, Party activity indicates that,
in its early years, the party largely followed Figueres.
Criticism was voiced,dissident views on basic
ideological questions were expressed,^ but in the end,
the party as a whole came down on the side of Figueres in
major disputes.
Figueres* influence now seems to be waning, however,
Zl q
and his image tarnished somewhat. The incumbent President 
of Costa Rica, Daniel Oduber of PLN, and liberacionista 
congressmen declined in 1975 to support Figueres * proposal
38 In the wake of PLN's 1966 election defeat,
Luis Alberto Monge and others attempted— with some 
success— to wrest part of the party control from Figueres 
and his inner circle of friends during a 1967 party 
convention. Monge interview, Aug, 18, 1967. For a 
published account of events leading up to the convention, 
see Theodore S. Creedman, "The Crisis in Costa Rican 
Politics," South Eastern Latin Americanist, XI, No, k
(March 1967), 1-3.
39 For example, in 1967 a group of PLN leftists 
held a series of meetings in the home of Fr. Benjamin 
Nflftez and eventually issued a document calling for large- 
scale economic and social reforms in Costa Rica, The 
document, named the Patio de Agua after Nfiflez* home, did 
not meet with the approval of Figueres. Henry Wells,
Costa Ricai Election Factbook No. 2 SuTmlement {Washingtons 
Institute for Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1970), 
9, 18.
^0 It is widely assumed in Costa Rica that 
Figueres has been involved in questionable financial 
arrangements with fugitive American financier Robert Vesco, 
a relationship which will be briefly discussed in chapter 
7.
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for constitutional amendments which would have facilitated 
Figueres' plans to return to the presidency as head of
kl
an authoritarian government* The party’s 1978 
presidential candidate, furthermore, will be Luis 
Alberto Monge, leader of the "Young Turks," who while 
admiring Figueres personally, began about a decade ago to 
oppose Figueres' control of the party.
As Figueres' influence declines, it seems more 
clear that PLN meets the criteria established by one 
writer for a modern, meaningful political party: (1) the
party has a day-to-day existence, has basic units in 
various parts of the country and involves relatively 
large numbers of citizens in such a way as to permit
&L Figueres stated in 1975 that Costa Rica needed 
"important reforms to the state apparatus” which could 
best be carried out by a government which would rule 
through executive decrees for several months. The consti­
tution prohibited such a government and also prohibited 
Figueres from standing for re-election. (The 19^9 consti­
tution had originally allowed re-election of presidents 
after an eight-year lapse from the time they left office; 
in 1969 it was amended to prohibit all re-elections, 
current ex-presidents being allowed one more term-;- 
which Figueres had from 1970 to 197^*) Figueres proposed 
an amendment in 1975 which would have permitted his 
re-election and said that once in office he would propose 
other legislation enabling him to create the government 
he thought needed. Figueres' plans were thwarted by his 
own party. President Oduber and his cabinet issued a state­
ment opposing the amendment and liberacionista congressmen 
followed suit. See an Oct. 2 9 , 1975 ACAn report published 
in FBIS, Latin American Daily Re-port. Oct. 30, 1975; and an 
ACAN report of Nov. 21, 1975» published by FBIS on Nov. 2 5, 
1975.
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some input into decision-making on the part of the rank
and files (2) the party stands for a particular program
or ideology; and (3) the party usually will represent
well-defined interest groups within the community.
Several factors— among them, a scandal which
surfaced as recently as May, 197?— threaten the party's 
Il-\
future.  ^ However, if party leadership is indeed going 
to be more widespread, as now appears likely, and if the 
party continues to exist and adhere to its stated beliefs, 
then it seems reasonable to judge PLN as a qualified 
success in having broken away from Costa Rica's strong 
pattern of personalistic parties to offer the country a 
modern political party based more on loyalty to ideas 
than loyalty to men.
The Election of 1953 
The 1953 election gave Costa Rica's new political
^2 Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Politics 
and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), ^6-47. 
Alexander believes that PLN meets these criteria. Among 
other writers who have made a similar assessment of PLN 
or its predecessor, the Social Democratic Party, are 
Federico Gil, "Responsible Parties in Latin America," 
Journal of Politics. XV, No, 3 (Aug. 1953), 339; Kantor, 
Costa Rican Election of 1953. 4-1; and English, LiberaciSn 
Nacional. 1 4 6. ~
43 See chapter 7 ,
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party its first chance to prove itself. The election wa3 
an important one for several reasons. This was the first 
presidential, election since the revolution, which had cut 
short some political careers, launched others and caused 
major political realignments. Also, in accordance with 
the 1949 constitution, women were voting for the first 
time and Costa Rica had the largest number of registered 
voters in national history. This was also the first 
election since the promulgation of the new constitution 
which required impartiality on the part of the president 
and Costa Ricans were waiting to see whether that 
regulation would be followed. Finally, the most significant 
aspect of the election, although this was not generally 
recognized at the time, was the entrance of the National 
Liberation Party into Costa Rican politics.
In the usual Costa Rican tradition, campaigning 
began early— about January, 1952— despite Ulate's plea 
in May, 1951 that electoral activity be postponed for a year 
so that the government could continue its work without 
having to contend with political agitations.^ Chief 
candidates, other than Figueres, were Mario Echandi, Ulate's 
foreign minister who resigned his cabinet post to run on
44 El Diario, May 13$ 1951. After Ulate's remarks,
32 of the 45 congressional deputies voted to agree that no 
political activities would take place for a year, El Diario. 
May 1 6, 1951* However, political activities resumed early the 
next year and, in late January, 1952, Echandi resigned as 
foreign minister in order to begin his campaign, El Diario. 
Feb, 1, 1952*
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the PUN ticket and the Democratic Party candidate,
Fernando Castro Cervantes, a wealthy businessman who had
been one of the three chief candidates at the 1947 Opposition
convention which nominated Ulate as president. Echandi
eventually withdrew and gave his support to Castro so
that the two could present a united front against 
k <
Figueres. J
From the beginning, Figueres and the PLN dominated 
the campaign. Figueres was a tireless and effective 
campaigner and the PLN's superior organization and larger 
resources proved a great asset. For example, there were 
65 cantones— very roughly equivalent to counties— in the 
country, and PLN had 168 offices, or almost three for each 
can-tSn. Other parties did not significantly vary from 
the traditional pattern of concentrating their efforts 
in the chief towns of the Meseta Central, The Democratic 
Party had something of a nationwide organization but not a 
very effective one.
In addition, PLN was the only party to put forth a 
detailed party platform, one based largely on the goals 
outlined by the Junta and the PLN charter, Echandi also
45 December, 1952 it was announced that Castro 
and Echandi would join forces in an effort to defeat Figueres. 
After some maneuvering, Castro emerged as the presidential 
candidate for the newly-united forces. The two parties 
continued to offer competing slates of candidates for
other offices, El Diario. Dec. 25» 1952.
46 Kantor, Costa Rican Election of 1953. 39.
had a program, somewhat less detailed; "but the Democratic 
Party, in the old personalistic tradition, offered little 
more than its candidate. Despite the existence of a PLN 
program which could be attacked or defended, much of the 
contest centered around other issues. Castro reminded 
voters of Figueres' connections with the Caribbean Legion 
and warned that Costa Rica might be dragged into foreign 
conflicts. He also implied that Figueres had Communist 
leanings, to which PLN supporters responded by pointing 
to the fact that the Communists themselves were backing 
Castro. This was correct, because Mora— and CalderSn 
Guardia as well— cast their support to Fernando Castro 
in an effort to defeat the man who had launched the 1948
L'p
revolution. f The portrayal of the elderly Castro, a 
prominent figure in the prerevolutionary Opposition 
movement and sometime representative of the United Fruit 
Company, as a "caldero-comunista" then became a feature 
of the PLN campaign. Stressing Castro's connection with 
CalderSn, full-page advertisements in El Diario de Costa 
Rica showed pictures of soldiers and strife during the 
CalderSn days and said:
47 Calderon's Independent National Republican 
Party ran candidates for congress, but both Mora and 
Calderon backed Castro in the presidential race. Alexander, 
Communism, 390. Calderon was still in self-imposed exile 
but directed his party from abroad.
Do you remember?
The Castroites want Costa Rica to return to the
days of C alder 6n.' ^
Don't permit it, citizen.' They are the same.
The campaign was clouded by several bizarre
incidents. In one of these, a small party called the
Revolutionary Civic Union (UCR) complained in September,
1952 that two of its members had been beaten by Civil
Guardsmen after they had a fracas with a colonel. Ulate
ordered the Guard to investigate when he heard of the
incident, but UCR asked that congress open its own
investigation. In a surprise move, congress voted to
initiate such an investigation without waiting for the
completion of the military report. Ulate then announced
thatr he regarded the congressional action as an insult,
and he resigned the Presidency of Costa Rica, saying he
would not resume office until congress reported that he
9
was cleared of all charges. Ulate’s resignation, as he 
probably anticipated, brought a groundswell of support for 
him. Congress declared that Ulate had proceeded with 
"absolute correctness" in the matter and asked him "in the 
most respectful but the most vehement fashion" to resume 
office.^ Ulate then returned to his post and proceeded to 
fire culpable military officials.
4-8 El Diario, Feb. 15, 1953.
4-9 For an account of the major events of the 
episode, see El Diario of Sept, 26 , 27 and 30 and Oct. 1.
7, 8, l4 and T9,”I93"2.
50 Ibid.. Oct, 8, 1952.
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Since no wrongdoing on his part had ever been 
suggested, some viewed Ulate's reaction as intemperate, 
one of wounded pride rather than reflection,^1 One 
member of his government, however, said that Ulate regarded 
the congressional action as an attempt to preempt executive 
prerogatives and was serious in saying he would not resume 
office unless congressional findings supported his 
position,
Ulate figured prominently in the campaign only in 
connection with a plebiscite to be voted concurrently 
with the election. In a move apparently designed to allow 
Ulate to stand for office at the end of the next term, 
Ulate's supporters secured congressional approval for 
a plebiscite which urged the next congress to amend the 
constitution to allow an ex-president to stand for re- 
election after only four years out of office instead of
51 Interview with Carlos Melendez, San JosS,
June 1, 197^.
52 Interview with Ema Gamboa, San Jos§, June 1,
197^* Ur. Gamboa, a prominent figure in the prerevolutionary 
Opposition activities, served in the Education Ministry 
during the Ulate administration and was briefly acting 
minister of education.
18?
the eight years required by the 19^9 constitution.-^
For different reasons, neither Ulate nor Figueres 
wanted to comment on the plebiscite. Ulate presumably 
favored it but he said nothing. Figueres opposed the 
plebiscite and, on at least one occasion, was reported 
to have spoken against it;-' but, mindful of Ulate1 s 
popularity at the time, Figueres generally remained silent, 
Ulate also maintained silence on another election 
matter which centered around charges brought by Echandi 
and Castro who claimed that the director of the Civil 
Registry and other Civil Registry officials were biased in 
favor of Figueres. ^  The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), 
which had authority over the Civil and Electoral Registries, 
investigated the matter and cleared the officials in
53 Despite a vigorous effort by PSD to defeat the 
measure, the 19^9-1953 congress had voted in favor of the 
amendment but the constitution required that, a second 
favorable vote be given by the next congress. El Diario, 
Mar. 27, 1953* The plebiscite was not binding on the new 
congress; it served only to express-the will of the people. 
The plebiscite was approved in the.general election but the 
incoming congress ignored the plebiscite and made no change 
in the constitution. An amendment in 19^9 prohibited any 
re-election, living ex-presidents at: that time being allowed 
one more term. . . - ■
5^ El Diario. March 6 , 1953.
55 El Diario devoted considerable attention to the 
matter. See the issues of Nov. 13, 18, 20 and 22; Dec. 2, 
k, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, and 23, 1952; Feb. 7, Mar. 4- and 5,
1953.
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question. Castro and Echandi, however, were never convinced, 
and it is possible that their concerns were justified. 
According to one account of what might be a related 
incident, another TSE investigation two years later 
revealed that several Civil Registry officials had accepted 
bribes from PLN supporters during the 1953 election,-^ 
Whatever the truth of the charges, it seems inconceivable 
that they could have determined the outcome of the 
presidential race.
It could be argued that Ulate should have personally 
seen to the investigation of the matter of the Civil 
Registry charges, but the constitution and electoral code 
required the president to remain neutral in the election 
and Ulate went to great lengths to avoid any appearance 
of "meddling” in the electoral process. Although it was 
assumed that he favored PUN candidate Echandi, the 
administration did not publicly back Echandi and the 
press was told that the government had no candidate,^
Echandi resigned from the cabinet as soon as his candidacy 
became clear, possibly because of Ulate's desire to avoid 
any appearance of the sort of "official" candidacies which 
he had denounced in the CalderSn years. Ulate went so far 
as to announce that any public employee who expressed his
56 John D. Martz, Central America t The Crisis and 
the Challenge (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina 
Press, 1959), 2
57 New York Times, March 19# 1952.
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personal support for a candidate would be instantly 
dismissed.
Given the constitutional provisions, Ulate’s 
actions were probably proper but they had the effect of 
placing government employees in an even stiffer straight 
jacket than that created by the U.S. Hatch Act. Not 
everyone agreed with the wisdom of the constitutional 
provisions. Jos5 Figueres, as president during the 
1957-58 campaign, took the position that the restrictions 
were outmoded and, in a March, 1957 radio speech, said 
he felt that he had a right to support the PLN ticket as 
long as he remained impartial with regards to the actual 
conduct of the election. However, the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal, acting on. a complaint brought by PLN’s 
opposition, ruled that Figueres had to abide by the legal 
provisions which prohibited a president from showing a 
preference for either party. In a second radio speech, 
Figueres accepted the Tribunal's verdict as binding on his 
activities but said that he was still of the opinion that 
the time had come to "abandon the myth of presidential 
neutrality, " ^ 0 No one would have been less inclined to 
agree with Figueres on this point than Ulate who, since
58 El Diario. March 19, 1952.
59 JosS Figueres, Los deberes de mi destino (San 
JosS* Imprenta Vargas, 1957)» 13-15» 21.
60 JosS Figueres, La imparcialidad del nresidentet 
(San Jos'S j Imprenta Nacional, '±95^ )> 3* 19. "
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the days of his opposition to CalderCn’s involvement
in political races, believed in the wisdom of limitations
on executive involvement.
In addition to maintaining an impartial role,
Ulate tried to prevent violence. After a fight between
political groups in Alajuela, he prohibited the carrying
of firearms until after the election, establishing a
61minimum six-months* jail sentence for violations.
Regulations governing mass meetings required that no two
parties could hold a rally in the same town on the same
day and also required that liquor stores and the offices
of opposing political parties be closed while a mass meeting
was underway. Police protection was provided and, in one
extreme case, police completely surrounded a meeting of
Communists in a park, thus allowing the Communists to
hold their public meeting without interference from hecklers
62outside the police cordon, In his last annual message
to congress, Ulate expressed his satisfaction with the
government's role in the conduct of the campaign:
,..this has been the first time in many years 
that, with scarcely three months le£t.-:before 
the election, of a president, no authority has 
fired a short at anyone, nor beaten, nor jailed, 
nor harrassed— in any form, not even by verbal 
explotion— any citizen, for political reasons . 
or any other reasons, in any part of the territory,
5l New York Times. Sep, 23, 1952.
62 Kantor, Costa Rican Election of 1953. 57*
63 Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie. 3 ,
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In-'bhe election, held in July, 1953 > pLN
won a landslide victory, receiving about two-thirds
of the vote in both the presidential and congressional 
64races. The plebiscite was also approved by a wide
margin but the incoming PLN-dominated congress exercised
its prerogative to ignore the plebiscite and the
constitution remained unchanged.
Most Costa Ricans regard 1948 as the great turning
point in their country's recent history, a date marking
their entrance into a new national era. Sociologist
Eugenio Rodriguez Vega’s statement typifies this view:
"When the first shot was fired in 1948, traditional
6 5Costa Rica was dead." J Yet in many ways 1953 spelled
the end of an era in Costa Rica more than 1948 had.
After the revolution of 1948, Figueres and his followers 
took power by force and enacted a program by fiat. Until
the people had a chance to speak, it was not clear whether
they would choose to continue along this path— so different 
from that taken by Costa Rica in the past— or whether the 
Junta period would remain as a high-water mark of radical 
reform and the country would return to its traditional 
ways. The two elections held during the Junta's term, in 
fact, seemed to indicate that the electorate had repudiated 
the Junta program— the party representing the Junta's views
§5 Eugenio Rodriguez Vega, Ammtes nara una 
sociologla costarricense (San JosS: Editorial Universitaria, 
1953)» 76.
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received only a small minority of the vote, while Ulate's 
National Union Party, representing traditional values, 
was overwhelmingly endorsed.
Four years after leaving office, however, Figueres 
and his colleagues were returned to power in a democratic 
election by a margin suffiently wide to indicate to■them 
that Costa Rica had voted a mandate for change, a green 
light for the continuation of the program begun under the 
Junta, In the interval between November, 19^9 and 
November 1953» Figueres and his political associates had 
developed a political party which claimed to offer the 
country a new program of development and a new concept of 
the role of the state. At the very least, the party had 
demonstrated that it offered a new style of politics and 
one which traditional forces had been unable to contain. 
Figueres' plans— both for his own career and for the 
country— had been clear from the moment he turned power 
over to Ulate, yet nothing had stopped him, Costa Rica's 
traditional system, acting through a popular president 
and a FUN-dominated congress had neither undone the Junta 
legislation nor developed a political force capable of 
meeting the challenge which Hgieres and the Junta had 
presented.
CHAPTER VII 
EPILOGUE
Neither Ulate's personal political strength 
nor that of his National Union Party— the only major 
party representing the values and goals of the traditional 
system— was ever as great after 1953 as it had been 
during Ulate's administration. The changes in the 
Costa Rican political system were not fully apparent, 
however, until the presidential race of 1962.
In the years between 1953 and 1962, Ulate led an 
active life. He resumed the publication of El. Diario, 
which continued to be a major interest all his life.^ " In 
the years before he became involved in politics, Ulate 
had regarded his watchdog role as a journalist as his
1 Although Ulate never lost interest in El Diario, 
he did not maintain control of the paper during all of the 
period after his presidency. The paper ran into financial 
difficulties and was sold to others. Ulate then repurchas­
ed the paper and resumed publication as soon as he could 
raise a sufficient amount of money. Ulate's friends and 
family believe that he was publisher of El Diario from the 
time he purchased it in about 1936 until his presidency.
He resumed publication of the paper after leaving office 
and seems to have had control of El Diario from about 19^9 
to 1963 and again from 196? to 19^9^ A number of his 
associates and other Costa Ricans have remarked on the 
difference between Ulate's orderly handling of public funds 
while he was president and his poor handling of his own 
business enterprises. Ulate apparently did well what he 
considered most important.
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chief contribution to the country and, he took up his role
again in his post-presidential years.
Freedom of the press was also one of the regional
issues which interested him, and Ulate was active in the
Inter-American Press Association, being elected Vice
2
Chairman in 1955* Although he had little interest in
the politics of foreign countries, Ulate was concerned
about regional cooperation efforts which were nonpolitical
in nature, and he contributed his support to a number of
Central American development projects. He was said to be
the prime mover behind a proposed Central American
Development Bank which the World Bank decided to back
in I960.'' in that same year, the Organization of Central
American States adopted the so-called Plan Ulate, a
proposal for a Central American Cattle Federation to
stimulate and improve livestock production in the 
4region.
However, as a leading Costa Rican said, Ulate was
2 New Xork Times, Nov. 6, 1955* Ulate, however, 
later had a disagreement with the Inter-American Press 
Association over the question of which countries should, be 
listed as lacking in a free press and he may have withdrawn 
his membership, at least temporarily. Ibid.. Apr. 2, 1957*
3 Hispanic American Report, XIII, No.7 (Sept. i9 6 0).
4 Ibid., XIII, No. 2 (Apr. i9 6 0).
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"a thoroughly political animal,"-* and Costa Rican 
politics remained his chief interest. He was the 
undisputed leader of the National Union Party until 
his death and, despite the party's declining strength, 
it played a significant role when it acted in concert 
with Calderon Guardia’s National Republican Party.
Only in the context of the shifting sands of 
Costa Rican politics can a union of PUN and PRN be 
understood. The two parties and their chiefs had been 
mortal enemies in 194-8 yet they gradually pulled together 
out of a desire to defeat FLN which emerged as Costa 
Rica’s major political force after 1953* In addition 
to the desire for power, Ulate had other reasons for 
wanting to defeat FIN. He had a bitter split with Jos& 
Figueres in 1955 during the invasion of Costa Rica from 
Nicaragua, the second such invasion precipitated by the
5 Interview with Alberto Mart£n, San Jos4, 
June 5, 1974.
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Figueres-Somoza dispute.^ Ulate furthermore disliked 
the very nature of FLN. As we have seen, he believed that 
parties claiming to be ideologically-based tended to be 
doctrinaire, intransigent and foreign to the give-and-take 
of Costa Rican politics. Although Costa Rica’s establish­
ment had once regarded Calderon's social reform as a threat, 
Calderon's political style did not vary greatly from that 
of Ulate. Both were personalistic leaders who made no 
attempt to transform their parties into modern mass parties 
of the FLN variety. In fact, it could be speculated that
6 In April, 1954, an attempt was made to assas­
sinate Anastasio Somoza and Somoza charged that the plot 
had been planned in Costa Rica. Costa Rica was slow to 
answer the charge and, in the opinion of John Martz,
"the attempted assassination of General Somoza, which 
quite rightfully enraged him, was clearly engineered . 
from Costa Rica...It is remotely possible that President 
Figueres did not know of the attempt personally, although 
this is quite unlikely. There is no question that members 
of his government and many high-ranking figueristas were 
well aware of the plot.”
Somoza responded by permitting CalderSn to use 
Nicaraguan soil to launch an invasion of Costa Rica in 
Jan., 1955* During the invasion, Figueres clamped 
censorship on the Costa Rican press and strongly criticized 
Ulate who had offered to mediate in the dispute and whose 
critical views of Figueres' support for Caribbean 
revolutionaries were well known. According to Ulate, 
Figueres in one radio speech, went so far as to denounce 
"cowards and traitors" in the Costa Rican press who he 
said had "syncronized" their verbal attack on the govern­
ment with the invasion. See John Martz, Central America: 
The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1959), 185-196, especially 191-192; 
Marvin Alisky, "The Mass Media in Central America," 
Journalism Quarterly. XXXII (Fall*1955), 481. For Ulate's 
views and a reprint of portions of Figueres1 radio speech, 
see Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde Leva a Costa Rica el Senor 
Presidente Jos§ Figueres? (San Jos4; Imprenta Universal: 
1955;, 9-10.
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Calderon's ouster in 19^8 was largely due to his failure 
to create such a powerful movement in support of his 
reform program.
PUN and FRN first hacked the same candidate in 
1958 when Calderon, who was still in self-imposed exile, 
gave informal support to PUN nominee Mario Echandi in
7
his successful hid for the presidency. Despite the 
combined efforts of PUN and PRN, Echandi probably could 
not have been elected but for a split in the PLN ranks.
A number of liberacionistas were dissatisfied with the 
choice of Francisco Orlich, Figueres' boyhood friend and 
Public Works Minister during the Junta and Figueres 
administrations, as the PLN presidential candidate.
Four of Figueres' cabinet ministers resigned after 
Figueres expressed open support for Orlich, an action
Q
which some regarded as- a violation of the constitution. 
Led by Jorge Rossi, they created the Independent
7 John Martz. "Costa Rican Electoral Trends, 
1953-1966," Western Political Science Quarterly. XX,
(Dec., 1 9 6 7), 891. During the same election, Ulate was 
elected to congress, but as we have seen, he took 
virtually no part in congressional activities.
8 Hisuanic American Report, X, No. 3 (April 1957)* 
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal later ruled that it was 
unconstitutional for Figueres to support a candidate.
See chapter 6 .
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Party and chose Rossi as their presidential candidate.
When the final vote was tallied, Echandi had won with 
102,8^1 votes, while Orlich received 94,783 and Rossi,
9
23»910. It is logical to suppose that most of the vote 
cast for Rossi, who soon rejoined PLN, would have 
otherwise gone to Orlich and made him the winner.
The election revealed several voting patterns which 
have, to a large extent, held in subsequent elections.^ 
First*despite the presence of several parties in the 
race, it was basically a two-party contest— one of PLN 
versus anti-PLN forces. Echandi’s victory was possible 
only because of the combined efforts of PUN and PRN.
The outcome of the election also demonstrated that PLN 
had a solid base of support in rural areas, while a 
significantly higher percentage of urban Costa Ricans, 
both wealthy and poor, rejected PLN. The coastal provinces 
of Limfin and Puntarenas, both of them heavily rural, were 
an exception to the pattern of rural identification with 
PLN. Banana workers in these regions, who had developed 
a loyalty to CalderSn and his PRN in the early 194-0’s,
9 Ibid.. XI, No. 2 (March 1958),
10 For discussions of voting patterns in Costa Rica 
since 1958* see Martz, "Electoral Trends, ' 1 69-79. Burt. H. 
English, Liberaci-Sn Nacional in Costa Rica (Gainesville 1 
University of Florida ^ ress), 92-117; Henry Wells, Costa 
Ricat Election Factbook Number 2, Sutyplement. February 1. 
1970 (Washington; institute for Comparative Study of 
Political Systems, 1970), Charles F, Denton, Patterns of 
Costa Rican Politics. Allyn and Bacon Series in Latin 
American Politics (Boston, 1971), 69-7 9.
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continued to be a source of support for PRN long after the 
revolution.
While PIN tended to win its support from poorer, 
less well-educated voters, the rural-urban split was 
probably a more definite pattern than the class division, 
as demonstrated by the relatively high percentage or 
urban poor who voted against FLN.^1 PLN's rural strength 
is explained by the fact that Costa Rica's traditional 
political system had largely ignored the countryside at 
election time and PLN, the "new" party, had capitalized, 
on this fact by bidding for and receiving the rural 
vote. In 1958 PLN, which conducted a generally more 
active campaign than did any other party, was the only 
party to devote a significant amount of attention to the 
countryside. PUN tended to confine its campaign efforts 
to the cities of the Meseta Central. This campaign 
pattern changed somewhat in later years as the lessons 
of the new political era sank: in on traditional political 
figures, forcing them to adopt some of PLN's high- 
profile campaign techniques in order to compete,
11 Denton believes that, due to the preponderant 
role of PLN in Costa Rican politics since 1953» PLN is 
identified as "the system." Urban poor, who have higher 
expectations than rural poor, tend to react to the system's 
failure to meet their demands by voting against PLN.
Denton, Patterns. 79.
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Ulate, however, was not fully aware of the extent 
to which the political scene had altered since the 194-0*s. 
He was held in high esteem "because of his honest, 
democratic government and he mistook this high personal 
regard for continued widespread political influence. Thus 
in 1962 as soon as he was eligible to stand for re-election, 
Ulate entered a three-way race for the presidency. His 
opponents were Orlich, who again received the PLN nod, 
and Calderon, who had returned to Costa Rica and was 
nominated by PRN. Ulate, whose political style had 
changed little over the years, offered no detailed program 
and made few campaign promises. He campaigned largely 
on his record as president, emphasizing the economic 
recovery of the period. Because of the antagonism between 
Calderfin forces and.those of Figueres' close friend, 
Francisco Orlich, Ulate also tried to present himself as
an alternative to the strife between the two groups which
he said would be renewed if either Calder-Sn or Orlich 
12were elected.
Ulate's lackluster campaign was a j&ilure, as shown 
by the vote. With the Ulate and Calder-Cn forces working 
against each other this time, Orlich won easily with 
50.3# of the vote, while CalderCn received 35»3f° and
12 New York Times. Feb, 4-, 19 6 2.
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Ulate trailed with a dismal 13.5%
Ulate was very disturbed by the size of his 
defeat. Criticism of his control was voiced within PUN 
after the election, and one group which tried to wrest 
power from Ulate was expelled from the party. A more 
important defection was that of Echandi who left the 
party to form his own Authentic Union Republican Party 
(PURA).1^ PURA generally shared PUN's position and 
sometimes operated in conjunction with PUN but at times 
took a separate course.
The outcome of the 1962 race made it clear that 
PUN— which in 1949 had won 33 of 45 congressional seats—  
would never again be a majority party. Ulate thus 
weighed the alternatives and decided to try to effect 
a more stable coalition with PRN. Ulate's concept of 
Costa Rican democracy as representative, rather than 
direct, made such an alliance acceptable. In Ulate's view, 
the important objective was to elect a good man who would 
then represent all Costa Ricans, regardless of party 
label. Party affiliations and structure were thus 
relatively unimportant to Ulate and he was willing to 
work out almost any sort of ad hoc arrangement needed.
13 Martz,"Electoral Trends," 891. A minor 
candidate received the remaining 1% of the vote.
14 Wells, "1970 Election," 23.
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Observers generally agree that Ulate was the
major force behind the creation of UnificaciSn Nacional
in 1 9 6 5 Unificaci5n was not originally designed to be
a new political party but only an agreement between PUN
and PRN to field common candidates for the 1966 election.
The initial statement announcing the formation of
Unificaci5n explained that "the coalition is temporary
with the object of winning the current political campaign.
In it each party will retain its own personnel and 
16organization." A statement of principles was drawn up 
which emphasized economic development and Costa Rica's 
determination to avoid interference in other nations' 
affairs and said that the organization's social policies 
would be guided, to a certain extent, by papal encyclicals. 
While thus endorsing CalderSn's views on social questions-- 
and Ulate's on other matters— the declaration said little 
about specific plans for further social reform, although
15 This was the opinion expressed by historian 
Carlos MelSndez, as well as PUN leader Jorge Yega and 
Ulate's sometime political associate Mario Echandi, in 
interviews in San Josl in June, 197^ •
Dr. Yega acted as Ulate's representative in meeting 
with Rafael Galder5n’s brother Francisco during the forma­
tion of Unificaci5n Nacional. For an interesting account 
of those events, see Dr. Vega's A la sombra del caduceo 
(San JosSj Imprenta Lehmann, 1972), 95-110.
16 Vega, A la sombra, 9 8 .
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the statement did endorse "better paid and more productive
1 7
work. The social reform measures of the Calderfin years 
were, in any event, no longer a source of disagreement.
PLN had moved the center of controversy further to the 
left and Calderon's reforms began to seem moderate. They 
had become a Costa Rican tradition and one in which Ulate
had esqpressed pride, although seldom discussing their
. . 18 origin.
PRN held the upper hand in the negotiations to 
form the coalition because of its greater numerical 
strength. PUN's permanent followers were few in number.
At the time of its founding in_the early 19^0's, the 
party was known as a "partido del sof&»"'a jest to the 
effect that its members could sit on one sofa. 19 in later
years, of course, the party's numbers grew but, perhaps 
due to the highly personalistic nature of PUN, it never 
had a large permanent dependable folowing. In each
20election, PUN's vote came from widely varying elements
17 Statement of principles of UnificacitSn Nacional 
in Otilio Ulate Papers.
18 See, for example, Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan 
Marshall y nueva politica intemacional americana,"
AmSrica, LVI (Jan.-June, 1958), 9-10.
19 Interview with Carlos Mel-Sndez, June 5»
20 English, LiberaciSn Nacional, 11^.
20*1-
whose loyalty and support could not he guaranteed for 
the next election. Such a party was ■cypical of the 
Costa Rican political scene in the days before the 
revolution, hut it was increasingly out of step with the 
times in the post-revolutionary period. PLN, which 
more clearly represented the interests of certain groups 
in society, had a more stable support base. Even PRN 
could count on a large working class vote because of 
Calderon's association with social reform and the 
continuing loyalty of this group for him.
In choosing candidates for the 1966 election, PUN 
thus recognized PRN's greater strength in the coalition. 
Putting the best face on the situation, one PUN leader 
referred to UnificaciOn as a union of "cabeza y cuerpo—  
head and body." PUN was said to bring to the coalition
pi
the elite of Costa Rica and PRN, the masses. Because
cuerpo carried more weight than cabeza at the polls, it
was agreed that the presidential candidate for the
coalition would be a calderonista. the first vice
president an ulatista and the second vice president a man
- 22chosen by general agreement.
The man eventually selected as presidential 
candidate— perhaps the only sort of person who could have
21 Vega interview.
22 Statement on the formation of UnificaciSn 
Nacional, May 2 0, 19&5* Otilio Ulate Papers,
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been chosen for such a union— was Jos€ Joaquin Trejos
FernSndez, an unknown mathematics professor whose
previous association with politics had gone no further
than his personal support for CalderCn.^ UnificaciSn,
however, managed to neutralize the disadvantage of
Trejos* total lack of experience by emphasizing a "clean
hands" theme during the campaign.
The PLN candidate, chosen only after Figueres
strongly indicated his personal preference, was Daniel
oh.
Oduber, from the PLN moderate left wing. At first,
23 The process by which Trejos was selected 
indicates the highly personalistic nature of UnificaciSn, 
Jorge Vega says that his wife suggested the name of 
Trejos one night after Ulate had rejected all of the 
calderonista candidates put forth by Francisco CalderCn. 
Vega acknowledges that Trejos was a political unknown 
and that he had some difficulty in persuading Ulate and 
Calderon to go along. Vega says that "the task of 
convincing don Otilio Ulate was not easy" but that 
Ulate finally agreed, sv/ayed in part by the fact that 
Trejos FernSndez was "the son of a great and loyal 
ulatista, don Juan Trejos, the guarantee of good 
quality."
Vega then went to confer with Francisco Calder6n 
and found .that "the surprise of Paco [Francisco CalderSn] 
was great. No one had thought of [Trejos] in any of the 
discussions," but CalderSn eventually agreed to accept 
Trejos. Vega, A la sombra. 102. Dr, Vega himself was 
chosen as UnificaciSn's candidate for first vice 
president.
Zhf Theodore Creedman, "The Crisis in Costa 
Rican Politics," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XI, No, 
h> (March 19&7) » 2.
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Oduber seemed to be a heavy favorite, but a number of 
factors— the most telling was possibly FLN's clumsy 
handling of UnificacLCn*s charge that Oduber had communist 
leanings— turned the tide in favor of Trejos.2  ^ The 
UnificaciSn candidate eked out a victory based on a 
margin of less than one percent between himself and 
Oduber.
The 1966 election was the last in which either 
Ulate or PUN played an active role. The "temporary"
■UnificaciSn continued to exist and some new small parties 
were brought into the coalition,, After much maneuvering, 
Mario Echandi emerged as Unificaci<6n*s presidential 
candidate in 1970, but Ulate refused to back Echandi,
25 PLN had been slow to respond to UnificaciCn 
charges against Oduber and also slow to repudiate the 
public support which communist leader Manuel Mora offered 
to Oduber late in the campaign, Jos£ Figueres later noted 
that "three kiss of death speeches" by Mora were a factor 
in the defeat of Oduber, Figueres, "Memorandum Provisional 
antes de que el Partido LiberaciCn Nacional haya tenido 
tiempo de analizar el proceso electoral que culminC el 6
de febrero de 1 9 6 6," Partido LiberaciCn Nacional Papers.
26 From all accounts, Ulate bore Echandi no ill 
will because of the separation of PURA from PUN but he 
resented Echandifs efforts to go over his head in gaining 
support of PUN leaders for the 1970 campaign, A sort of 
PUN "rump assembly" had endorsed Echandi in 1969 but Ulate, 
according to a San JosS Radio Reloj broadcast on April 17, 
1 9 6 9, dismissed the idea of PUNfs endorsing Echandi as 
"another of Mario Echandi*s pranks." The broadcast is 
published in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin 
American Daily Report, April 18, 1 9 6 9,
After failing at various attempts to find a compromise 
candidate, Ulate withdrew PUN from the coalition and 
even indicated that he would consider accepting a PUN 
nomination himself, although he was then quite elderly.^ 
Many individual PUN members, however, wanted to support 
Echandi who held political beliefs similar to theirs 
and who seemed to have a chance of winning. Thus it 
was decided that the party simply would not nominate 
anyone for president, leaving each member free to 
support whom he chose. With Ulate offering no support 
and with CalderCn ill and unable to campaign extensively, 
Echandi lost the election to JosS Figueres, who began 
serving his third presidential term in 1970.
Ulate continued to serve as president of PUN 
and in 1973 he made another attempt to unite the 
opposition in time for the 197^ elections. However, 
Calderdn Guardia had died soon after the 1970 election 
and a unified opposition could not be brought
27 La Prensa Libre. Aug. 20, 19^1, as published 
in FBIS, Latin American Daily Report. Sept. 12, 19^9.
28 Henry Wells, Election Factbook. 12.
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together.
While his political influence was declining,
Ulate continued to take his watchdog role seriously.
During his last year he was particularly concerned about 
the fugitive American financier Robert .Vesco, who came 
to Costa Rica during Jos£ Figueres' 1970-197^ term.
Ulate was deeply offended by Figueres' making Vesco 
welcome in Costa Rica while an SEC investigation of 
Vesco*s alleged fraudulent manipulations of mutual funds 
was underway in the United States. Vesco, who also 
had been indicted in the United States in connection with 
an illegal $200,000 cash contribution to Fresident Nixon’s 
campaign fund, soon invested heavily in Costa Rican 
enterprises, including several in which Figueres had an
29 Papers in his files indicate Ulate's attempts 
to reunite the opposition. See also a dispatch of the" 
Mexican news service INF0RMEX, July 25» 1973. reported in 
FBIS, Latin American^Dpilv Report. July 2 6 , 1973^
In February 1974, a few months after Ulate's 
death, Daniel Oduber, who had again been nominated by 
PLN, was elected president. His election marked the first 
time since 19^ that an incumbent party had not been 
turned out of office by the Costa Rican electorate. The 
reversal of Costa Rica's thirty year pattern of 
alternation in office suggests that PLN had greatly 
consolidated its power. With the longtime leaders of 
PUN and PRN, Ulate and CalderSn, no longer living, the 
future of the opposition movement seems in question.
30 See Christian Science Monitor. May 2k, 1973*
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interest, Figueres admitted to having financial 
transactions with Vesco and even to allowing Vesco money 
to pass through his personal New York bank accounts, but 
he denied that he had done anything illegal.-^2 A 
number of Figueres' closest associates put distance 
between themselves and the president on this matter.
Costa Rica's First Vice President Aguilar Bonilla, for 
example, released a statement expressing his "complete 
disagreement" with The president's relationship with 
Vesco,33
Ulate did not believe Figueres' protestations 
of innocence, but even if he had, Ulate would have 
disapproved of the association with Vesco because of his 
belief that the president should avoid even the appearance 
of questionable activities. During the spring and 
summer of 1973 Ulate's criticism mounted. In May he told
31 In 1972 Vesco invested two million dollars in 
a Costa Rican company controlled by Figueres, He later 
was reported by the New York Times. May 30, 1973* to 
have invested some millions in a company headed by 
Figueres' son, Newsweek reported on Dec. 30, 197^ that 
Vesco*s Costa Rican investments had grown to $^8 million. 
See also the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 197^.
32 Christian Science Monitor. May Zk, 1973.
33 Augilar Bonilla's statement was reported by 
the Spanish news service EFE on July 28, 1973 and 
published in FBIS, Latin American Daily Report. Aug. 2, 
1973.
210
a press conference that Vesco had left "our
sovereignty in tatters," and said that if he were
president, "Vesco would be deported immediately." At
the same time, he wrote President Nixon a letter asking
for all available U.S, documentation that might involve
Costa Rica in the Watergate scandal as a result of
Vesco's dealings. Then, m  July, denouncing the
Figueres-Vesco relationship in a radio speech, he
announced that he was "launching his last battle" against
Vesco's influence in Costa Rica,
Ulate was especially disturbed about Vesco's
influence in the Costa Rican media.Figueres was
planning to found a newspaper, Excelsior■ and it was
widely believed that the paper would be funded by Vesco,
37
although Figueres denied the rumor. Ulate thought that 
Excelsior would be accorded special privileges and, 
because of its strong financial position, might be able
3^ New York Times, May 2 6, 1973*
35 Text of Ulate radio speech, dated July S, 
1973* Otilio Ulate Papers.
36 Ibid. Newsweek reported on Dec. 30, 197^ 
that Vesco owned or controlled at least one Costa Rican 
television station and a number of radio stations.
37 La NaciCn. June 15» 19731 as published in 
FBIS, Latin American Daily Report, June 21, 1973*
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to drive other newspapers out of* business. He thus 
viewed the planned opening of Excelsior as tantamount to 
an attempt to create an official press. In his radio 
address Ulate cited evidence of Yesco's connection with 
the newspaper and reminded Costa Ricans of the importance 
of preserving an independent press.
During the last few months of his life, Ulate 
tried to gain an audience both in Costa Rica and in the 
United States to protest Vesco.*s presence, A considerable 
amount of criticism did eventually surface in Costa Rica, 
but the protests were largely unheeded while Figueres 
remained in office. The Costa Rican courts turned down
"30
a U,S, request for Vesco*s extradition in June 1973*
At the time of Ulate's death, on October 27» 1973,
38 In his radio speech Ulate made much of the 
fact that the director of the planned Figueres paper, 
Luis Burstln, had recently produced ten million colones 
for the enterprise, whereas shortly before that time 
Burstln had had to apply for a bank loan when he needed 
some three million colones to open a tortilla factory, 
Otilio Ulate Papers.
39 AFP, June 1 6 , 1973» published in FBIS, Latin 
American Daily Report. June 18, 1973*
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Vesco's position in Costa Rica seemed secure. ^ 0
Ulate's last years, after the disillusioning 
electoral defeat of 1 9 6 2, must have been rather sad ones. 
Just as his personal influence was ebbing, so the political 
system to which he was accustomed, and for which he was 
best suited, was also fading away.
40 Vesco is still in Costa Rica, but his tenure 
appears less secure since Figueres' term ended in 1974,
The so-called "Vesco Law"— a law passed during Figueres' 
administration which stipulated requirements making 
extradition more difficult- bas been repealed. Further­
more , a number of Figueres’ own party members have 
criticized Vesco's continued presence. These complaints 
within PLN became particularly pronounced in May, 1977 
after the publication in. the New'R'enubllc~"of ■ an interview 
with Jos£ Figueres in which he said that Vesco had 
contributed heavily to HLN presidential and congressional 
campaign chests diring the 1973-1974 campaign. Some 
embarrassed liberacionistas thought Figueres was trying 
to retaliate against members of his party who blocked his 
1975 bid for a fourth presidential term. President Oduber, 
under obvious pressure, later announced that Vesco had 
agreed to leave the country, but Vesco himself was reported 
to have denied making such an agreement. For extensive 
coverage of these developments— from a source generally
critical of Figueres' actions— see La, Republica, May 5»
1977 and subsequent issues.
CHAPTER VIII 
PERSPECTIVES
In his last annual address to congress, Ulate
summarized his administration's goals as having been
those of the Chinese proverbs ”to leave the saber rusty,
the plow well-cared for, the jail empty and the granary 
1full.” The pragmatic nature of the proverb was 
completely consonant with Ulate's approach to government, 
and there can be little doubt about his success in 
achieving these goals. He took office in a country with 
a faltering economy in which there was, according to 
historian Carlos MelSndez, considerable concern about the 
government's orientation on economic q u e s t i o n s A t  the 
end of his term, long-neglected debts, both foreign and 
domestic, had been attended to and the country's credit 
rating restored, thus making possible future borrowing 
for development projects. In addition, a serious foreign 
exchange shortage was eliminated and foreign exchange 
reserves accumulated. A decade-long tradition of
1 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del senor presidente 
constitucional de'la republics don Otilio Ulate presentado. 
a la asamblea legislativa el 1 de mayode 1953 (San Jos§» 
iraprenta Nacional, 1953)» 31«
2 Interview with Carles Melendez, June 1, 197^.
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imbalanced budgets was reversed and budget surpluses 
which accumulated were applied toward a large-scale plan 
of public works aimed at laying the basis for a prosperous 
society. Due both to good weather and government 
encouragement, Costa Rica's granaries were literally 
full. An. old custom of importing food crops at a high 
cost to consumers was ended and Costa Rica began exporting 
food crops, after satisfying all local demand. Ulate 
could not claim credit for the good harvests of coffee 
and bananas which occurred toward the end of his adminis­
tration, but he did put the increased revenue from the 
record crops to good use in the development program.
Acting largely on constitutional mandates, the 
administration also drafted laws which gave permanence 
to some of Ulate's programs, such as his reform of the 
national banking system, and which gave substance to the 
institutional reform begun under the Junta. The single 
large shortcoming of the Ulate administration may have 
been its failure to see that workers shared fully in the 
new prosperity. However, the social reform programs of 
the 1940's were maintained, and in many cases, were for 
the first time since their founding given sufficient funds 
to make them meaningful operations. More in line with 
Ulate's thinking, self-help programs of technical assist­
ance and small-scale construction projects were begun
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in order to assist rural communities and individual 
farmers.
Statistics on economic progress do not tell the 
whole story of Ulate’s administration because his greatest 
contribution was one of restoring Costa Ricans' faith 
in their government. More than any other president in 
the past decade * and probably more than any other in the 
country's history, Ulate abided by constitutional norms 
guaranteeing civil liberties, effective suffrage and 
freedom from executive abuse. In this way, he did a great 
deal to heal the wounds and calm the fears of the 1940*s. 
Applying the same principles toward foreign policy, he 
improved relations with Costa Rica's closest Central 
American neighbor and left the country in peace at the 
end of his term.
Most historians, like contemporary journalists, 
have been more attracted to the drama of the revolutionary 
period than to the quiet progress of the Ulate adminis­
tration. Consequently little attention has been devoted 
to the Ulate years. John Martz, who believes that 
’probably no Costa Rican president in recent years has made 
such a valuable contribution,” is one of the few who has 
given Ulate his due.-* Costa Ricans in Ulate's day seemed
3 John Marts,. Central America; The Crisis and the 
Challenge (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1959), 235.
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to agree with this assessment, if one judges by the heavy 
endorsement given him in the plebiscite of 1953» which was 
generally regarded at the time as a vote of confidence 
in the Ulate administration. It should be noted in 
this context that such a vote of approval at the end of 
a Costa Rican administration is rare. The Costa Rican 
electorate has shown a strong tendency to turn against 
incumbent administrations at some point in their tenure.
Despite these facts, Ulate had continually 
declining political influence after 1953 and his party 
also fared poorly. By 1953 the political momentum of 
the country had passed from traditional forces to JoffS 
Figueres and his National Liberation Party. The 
plebiscite of that year seems, in retrospect, to have 
been a farewell tribute to an honorable man rather than 
a mandate for a continuation of his policies. In examining 
the reasons that the tide turned away from Ulate, it may 
be useful to consider his approach toward government 
and the reasons that this political philosophy faced 
difficulties after the 19^0's.
Most of Ulate’s political attitudes were those of 
a conservative: his distaste for abstract ideas and his 
reliance on historical experience; his ’’organic" view of 
society and abhorrence of the atomistic concept of 
society as divided into hostile interest groups; his
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aristocratic preference for indirect democracy in which 
the "best men" govern not to serve their own interests 
but those of the public.
Ulate was deeply committed to free suffrage but he 
felt it no threat to the established order, because 
he shared Jefferson's belief that a "natural aristocracy" 
of talent existed and that the electorate would freely 
turn to such leaders to govern the country. Ulate thus 
saw a fundamental harmony between different classes and 
interests in Costa Rica and believed that government should 
be a process of conciliation and of moving toward goals on 
which there was a general consensus rather than a process 
of struggle of one group against another. Seeing no 
natural conflict between social groups, he rejected 
ideological parties representing the interests of different 
groups as unnecessary and harmfulj Costa Rica needed only 
to choose a good man who would accept the responsibility 
of governing in the name of all the people.
Ulate thought Costa Rican history bore out his view 
of Costa Rican society. At least since 1889 the country 
had been governed along the lines he favored and, in his 
opinion, had developed into "a rural democracy which would
h.
have warmed the heart of Thomas Jefferson." He thought
if- Ulate was fond of quoting this description of 
Costa Rica given by two American writers. See Ulate,
19 52 Mensa.ie and Lawrence and Sylvia Martin, "Four 
Strong Men and a President,” Harper's, CLXXV, (Sent. 19^2), 
425.
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Costa Rica sc far superior to its neighbors, for example, 
that he publicly stated in 1951 that his nation could not 
consider joining -a Central American federation until the 
other countries in the region had come somewhat closer to 
Costa Rica's level of achievement.^
In his belief in Costa Rica's democracy, 
tranquility and superiority, Ulate subscribed to a 
popular myth which was— and to a certain extent still is—  
widely held by Costa Ricans of all classes.0 Since a 
people's history is shaped not just by what has actually 
happened to them, but also by what they perceive themselves 
as having experienced, this myth has been a powerful 
motivating force in Costa Rica. It inspired a national 
pride in the country’s political system and institutions 
which protected these institutions and allowed the country 
to turn its attention from internal security and toward 
development. As Costa Rica, which had already begun the 
national period with certain advantages over its neighbors, 
developed a larger middle class, a higher literacy rate 
and level of education and a more stable and democratic
5 Thomas L.. Karnes, The Failure of Union; Central 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1961), 2^9.
6 "Myth” is used here in George Sorel's sense, 
as a set of ideas which may or may not be true but which 
forms the basis for belief and action. Joseph H. Hallowell, 
Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, I960), *!<60.
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form of government, the myth was reinforced. While this
view was thus beneficial for a time, it later appears
to have served as an excuse for inaction and a lessening
of progress. Some Costa Rican leaders recognized the
problem, at least to a certain extent. Ricardo JimSnez
said late in life:
I was under the impression that we conceived 
the civil ideal differently {'from the rest 
of Central America] and had a truer republic 
and a purer democracy. As time went on I 
have come to see that we have become more 
"Central Americanized »” putting ourselves 
in tune.7
Ulate, however, never entirely lost his idealistic 
view of Costa Rica. In a diary kept In his later years, 
he noted that Figueres and Vesco probably had guilty 
consciences because of what they were doing to "a
g
beautiful little rural democracy."
These political views held by Ulate were basically 
similar to those of the Generation of 1889 which provided 
such a rich vein of leadership for the country for half 
a century. The success of this generation had in turn 
rested on earlier experiences, particularly the isolation, 
generalized poverty and close racial and family ties 
which bound together the small Costa Rican population.
7 Jimenez cited in John and Mavis Biesans, Costa 
Rican Life (New York; Columbia University Press, 19/4.3+) 
225.
8 Otilio Ulate, Unpublished diary, Otilio Ulate
Papers.
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Given such a cohesive society, Costa Rica's traditional
political system, as evolved by the Generation of 1889t
could count on a fairly high level of agreement on basic
questions; political disputes thus tended to deal with
peripheral matters and did not challenge the core of the
social order. Costa Rica's was a conservative society,
and most political leaders had the same faith in
personalistic parties and politics which Ulate later
expressed. Indeed, these tendencies may be innate.
Although the word "conservative" is not popular in
modern Costa Rica, many of the country's leading thinkers
describe their society in terms of individualism, strong
loyalty to persons rather than institutions, and skepticism
toward bold action and Big Government— terms which imply
conservatism. For example, Rodrigo Facio, himself a
leader of the very liberal Partido Social Democrats, says
□
flatly: "The tico is personalistic. Professor Abelardo
Bonilla, more traditional in his thinking, draws similar
conclusions:
Does the Costa Rican...have a clear concept 
of the State? We think not...He doesn't 
think about the State which is an abstraction 
for him. He thinks about the Government and 
the people that are in it...but the concept
9 Rodrigo Facio, ”La constitucion politics de 19^9 
y la tendencia institucional,” Revista de la Universidad de 
Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 99.
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and -the doctrine about the State are 
limited to students and professional 
jurists and not to all the people, because 
a good part— reflecting the spirit of the 
people— flees as from.'the plague any 
doctrinaire speculation’and concerns himself 
only with the letter of the law, just as the 
voter concerns himself with the candidate and 
not his program.10
Perhaps the most vivid description of this 
conservative mentality is given by sociologist Eugenio 
Rodriguez Vega:
The Costa Rican is not audacious in his ideas, 
nor in his plans nor in his activities; he 
always thinks on a small scale and on a short­
term basis... the psychology of the pulperla 
characterises us. 1^ -
Jas§ Figueres, himself thoroughly committed to 
a modern political system, believes that Costa Rica's 
lack of ideological parties during the early part of the 
century was a sign of political immaturity and he has 
cited, almost with embarrassment, the fact that more
’backward" countries in Central America had Liberal
12and Conservative parties. Apologists for the personal 
istic system, by contrast, considered it one of Costa
10 Abelardo Bonilla, El costarricense y su 
actitud polltica,” Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica.
X (Nov. 195^),
11 The pulperla is a general store-soda fountain 
arrangement important in the social life of some communities. 
Eugenio Rodriguez Vega,. Apuntes para una ^ociologla
c ostarricense (San Jos§: Editorial Universitaria, 1953)» 61.
12 Interview with Jos§'Figueres, July 17, 1967*
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Rica's strengths. Professor Bonilla, for example, 
reflecting on someone's comment that Costa Rica’s esteemed 
Cleto Gonzalez Viquez would have been great if he had 
only had a political philosophy, noted that "the people 
would have thought it was precisely the lack of it that 
made him a model Costa Rican governor.
This traditional system operated on the premise 
that the political goals of most groups did not differ 
radically and that they could be met through the system.
In the 1930's this consensus began to break down for 
several reasons. The chief reason may have been that the 
Generation of 1889 seemed to have slacked its efforts 
toward continued social and economic progress, possibly 
because the leaders of this generation had become too 
complacent about Costa Rica, too convinced of the reality 
of the myth. Since Costa Rica's system of indirect demo­
cracy implied both deference on the part of the lower 
classes and duty on the part of the privileged elite, the 
failure of the elite to fulfill its end of the- bargain 
helped undercut faith in the system. Groups with a more 
skeptical view of society and of government, such as 
the Reform Party and the Communist Party, began to 
gain an audience. Unlike most earlier political parties 
and movements, these movements— particularly that
13 Bonilla, "Actitud politica," ^7 .
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of -the Communist Party— implied a lack of faith in the 
very nature of the system.
The most serious challenges— the ones the system 
finally could not accommodate, defeat or absorb— came 
in the 194-0' s. Even allowing for the fact that CalderSn 
Guardia's social reform program was less radical than it 
was perceived to be, he nevertheless represented the 
greatest threat to the political system of I889 since 
it had evolved. In the first place, Calder6n was not a 
voice crying in the wilderness, but the President of the 
Republic, and hence he had a much greater chance of 
actually putting his program into effect. Iin addition, 
Calderon's alliance with the Communist Party and his 
more-than-usually arbitrary means of dealing with 
political opponents alarmed many leaders of the traditional 
school, particularly those such as Ulate who were strong 
democrats. It is doubtful that Ulate and others would 
ever have launched a revolution against Calder&n but 
they acquiesced in JosS Figueres' ouster of him and, in 
so doing, they acknowledged the inability of their 
system to deal with CalderSn in less drastic ways and thus 
helped to undermine the system they believed in.. By 
permitting Jos§ Figueres to seize control of the govern­
ment, they cu-t short the first challenge but were then 
powerless to stop what proved to be an even more
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threatening— "because more successful— departure from
the traditional path.
Because he was accustomed to and "believed in a
political system in which basic values are taken for
granted, Ulate was not at home in a period of revolution;
Like most conservative leaders, Ulate was a actor, not
a theoretician, and his approach to government was the
pragmatic one of getting the job done. This approach
is most effective in a stable social order where great
change is seldom undertaken and such change as occurs
is based on a natural extension of existing laws and 
14customs.
Ulate's relatively tolerant attitude toward 
political opponents and his view of his duty as that of 
restoration of social harmony were thus a part of his 
effort to reconstruct a social order based not so much 
on the triumph of his policies over those.of some other 
group as on reconciliation of different views in such a
14 Ulate's approach to change is, in this, sense, 
reminiscent of that of Disraeli, who believed:
The great question is not whether you should resist 
change, which is inevitable, but whether that 
change whould be carried out in deference to the 
manners, the customs, the laws, the traditions of 
the people or in deference to abstract principle 
and arbitrary and general doctrines■*
Quoted in Peter Viereck, Conservatism from John Adams to 
Churchill (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), 43T
way that the most basic conflict never arose. Once the
basis of the political system was challenged, however,
Ulate's position became difficult to maintain. Henry
Kissinger has observed the dilemma of a conservative in
a period of great changei
It is the task of the conservative not to 
defeat but to forestall revolutions...a society 
which cannot •prevent a revolution, the 
disintegration of whose values has been 
demonstrated by the fact of revolution, will 
not be able to defeat it by conservative
means.15
Nothing has been so indicative of the end of the 
conservative era of consensus in Costa Rica as the 
success of the National Liberation Party founded during 
Ulate's administration. The party and the political 
beliefs of its leaders are the antithesis of the 
traditional order. The party leaders express faith in 
government of institutions, not men; they are proud of 
their party's ideological base; they sponsor controversial 
programs which are known to divide the country in sharp 
debate; and they emphasize a high profile role for the 
government in many spheres.
PLN's success within Costa Rica's Conservative 
milieu can be explained several ways. In the first place-
15 Henry Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemmaj 
Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich,” 
American Political Science Review (Dec. 195*01 156.
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and this is probably the most important factor——the .party
simply has a much more effective organization and a much
more thorough method of campaigning. Compared with the
efforts of other parties, PLN is a juggernaut at campaign
time, and JosS Figueres, in particular, has shown a
willingness to begin campaigning years before an election,
as he did in 1953 and 1970. Furthermore, the party
claims to have tapped new sources of political support, to
be offering Costa Rican peasants and workers a more
1 ^
direct participation in the democratic process.
PLN has also drawn support from another source—  
members of the country’s elite who have gravitated to 
PLN as it became clear that this new political force 
would be the dominant one in Costa Rica. The President 
of the PUN-dominated legislature during Ulate’s adminis­
tration, himself a PUN member who later joined PLN, noted 
that, "at the beginning of Ulate's term, most of us were 
ulatistas but many of us have since joined LiberaciSn.»^7
16 If any social group has gained a greater voice 
in the modem political system, however, it appears to be 
not the working class, but certain members of the middle 
class, particularly those associated with the expanding 
bureaucracy. Charles Denton argues rather convincingly 
that with the new higher-profile role of the government 
the Costa Rican working class has been subjected to 
greater regulation but has had fewer of its demands met. 
See Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (New York: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1 9 7 1), 82.
17 Interview with Marcial Rodriguez Conejo,
July 15, 1967.
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Such defections have "been costly to PUN and the traditional 
order in terms of the leadership essential to the function­
ing of its personalistic system. Furthermore, there are 
indications that the younger generation of Costa Ricans 
are accepting PLN as the majority party in even greater 
numbers than their parents. Asked to list the political 
party with which they most closely identified, upper class 
schoolboys in San JosS, many of whose parents were sup­
porters of PUN, listed PLN twice as often as any other 
18party. While allowing for the fact that youth tends 
to be more liberal than the older generation in most 
societies, the survey still indicated the likelihood 
of growing strength for PLN.
One observer has noted that Costa Rican society 
has changed little and that PLN, like the other parties, 
draws its leaders from the very small prestige class.^ 
Leaders of most political movements, whatever their 
nature, are probably drawn from, elites, but this does not 
negate the important differences between movements. There 
seems to be more substance to the observation that Costa 
Rica has not undergone radical changes under PLN's
18 Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the^Establishment: 
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicagoi Rand 
McNally,“1966), 51.
19 Denton, Patterns, 105■
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direction. This may be, as one writer indicates, because
PLN leaders have lost some of their seal, have become too
20rich and out of touch with the country. Another 
explanation is that Costa Rica's usually conservative 
society, even if it chooses to be led by a liberal party, 
acts as an inhibiting influence on bold action.
Despite these facts, however, PLN is a new force 
in Costa Rica, offering both a program and a concept of 
government and society different from that of the 
traditional system, which it has now largely supplanted. 
Costa Rica in recent decades has shown a tendency toward 
alternation in power, and it is quite possible that this 
pattern may reassert itselfj but even so, a viable alterna­
tive to PLN is more likely to develop from a PLN split or 
from a strengthening of what remains.of the UnificaciSh 
Nacional than from a revival of PUN or some other 
traditional party. Sometime between 19^ and 1953* Costa 
Rica turned away from its traditional system and Otilio 
Ulate, one of the last and best representatives of that 
system, was unable to restore it to the position of 
unquestioned supremacy it held during the Generation of 
1889.
20 Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Political 
Parties (New Yorki Praeger, 1973)» 2 3 2.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sines a complete listing of all studies relevant to 
this topic would include most of the works on Costa Rican 
social and political history, this ‘bibliography makes no 
pretension to comprehensive coverage. Standard secondary 
works on Latin American politics or on conservative 
political thought, even when cited in the text, have not 
"been listed, with the exception of a few which contain 
particularly valuable background material. By the same 
token, writings by Jos€ Figueres or those about Figueres or 
the Junta period have been included only if they have a 
particular relevance to this study. A more complete listing 
on the Junta is found in the M.A. thesis of this writer.
The most important sources for this study fall into 
four categories* newspapers, personal interviews, materials 
in private collections and government documents. Articles 
from newspapers have not been listed individually in the 
bibliography; rather, one inclusive listing for each paper 
has been given. In the same fashion, items from private 
collections are not listed separately in the bibliography, . 
although they have been .cited individually in the text.
229
230
I. Private Collections
ptilio Ulate Papers, A collection of correspondence!
I. official statements, unfinished writings and
proclamations relating to Ulate and to the Partido 
Unidn Nacional, 19^8-1 9 7 3. In the possession of 
the Ulate family, San Jos§.
Homenaje a Otilio Ulate. A tape-recorded collection of 
Ulate statements on various political issues as 
well as rerainiscenses by Ulate's friends and 
political associates. Prepared in 1973 and 197^.
In the possession of the Ulate family, San JosS.
Junta Fundadora de la Segunda Repfiblica. "Actas de las 
sesiones." Transcript of the minutes of the 
meetings of the 19^8-19^9 Governing Junta, 2 vols.
In the possession of Lie. Daniel Oduber, San JosS.
Papers of the Partido Liberaclfin Nacional, Copies of the 
correspondence, public statements and unpublished 
writings of Jos€ Figueres and of the PLN, 19^8-1 9 6 7. 
Office of the president of the PLN, San JosS..
II, Public Documents
Calderon Guardia, Rafael Angel, Mensa.ie del presidente de 
la rep&blica Doctor don Rafael A. CalderOn Guardia 
al uoder legislative introduciendo el provecto de 
reforma a la carta magna, oara establecer el 
capitulo de garanfrlas sociales. San JosSi 
Imprenta Nacional, 19^ 2.
Costa Rica, Colecci^n de leves. decretos. acuerdos v
resoluciones. Primer Semestre de 19^8, Segundo 
Semestre de 19^8, Same for all volumes through 
Segundo Semestre de 1953* 12 vols. San Jos^ j
Imprenta Nacional, 19^8-1954.
__________. Informe de la labor realizada nor la oficina
del oresu-puesto durante el aflo 1953. San JosSi 
Imprenta Nacional, 1955.
__________, Informe de labores de la a-samblea legislativa .
del 8 de noviembre de 19^9 al 30 de octubre de 1953. 
San Jos-6: Imprenta Nacional, 195^
 ___. Asamblea. Nacional Constituyente de 19^9*
Actas, 3 vols. San Jos6t Imprenta Nacional, 1953.
231
Banco Central. Primera memoria anual. afio 1950.
San JosS: Imprenta Tormo, 1951- One volume for
each year through 1953 (Segunda memoria for 1951* 
etc.)
Direcci-Cn General de Estadlstica y Censos.
Areas demogrSficas de Costa Rica. San JosS: 
Ministerio de Economla y Hacienda, 1959*
Censo de poblacifin de Costa Rica.
11 de mayo de 1927. San JosSt Ministerio de 
Economia y Hacienda, i9 6 0.
_________ , __________ . Censo de uoblacifrn de Costa Rica,
22 de mavo de 1950. San JosS: Ministerio <Ie
Ecaftomia y Hacienda, 1953*
Figueres, JosS. Estos diez aflos:- Discurso pronunciado nor 
el geflor Bresidente de la reufiblica. don Jos6 
Figueres. 29 de enero de 1956. SanJcsS: fmnrenta
Organisation of American States. Inter-American Statistical 
Institute. America en. cifras 1963. Ill, IV, 2 vols. 
Washington: OAS, 1964.
Secretarla Permanente del Tratado General de IntegraciSn 
Centroamericana, Tercer gonrpendio e'stadistico 
c entroamericano. 1963 .
Ulate, Otilio. Mensa.ie del sefior oresidente constitucional 
de la reoGblica don Otilio Ulate pres'gntado a la 
asamblea legislativa el 1° de mavo de 1950. San 
Jos£; Imprenta Nacional, 19507 One volume for each 
year through 1953 (Mensa.ie.. .1951, etc.).
United Nations. Yearbook on Human Rights for 1950. New 
York, 1952. Same for all volumes through 1953*
4 vols.
, Economic Commission for Latin America. Los 
recursos humanos de CentroamSrica, FanamS. y Mexico 
en 1950-1930: New York, I960.-
U.S. Department of Labor.' Labor Law and Practice in Costa 
Rica. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
' 1962.
232
U.S. Embassy, San JosS. "Annual Economic Report for 1949," 
unpublished report prepared April 17, 1950. One 
report for each year through 1953 ("Annual Economic 
Report for 1950," etc.).
III. Newspapers and Magazines
Christian Science Monitor. May, 1973.
The Department of State Bulletin, the Official Weekly Record 
of United States Foreign Policy. November, 1949- 
December, 1953 and July, 196l-June, 19&2.
El Diario de Costa Rica. (San Jos£). 1948-1953*
La Gaceta. (San JosS), May-June, 1948.
Hispanic American Report.. 194-9-1964.
La Hora. (San Jos£). May, 1950.
Latin American Daily Report. Foreign...Broadcast Information 
Service. 1969-1977.
La Nacign. (San Jos6). February, 1951 and June-August,
1967.
Newsweek. December 30, 1974.
New York Times. 1947-1977.
La Prensa Libre. (San Jos§). January, 1949.
La RepUblica. (San JosS). September, 197^-July, 1977.
Surco, monthly publication of the Centro para el Estudio de.
Problemas Nacionales. (San JosS)« May-June, 1944.
Time. January 23. 1950.
The Times of London. 1948-1953.
Times of the Americas. 1969-1 9 7 1,
Wall Street Journal. November 27, 1972 and November 12, 1974.
IV. Interviews
Gonzalo Facio Segreda. August 8, 1 9 6 7.
233
JosS Fernfindez. Several interviews, June-July, 1 9 6 7.
JosS Figueres Ferrer. July 13, August 17 and 18, 196 7,
Eraa Gamboa. June 1, 197^*
Uladislao GSmez Solano. August 1 , 19&7.
Mario Echandi JimSnez. June 6 , 197^.
Fernando Lara Bustamente. June 9, 197^.
Alberto MartSn Chavarria. August 9 and 13* 1967* and 
June 8 , 197^*
Carlos Mel-Sndez. June 1, 197^.
Luis Alberto Monge, August 18, 19&7*
Benjamin N-tiRez Vargas. August 11 and 1 6 , 1 9 6 7.
Daniel Oduber QuirtSs. August 7 , 10, 21, 23 and 2^ , 19^7.
Carmen Figueres de Orlich. August 23, 1 9 6 7,
Francisco J. Orlich. August 1 6, 1 9 6 7,
Marcial Rodriguez Conejo, July 15, 19&7.
Julio Suftol. June 5* 197^-
Olga Marta Ulate. Several interviews, May-June, 197^. 
Otilio Ulate Blanco. July 27 and 2 8 , 19&7*
Jorge Vega Rodr-lguez. June 5, 197^.
V . Books and Pamphlets
Albertazzi Avendafto, Jose, La tragedia de Costa Rica. 
MSxicoi privately printed, 1951.
Alexander, Robert J. Communism in Latin America. New 
Brunswick j Rutger^ University Press, 1957•
_. Latin American Political Parties. New York:
Praeger, 1973.
_. Latin-American Politics and Government. New
York: Harper and' Row, I9 6 5.
23^
Ameringer, Charles D, The Democratic Left in Exile.
Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 197^.
Bell, John Patrick. Crisis in Costa Rica; The 19^8
Revolution. University of Texas Latin American 
Monographs No. 2^ . Austin, 1971.
Biesanz, John and Mavis.-. Costa Rican Life. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19^.
Blubs tei-n, Howard I. et. al. Area Handbook for Costa Rica.
Washington:' U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970,
Burr, Robert (ed.). The Dynamics of World Power: A
Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy. 
19^-5-197 3 7 III j New York: ' Chelsea House, 1973»
Busey, James L. Notes on Costa Rican Democracy. University 
of Colorado Series m  Political Science No. 2. 
Boulder, 1962,
CalderCn Guardia, Rafael Angel. El gobemante v el hombre 
frente al problems social costarricense. San JosS: 
privately printed, 19^2.
Caflas, Alberto F. Los 8 afios. San JosS; Editorial 
Liberaci-Sn Nacional, 1955.
Castro Esquivel, Arturo. JosS Figueres Ferrer: el hombre
v su obra. San Jos6: Imprenta Tormo, 1955.
Dennett, Raymond and Durant, Katherine D. (eds.). Documents 
on American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1953.
Denton, Charles F. Patterns of Costa Rican Politics. Allyn 
and Bacon Series in Latin American Politics. Boston, 
• 1971.
Echandi JimSnez, Mario. Los hombres ndblicos frente a los 
dineros ndblicos. San Jos€t Imprenta Nacional,
19^ 27
English, Burt H. LiberaciSn Nacional in Costa Rica.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971.
Estrada Molina, Ligia. Teodoro Picado Michalskv: Su
anorte a la historiografia. San Jos§: Imprenta
Nacional, 1967«
FemSndez DurSn, Roberto. La huelga de brazos caidos.
San Jos$: Editorial Liberacion Nacional, 1953.
235
Fernandez Guardia, Ricardo. Cartilla histgrica de Costa 
Rica, San Jos§: Imprenta Lehmann, 1967.
_________ .(ed.). Costa Rica en el siglo XIX. San JosS:
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1970.
Figueres, JosS. Cartas a un ciudadano. San JosS: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1953*
. Los deberes de mi destino. San JosS: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1957-
i
__________. Doctrina social v .iomales crecientes. San
JosS: Imprenta Nacional, 19^9*
_________ . La imparcialidad del -presidente. San Jos§:
Imprenta Nacional, 1957-
. Palabras gastadas: democracia— socialising—  
liber tad. San Jos§ j Imprenta Nacional, 194-3.
__________. ForquS fueron nacionalizados los bancos
comerciales. San JosS: Imprenta Nacional, 19^3.
Garro, Joaquin. Las dScadas del siglo veinte y otros temas. 
San JosS: Imprenta Vargas, 19^6.
_________ , La derrota del Partido LiberaciSn Nacional.
San JosS; Imprenta Vargas, 1958.
__________. Veinte aflos de historia chica. San JosS:
Imprenta Vargas, 1967.
Goldrich, Daniel. Sons of the Establishment— Elite Youth 
in Panama and Costa Rica. Chicago: Rand McNally,
T&51T. ;
HemSndez Poveda, RuhSn. Desde la barrai Como se discutiS 
y emitifi la constituciOn politics de 1949. San 
JosS: Editorial Borrase, 1953.
Hughes, Steven W. and Mijeski, Kenneth J, Legislative- 
Executive Policy-Making: The Cases of Chile and
Costa Rica. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975-
James, Preston E. Latin America. New York: Odyssey Press,
1959.
Johnson, John J. Political Change in Latin America: The
Emergence of the Middle Sectors. Stanford: Stanford
University tress, 1953.
236
Jones, Chester Lloyd. Costa Rioa and Civilization in the
Caribbean. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1935.
Kalijarvi, Thorsten V. Central America: Land of Lords and
Lizards. New York: Van Nostrand, 1 9 6 2.
Kantor, Harry. The Costa Rican Election of 1953: A Case
Study. University of Florida Latin American 
Monographs No. 5. Gainesville, 1958.
Karnes, Thomas L. The Failure of Union: Central America,
182^-19^6. Tempet Arizona State University Center 
for Latin American Studies, 1976.
LeSn, Jorge. Nueva geografia de Costa Rica. San JosS: 
Libreria La Espaflola, 1952.
Loomis, Charles P. (ed.). Turrialba: Social Systems and
the Introduction of Change. Glencoe: Free Press,
1953.
Macaulay, Neill. The Sandino Affair. Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1 9 6 7.
Mander, John. The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of 
Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf7 19&9.
Martz, John D. Central America: The Crisis and the 
Challenge. " Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1959.
May, Stacy et. al. Costa Rica: A Study in Economic
Development. New York: The Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1952. .
Monge Alfaro, Carlos. Historia de Costa Rica. San JosS: 
Imprenta Trejos, 1959.
Munro, Dana. The Five Republics of Central America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1918.
Navarro, Bolandi, Hugo. La generaciSn del ^8: Juicio
histSrico-polltico sobre la democracia costarricense. 
MSxico: Ediciones Humanismo, 1957.
_________ . JosS Figueres en la evoluciofi de Costa Rica.
Mlxicot QuirSs, 1953.
Parker, Franklin D. The Central American Republics.
London: Oxford University Press, 196*+.
237
Partido LiberaciSn Nacional. "Carta fundamental, 12 de 
octubre de 1951«" mimeographed pamphlet, no date.
Dos mensa.ies: JosS Figueres Ferrer y
Daniel Oduber QuirCs. San JosS* Imprenta 
Vargas, 19^5 •
__________. Nuestro programs de traba.io. 1966-1970.
San JosSi Imprenta Borrase, 196o.
Peralta, HemSn G. Las constitucion.es de Costa Rica.
Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1962.
RodriguezMario. Central America. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1965•
Rodriguez Vega, Eugenio. Anuntes -para una sociologla 
costarricense. San JosS:Editorial Univer- 
sitaria, 1953*
Sancho, Mario. Costa Rica: Suiza Centroamericana. San
JosS: Imprenta La Tribuna, 1935*
Schmieder, Oscar. Geografla de America Latina. MSxico: 
Fondo de Cultura EconSmica, 1965.
Schneider, Ronald M. Communism in Guatemala. 1944-1954, 
University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy 
Research Institute Series, No. 7. New York: 
Praeger, 1959.
Stephens, John Lloyd. Incidents of Travel in Central 
America, Chiapas and Yucatan. I. . Toronto: 
Dover,-1969.
Stewart, Watt. Keith and Costa Rica: A Biographical
Study of Minor Cooper Keith. Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1964,
Ulate, Otilio. Hacia donde lleva a Costa Rica el Seflor 
Presidente Figueres? San JosS: Universal, 1955.
Vega Rodriguez, Jorge. A la sombra del caduceo. San 
JosS: Imprenta Lehmann, 1972.
Wells, Henry. Costa Rica: Election,Factbook Number 2,
Supplement. February 1. 1970.. Washington: 
Institute for Comparative Study of Political 
Systems, 1970.
238
West, Robert C. and John P. Augelli. Middle Americat 
Its Lands and Peeples. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1 9 6 6.
Wilgus, A. Curtis (ed„). The Caribbean: The Central
American Area* Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1 9 6 1,
__________(ed.), The Caribbean: Its Political Problems.
Gainesvill^l University of Florida Press, 1958.
Woodward, Ralph Lee. Central America: A Nation Divided.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Zeledfin, Marco Tulio. Historia constitucional de Costa 
Rica en el bienio 19^8-1949. San JosS: 
privately printed, 1 9 5 0.
VI. Articles
Alexander, Robert J, "The Latin American Anrista
Parties," The Political Quarterly, XX, 3 (July- 
September 19^9)7 23&-4-7V
Alisky, Marvin. "The Mass Media in Central America," 
Journalism Quarterly. XXXII (Fall. 1955) ^79-
Barahona, Luis. "Visifin interna del campesino costari-' 
cense," Revista de las Archivos Nacionales,
AKo X, Nos. 1 and 2 (January and February 19^6).
Bonilla, Abelardo. "El costarricense y su actitud
political Ensayo de interpretacifln del alma 
nacional," Revista de la Universidad de Costa 
Rica. X (November 195^). 33-50.
Busey, James L. "Foundations of Political Contrast: 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua," Western Political 
Quarterly. XI, 3. (September 1958), 627-59*
__________ . "The Presidents of Costa Rica," The
Americas. XVIII, 1 (July 1 9 6 1), 55-70*
Creedman,- Theodore S. "The Crisis in Costa Rican
Politics," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XI,
4 (March 19671, 1-3.
239
Facio, Rodrigo. "La constituciCn politics de 195-9 y la 
tendencia institucional," Revista de la 
Universidad de Costa Rica. XIII (July 1956), 97- 
113.
Figueres, JosS, "Problems of Democracy in Latin
America," Journal of In t e r n a t io n a l  A f f a i r s . IX 
(1955), 11-23.
_________ . "Unity and Culture," in Harold Eugene Davis
Ted.), Latin American Social Thought. 5-62-82. 
Washington! The University Press of Washington, 
D.C., 1 9 6 1.
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. "Executive Power in Central 
America," in Asher N. Christensen (ed.), The 
Evolution of Latin American Government. 5-02-5-15-. 
New York: Henry Holt, 1951*
Gardiner, C. Harvey. "Costa Ricas Mighty Midget," 
Current History. January i9 6 0, 8-13, 51-52.
Gil, Federico. "Responsible Parties in Latin America,"
Journal of Politics. XV, 3 (August 1953)» 333-5-8.
Gunther, John. "Costa Rica, a True Democracy," Current 
History, LII (December 195-0), 10-12,
GutiSrrez'Carranza, Claudio. "Ensayo sobre las
generaciones costarricenses, 1&23-1953," Revista 
de la. Universidad de Costa Rica. X (November 
■ 1954), 51-61.
JimSnez, Amoldo. "El rSgimen municipal," Revista de la 
Universidad de Costa Rica. XIII (July 1956), 
69-9 6.
Jimgnez, Manuel. "Coffee in Costa Rica," Bulletin of
the Pan American Union. LXXIX, 3 (February 195-5), 
88-89.
Jones, Clarence F. and.Paul C. Morrison. "Evolution of 
the Banana Industry of Costa Rica," Economic 
Geography. XXVIII, No.'1 (Jan. 1952), 2-3.
Kantor, Harry. "The Struggle for Democracy in Costa
Rica," South Atlantic Quarterly, LV, 1 (January 
■1956),’12-18.
240
Lefin, Jorge. "Land' Utilization in Costa Rica,"
Geographical Review.- XXXVIII, 3 (1948), 444-56.
Martin, Lawrence and Sylvia. "Four Strong Men and a 
President," Harper's. CLXXXV (September 1942), 
"418-28.
Martz, John D. "Costa Rican Electoral Trends, 1953-1966," 
Western Political Science Quarterly. XX 
(December 1967J, 866-909.
Milner, Judy Oliver. "Political Thought of JosS
Figueres," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XVII,
1 (June 197317 1-4. 1
Monge, Luis Alberto and Daniel Oduber. "Dictaduras,
imperialism© y democracia," Combate. II (March- 
April, I960), 12-20.
Murkland, Harry B. "Costa Rica: The Fortunate Society,"
Current History, XXII (March 1952), 141-44.
Picado Michalski, Teodoro. "The School and Democracy 
in Costa Rica," Bulletin of the Pan American 
Union (1935) . 30>09^ " ’
Thoming, Joseph F. "Costa Rica: A Rural Democracy,"
World Affairs. CVIII, 3 (September 1945), 171-80.
Ulate, Otilio. "Nuevo Plan Marshall y nueva politica
internacional americana," Am§rica.- LVI (January- 
June 1958), 6-12.
__________. "Responsible Freedom in the Americas: The
Individual and the State," Vital Speeches of the 
Dav. XXI (October 15, 1954— October 1, 1955)» 
959-71.
Valle, Rafael Heliodoro. "Hispanic American Journalism
in the Caribbean Area," in A.- Curtis Wilgus (ed.), 
The Caribbean: Contemporary Trends. 114-20.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953.
Waibel, Leo. "White'Settlement in Costa Rica,"
Geographical Review, XXXIX, 4 (October 1939), 
529-560.
Wells, Henry. "The 1970 Election in Costa Rica," World 
Affairs. CXXXIII, 1 (June 1970), 13-2?.
241
VII. Theses
Creedman, Theodore S. "The Political Development of
Costa Rica, 1936-1944* Politics af an Emerging 
Welfare State in a Patriarchical Society," 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Maryland, 1971*
Oliver (Milner), Judy. "Twelve Who Ruled in Costa Rica* 
The Junta of 1948-1949," unpublished M.A. thesis. 
Louisiana State University, 1968.
Stephenson, Paul G. "Costa Rican Government and 
-Politics," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
Emory University, 1 9 6 5.
Worthington, Wayne Lamond. "The Costa Rican Public 
Security Forces: A Model Armed Force for
Emerging Nations?," unpublished M.A. thesis. 
University of Florida, 1966.
VITA
Judy Oliver Milner was bom in Alabama on 
November 15, 19^2* She received a B.A. in history from 
the University of Alabama in 196*1- and an M.A. in Latin 
American Studies from Louisiana State University in 1968, 
She spent the year of 196*1- in Mexico City, working first 
as a student teacher at the Colegio Americano and then as 
a graduate student at the Universidad Nacional Autfinoma 
de MSxico. She spent the summer of 1967 in Costa Rica, 
doing thesis research on an LSU Field Research Fellowship 
and did further research in San JosS in 197^ • From 1970 
to 1973 she was Foreign Study Adviser and Assistant to 
the Dean for International Programs at the University of 
Alabama. Since 197^ she has worked in Washington as 
Latin American analyst for the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, and in this capacity she has 
traveled in Central and South America. She has 
published articles on Latin America in popular and 
professional journals.
2*1-2
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Candidate: 
Major Field: 
Title of Thesis:
Judy Oliver Milner 
History
OTILIO ULATE AND THE TRADITIONAL RESPONSE TO
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CHANGE IN COSTA RICA
Approved:
SbzMjz-
(J M ajor Professor and Chairman
f Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
<?. — -£2—
Date of Examination: 
June 29, 1977
